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Abstract
EQUIVOCATION was introduced by Shannon in the late 1940’s in seminal papersthat kick-started the whole field of information theory. Much ground has been
covered on equivocation’s counterpart, channel capacity and in particular, its bounds.
However, less work has been carried out on the evaluation of the equivocation of a
code transmitted across a channel.
The aim of the work covered in this thesis was to use a probabilistic approach to in-
vestigate and compare the equivocation of various codes across a range of channels.
The probability and entropy of each output, given each input, can be used to calculate
the equivocation. This gives a measure of the ambiguity and secrecy of a code when
transmitted across a channel. The calculations increase exponentially in magnitude as
both the message length and code length increase. In addition, the impact of factors
such as erasures and deletions also serve to significantly complicate the process.
In order to improve the calculation times offered by a conventional, linearly-programmed
approach, an alternative strategy involving parallel processing with a CUDA-enabled
(Compute Unified Device Architecture) graphical processor was employed. This en-
abled results to be obtained for codes of greater length than was possible with linear
programming. However, the practical implementation of a CUDA driven, parallel pro-
cessed solution gave rise to significant issues with both the software implementation
and subsequent platform stability.
By normalising equivocation results, it was possible to compare different codes under
different conditions, making it possible to identify and select codes that gave a marked
difference in the equivocation encountered by a legitimate receiver and an eavesdrop-
per.
The introduction of code expansion provided a novel method for enhancing equivoca-
tion differences still further. The work on parallel processing to calculate equivocation
and the use of code expansion was published in the following conference:
Schofield, M., Ahmed, M. & Tomlinson, M. (2015), Using parallel processing to
calculate and improve equivocation, in ’IEEE Conference Publications - IEEE
16th International Conference on Communication Technology’. In addition to the
novel use of a CUDA-enabled graphics process to calculated equivocation, equivo-
cation calculations were also performed for expanded versions of the codes. Code
expansion was shown to yield a dramatic increase in the achievable equivocation lev-
els.
Once methods had been developed with the Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC), they
were extended to include work with intentional erasures on the BSC, intentional dele-
tions on the BSC and work on the Binary Erasure Channel (BEC). The work on equiv-
ocation on the BSC with intentional erasures was published in:
Schofield, M. et al, (2016), Intentional erasures and equivocation on the binary
symmetric channel, in ’IEEE Conference Publications - International Computer
Symposium’, IEEE, pp 233-235. The work on the BEC produced a novel outcome
iii
due to the erasure correction process employed. As the probability of an erasure oc-
curring increases, the set of likely decoded outcomes diminishes. This directly impacts
the output entropy of the system by decreasing it, thereby also affecting the equivoca-
tion value of the system. This aspect was something that had not been encountered
previously.
The work also extended to the consideration of intentional deletions on the BSC and
the Binary Deletion Channel (BDC) itself. Although the methods used struggled to cope
with the additional complexity brought by deletions, the use of Varshamov-Tenengolts
codes on the BSC with intentional deletions showed that family of codes to be well-
suited to the channel arrangement as well as having the capability to be extended to
enable the correction of multiple deletions.
iv
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Contribution to Knowledge
The equivocation of a code gives a measure of the ambiguity and secrecy of a code
when transmitted across a channel.The work covered in this thesis took a probabilistic
approach to investigating and comparing the equivocation of various codes across a
range of channels. The work used novel approaches to perform the calculations and
generated some interesting results that enabled the direct comparison of a range of
different codes.
The key points of novel work and contributions to knowledge are summarised below:
• Equivocation calculations were performed on a general purpose computer but
used a CUDA-(Compute Unified Device Architecture) enabled graphics processor
to perform the calculations in parallel, providing sigificant calculation run-time
improvements over their linear counteparts (in some cases, up to 35 times faster).
• The calculations performed enabled a direct comparison of the equivocation lev-
els of a range of codes and, in particular, perfect and best known linear codes.
This permitted the identification of codes that give practical and useful outcomes
such as a large differential between a low equivocation level for a legitimate user
and a high equivocation level for an eavesdropper on a wiretap channel.
• The use of code expansion on a channel can dramatically increase the equiovca-
tion level of the code. Code choice and level of expansion can then be tailored to
increase the differential between the equivocation for the legitmate receiver and
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an eavesdropper. The novel work on parallel processing to calculate equivocation
and the use of code expansion was published by Schofield et al. (2015).
• The calculation methods used for the Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC) were ex-
tended to modifications of the BSC and to other channels. Channels investigated
included the BSC with intentional erasures (IE+BSC), the BSC with intentional
deletions (ID+BSC), Binary Erasure Channel (BEC) and Binary Deletion Chan-
nel (BDC). The work on parallel processing to calculate equivocation and the use
of code expansion was published by Schofield et al. (2016).
• The erasure correction method used on the BEC gave rise to an interesting sit-
uation where a diminishing set of output options triggered a decreasing output
entropy, something that had not been encountered previously.
• Varshamov-Tenengolts codes VTa(n) consist of all binary vectors (x1, ....,xn) satis-
fying ∑ni=1 ixi ≡ a(mod(n+1)). It was shown that for VT0(n) codes with n= 2m−1,
m ≥ 2, the code will have the same number of codewords as the Hamming(m,2)
code (where m = n− k), described by the properties Ham[2m− 1,2m−m− 1,3] or
Ham[n,k,3], i.e. |VT0(n)|= |Ham[n,k,3]|.
• The use of Varshamov-Tenengolts codes on the BSC with intentional deletions
showed that family of codes to be well-suited to the channel arrangement as
well as having the capability to be extended to enable the correction of multiple
deletions.
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1.2 Basic Principles
Information Theory is defined (Britannica.com 2017) as:
a mathematical representation of the conditions and parameters affecting
the transmission and processing of information
and covering applications including:
• Data compression
• Error-correcting and error-detecting codes
• Cryptology
• Linguistics
• Algorithmic information theory
• Physiology
• Physics
This thesis focuses primarily on understanding and developing an aspect of error-
correcting coding called equivocation, which gives a measure of the ambiguity of a
signal. By calculating the equivocation of different codes under varying channel ar-
rangements, it is possible to identify codes that provide greater levels of secrecy for the
users.
To communicate information from one location (the source) to another (the sink ), the
information can be transmitted via a channel to form a signalling system. If the in-
formation to be sent across the system must possess certain characteristics, such as
secrecy or an ability for errors to be detected or corrected, then it may be necessary to
encode the data prior to transmission and then decode it upon receipt. A typical sig-
nalling system can therefore be represented as shown in Figure 1.1 (Hamming 1980,
p. 4).
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Source Encode Channel Decode Sink
Noise
Figure 1.1: A Typical Signalling System
In practice, any channel used for transmitting the data is unlikely to be perfect and is
likely to introduce an element of noise to the transmitted data. The noise introduced to
the transmission channel can affect whether the encoded data is received correctly so
that it can be correctly decoded. Dependent on requirements for the data, the errors
introduced by a noisy channel may need to be either detected or corrected.
In this context, a code is a specified system of symbols that are purposefully used
to represent other symbols. In many systems, particularly those based on electronic
components with binary states, the simplest and most efficient choice of symbols is to
use the digits 0 and 1 to represent the data.
Many codes exist that enable the detection and correction of data, each with different
properties and characteristics. There are correspondingly many ways of comparing
the codes and their relative capabilities. Transmission channels can involve different
sources and types of noise that may introduce errors that are random, regular or that
come in bursts. Codes that work well in certain situations may be of little or no value
in others. For example, an error-correcting code that gives good results on the Binary
Symmetric Channel may be unable to correct deletions and therefore may be ineffec-
tive at dealing with deletions on the Binary Deletion Channel or on a modified Binary
Symmetric Channel with intentional deletions.
In Chapter 2 a range of different channels are introduced and discussed, including the
general Information Channel, the Binary Symmetric Channel, Binary Erasure Channel,
Binary Deletion Channel, Binary Symmetric Erasure Channel and the WireTap Chan-
nel. The equivocation of codes transmitted via the these channels and modifications
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of them are calculated in order to compare the levels of secrecy offered by different
codes. Equivocation and capacity are two closely related measures that are linked to
the amount of information contained by a code and its entropy. Considerable work has
been done to establish upper boundaries for the capacity of different channel arrage-
ments. For example, work on the capacity bound on the Binary Deletion Channel has
been completed by Dalai (2011), Mitzenmacher (2006), Kalai et al. (2010), Kanoria &
Montanari (2010), Kirsch & Drinea (2007), Fertonani & Duman (2010). However much
less work has been undertaken on the practical calculation of equivocation for different
codes with different channel arrangements. This thesis aims to address that issue.
Equivocation gives a measure of the level of ambiguity of a code across a channel
and hence its secrecy. By looking at equivocation levels for different error probabilities,
it is possible to compare the equivocation for a legitimate receiver with a lower error
probability against an illegitimate receiver with a higher error probability.
Calculation of equivocation is a numerically intensive process. To assist this process,
software was written to perform the many calculations in parallel, enabling a reduction
of time taken to perform the calculation. This was achieved by using the parallel pro-
cessing capabilities of a graphics card, specifically an Nvidia-made card that was built
around the Compute Unified Device Architecture (CUDA) (Nvidia 2015). This enables
use of the Graphical Processing Unit (GPU) for more general purpose uses. CUDA is
a parallel computing platform and programming model created by Nvidia. It is imple-
mented by computers with CUDA-capable Nvidia GPUs, with the main CPU acting as
the ‘host’ for the linear component of a program which then delegates responsibility for
running parallelised sections of code to the GPU ‘device’ (Sanders & Kandbrot 2011).
The task of efficient delegation and management of resources is largely done by the
CUDA architecture and programming model. Graphics cards have seen dramatic in-
creases in use across several fields, especially that of crypto-coin mining where recent
surges in have led to shortages, price spikes and even rationing of device sales (BBC
2018). Other parallel methods could have been used such as the use of multi-core
processors or the use of multiple, linked processors but CUDA was used as a novel
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method in this field.
The parallelisation of the calculation by using GPUs can deliver significant performance
benefits, either allowing equivocation values to be found more quickly or for longer
codes.
Once the equivocation values for different codes have been found and normalised, they
can be compared. This enables codes with higher levels of normalised equivocation to
be identified and improvements to existing codes to be implemented.
This thesis is presented in 8 chapters.
• The remainder of Chapter 1 is given to introducing a few necessary preliminaries
about fields and matrices. Whilst the use of tools such as elementary row oper-
ations may not necessarily be explicit or apparent in subsequent chapters, their
use is common within the software implementation. The information systems
discussed in this thesis will all be based on the transmission of binary symbols,
represented by 0 and 1. To effectively operate on pairs of binary symbols, a very
brief overview of the underlying algebraic structure of fields will be given. The
manipulation of multi-element, extended fields through the use of field polyno-
mials and matrices is also commonplace in this work. Examples of this include
tasks such as multiplying the binary elements of an k-bit message by a k×n gen-
erator matrix to produce a codeword or the multiplication of a codeword by the
transpose of a parity check matrix to produce a syndrome for the codeword.
• Chapter 2 looks briefly at some types of channel that were investigated during
the research for this thesis or that are expected to be of use in subsequent work.
• Chapter 3 looks at some codes and their properties, including the relationship
between codes and the geometries associated with sphere-packing.
• Chapter 4 develops the ideas behind equivocation, including information and en-
tropy.
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• Chapter 5 gives details of a novel approach involving the practical implementation
of a method to calculate equivocation using parallel processing. The new work in
Chapter 5 was published in Schofield et al. (2015).
• Chapter 6 extends the work in Chapter 5 to give a new examination of the equiv-
ocation of codes containing erasures on both the Binary Symmetric and Binary
Erasure Channels.The new work in Chapter 6 was published in Schofield et al.
(2016)
• Chapter 7 extends the work further to give a novel consideration of the equivoca-
tion of a Binary Symmetric Channel containing intentional deletions. A relation-
ship between the number of codewords in a Hamming code and a Varshamov-
Tenengolts code is established and Varshamov-Tenengolts codes are extended
to enable the correction of multiple deletions.
• Chapter 8 concludes the thesis, highlighting and suggesting some areas to in-
vestigate in future research.
1.3 Information Theoretic Secrecy
In his seminal paper, Shannon (1949) discusses three general types of secrecy system:
1. Concealment systems - the existence of the message is hidden from the eaves-
dropper
2. Privacy systems - special equipment is required to recover the message
3. Secrecy systems - the meaning of the message is concealed by cipher, code etc.
In a secrecy system, the existence of the message is not hidden and any eavesdropper
is assumed to have the equipment needed to intercept and record the transmitted
signal. This work in this thesis is based upon the use of codes both as a secrecy
system but also for the detection and correction of errors, erasures or deletions.
Shannon defined perfect secrecy as:
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requiring of a system that after a cryptogram is intercepted by the enemy,
the a posteriori probabilities of this cryptogram representing various mes-
sages be identically the same as the a priori probabilities of the same mes-
sages before the interception.
In other words, with perfect secrecy, the enemy or eavesdropper is no better off after
intercepting any amount of material than before. For example a one-time pad, where
each character of the message is paired using modular addition with a random secret
key that is shared by the sender and receiver. Even if part of the message was known
to be "attack at d - - -", it wouldn’t be possible to decode the final 3 characters unless
the key for each of the letters was known.The attack could be at any of dawn, dusk,
dark etc. The one-time pad also offers information theoretic security i.e. its robustness
comes purely from the principals of information theory and is unable to be broken even
with unlimited computing power.
1.4 Fields
1.4.1 Introduction
Whilst data may take many forms and may be represented by many different symbols,
this thesis deals solely with binary data, represented by the two symbols 0 and 1. To
operate with and manipulate binary data throughout this work, it is useful to touch very
briefly upon some of the theory of both algebraic number fields and matrices.
Fields are algebraic structures consisting of a set with two operations, usually called
addition (+) and multiplication (×, or omitted) that satisfy certain axioms (Hill 1986).
Subtraction is by adding with the additive inverse. The additive inverse of an element
a is another element b such that the direct sum a⊕b is zero. The multiplicative inverse
of an element a is another element b such that the tensor product a⊗b is one. Division
is by multiplying with the multiplicative inverse.
The finite field Fi has i elements 0,1, ...(i− 1) and is also called the ring of integers,
modulo i or the Galois Field of i, GF(i). The binary field GF(2) consisting of the two
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elements 0 and 1 is the smallest finite field. In GF(2), for addition, 0⊕0= 0, 0⊕1= 1,
1⊕0= 1 and 1⊕1= 0 and for multiplication, 0⊗0= 0, 0⊗1= 0, 1⊗0= 0 and 1⊗1= 1.
Galois Fields exist for prime numbers only and can be extended to powers of primes. A
primitive element in a base field is an element of the Galois Field whose powers result
in all the non-zero elements of the Galois Field. E.g. GF(5) has primitive elements 2
and 3 because:
20 = 1, 21 = 2, 22 = 4, 23 = 3 (and 24 = 1)
and
30 = 1, 31 = 3, 32 = 4, 33 = 2 (and 34 = 1)
But 4 is not a primitive element, since:
40 = 1,41 = 4,42 = 1,43 = 4,44 = 1
and therefore not all non-zero elements of the field have been generated. This is
supported by the modulo-5 multiplication and addition tables in Table 1.1 and Table 1.2.
× 0 1 2 3 4
0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 2 3 4
2 0 2 4 1 3
3 0 3 1 4 2
4 0 4 3 2 1
Table 1.1: Multiplication modulo 5
+ 0 1 2 3 4
0 0 1 2 3 4
1 1 2 3 4 0
2 2 3 4 0 1
3 3 4 0 1 2
4 4 0 1 2 3
Table 1.2: Addition modulo 5
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1.4.2 Extended Fields
Extended fields can be seen as a vector of a base field. E.g. GF(23) (which can also be
represented by the notation F32 ) is an extended field of GF(2) with elements {0, 0, 0},
{0, 0, 1}, {0, 1, 0}, {0, 1, 1}, {1, 0, 0}, {1, 0, 1}, {1, 1, 0} and {1, 1, 1}. The zero element
of the extended field is {0, 0, 0} and a primitive element is α. All other elements are
obtained from α.
1.4.3 Field Polynomials
A primitive element α in a GF(pq) Galois Field has the property that the polynomial
α pq−1−1= 0, where p is the number of elements in the base field and must be a
prime number and q is the number of elements in the vector of the extended field.
This polynomial will be zero if any of the factors in the equation are zero. Factorising
it should give factors that are both irreducible and primitive. For example (Sweeney
2002), in GF(23), i.e. when p= 2 and q= 3:
α2
3−1−1= α7−1= 0 (1.1)
but in modulo 2,
α7−1= (α+1)(α3+α+1)(α3+α2+1) (1.2)
therefore
(α+1)(α3+α+1)(α3+α2+1) = 0 (1.3)
and thus at least one of these factors in parentheses must also be equal to zero. So, if
α3+α+1= 0, then
=⇒ α3 =−α−1= α+1
=⇒ α4 = αα3 = α(α+1) = α2+α
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=⇒ α5 = αα4 = α(α2+α) = α3+α2 = α2+α+1
=⇒ α6 = αα5 = α(α2+α+1) = α3+α2+α = α+1+α2+α = α2+1
=⇒ α7 = αα6 = α(α2+1) = α3+α = α+1+α = 1
or α7−1= 0 as required
This enables all elements to be represented as polynomials, shown in Table 1.3. It also
confirms that α23−1−1= α7−1= 0.
Element Polynomial Vector Value
0 0 {0, 0, 0} 0
α0 x0 = 1 {0, 0, 1} 1
α1 x1 = x {0, 1, 0} 2
α2 x2 {1, 0, 0} 4
α3 x+1 {0, 1, 1} 3
α4 x2+ x {1, 1, 0} 6
α5 x2+ x+1 {1, 1, 1} 7
α6 x2+1 {1, 0, 1} 5
Table 1.3: Polynomials in GF(23)
1.5 Matrices
1.5.1 Matrices
The use of matrix multiplication is commonplace throughout this work. Messages and
codewords can be represented by 1×n matrices (row vectors of length n) and the full
set of codewords that comprise a linear code can be generated from messages by the
multiplication of the message by a k×n matrix called a generator matrix. Therefore the
ability to efficiently manipulate and, in particular, multiply matrices is a key capability in
this work.
An n by m matrix A is an ordered set of n×m elements in a rectangular array of n rows
and m columns:
A=

a11 · · · a1m
...
. . .
...
an1 · · · anm

11
1.5. MATRICES
1.5.2 Adding Matrices
To add two (n×m) matrices A and B, add corresponding elements of each matrix.

a11 · · · a1m
...
. . .
...
an1 · · · anm
+

b11 · · · b1m
...
. . .
...
bn1 · · · bnm
=

a11+b11 · · · a1m+b1m
...
. . .
...
an1+bn1 · · · anm+bnm

1.5.3 Multiplying Matrices
The product of an (n×m) matrix A and an (m× p) matrix B has order (n× p).

a11 · · · a1m
...
. . .
...
an1 · · · anm


b11 · · · b1p
...
. . .
...
bm1 · · · bmp
=

Σmi=1a1ibi1 · · · Σmi=1a1ibip
...
. . .
...
Σmi=1anibi1 · · · Σmi=1anibip

1.5.4 Matrix Metrics
A basis B of a vector space V over a field F is a linearly independent subset of V that
spans V ie the basis set of linearly independent vectors that, in a linear combination,
can represent every vector in a given vector space (Moon 2005). The row space of an
n×m matrix M is the set of all linear combinations of row vectors of M:
c1r1+ c2r2+ . . .
where ci are scalars and ri are row vectors of M. The row vectors form a subspace of
the vector space of m-tuples. The row rank is the dimension of the row space. For
example the row space of the binary matrix:

1 1 0 1
0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1

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includes the vectors:
(
1 1 0 1
)
,
(
0 1 1 0
)
,
(
0 0 0 1
)
,
(
1 0 1 1
)
,
(
1 1 0 0
)
and
(
0 1 1 1
)
. The column space is the set of all linear combinations of column
vectors of the matrix and the column rank is the dimension of the column space. The
matrix rank can be found from either the row rank or the column rank of the matrix.
1.5.5 Elementary Matrices
Elementary row operations for matrices include the:
• Interchange of any two rows
• Multiplication of any row by a non-zero field element
• Addition of any multiple of one row to another
A matrix is non-singular if all the rows of an n×m matrix are linearly independent.
An identity matrix, I consists of 1’s on the leading diagonal and 0’s elsewhere. e.g.
I4 =

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1

The transpose of an n×m matrix [ai j] is the m×n matrix [ai j]T = [a ji]
An elementary matrix is a matrix which differs from the identity matrix by one single ele-
mentary row operation. Left multiplication (pre-multiplication) by an elementary matrix
represents elementary row operations, while right multiplication (post-multiplication)
represents elementary column operations. The elementary matrix:
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
1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1

has interchanged rows 2 and 3 of the identity matrix, while

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1

has replaced row 3 with the sum of rows 3 and 4.
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Channels
Chapter 2 looks briefly at several different types of channel used within the thesis,
including:
• The Information Channel
• The Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC)
• The Binary Erasure Channel (BEC)
• The Binary Deletion Channel (BDC)
• The Binary Symmetric Erasure Channel (BSEC)
• The Wire-Tap Channel (WTC)
Building on the basic theoretical model of the Information Channel, the Binary Sym-
metric, Erasure and Deletion Channels each affect the transmission of binary data
differently. The BSEC is included for completeness in the chapter, but no equivocation
values were calculated for it. The addition of a wire-tap channel to each scenario en-
ables the comparison of the channel properties for a legitimate receiver on the main
channel and an illegitmate recipient listening via the compounded properties of the
main channel and the eavesdropper channel. The WTC is a cascaded channel, where
the legitimate receipient receives the data after the first cascade and an eavesdropper
receives it after the second cascade. In addition, several modifications to standard
channels are considered, in particular on the BSC which is considered with the com-
pounding factors of both intentional erasures in Chapter 6 and intentional deletions in
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Chapter 7. All the channels investigated are taken to be memoryless i.e. each symbol
is independent of what preceded it.
2.1 The Information Channel
The Information Channel represented in Figure 2.1 (Roman 1997) is a statistical model
of the medium through which the signal passes (or is stored).
X Y
x1
x2
...
xi
...
xq
P(y j|xi)
y1
y2
...
y j
...
ys
Figure 2.1: The Information Channel (Roman 1997)
A channel is described by a set of conditional probabilities (P(y j|xi)) (1≤ i≤ q, 1≤ j≤
s) which are the probabilities that an input xi from an alphabet of q letters will appear
as some output y j from an alphabet of s letters. q and s need not be the same. The
channel is completely described by the matrix, P of conditional probabilities:
P= (P(y j|xi))
P =

P(y1|x1) P(y2|x1) ... P(y j|x1) ... P(ys|x1)
P(y1|x2) P(y2|x2) ... P(y j|x2) ... P(ys|x2)
...
...
...
...
P(y1|xi) P(y2|xi) ... P(y j|xi) ... P(ys|xi)
...
...
...
...
P(y1|xq) P(y2|xq) ... P(y j|xq) ... P(ys|xq)

• The i’th row corresponds to the i’th input symbol, xi
• The j’th column corresponds to the j’th output symbol, y j
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• The sum of the elements in any row i (1≤ i≤ q) is always 1:
s
∑
j=1
P(y j|xi) = 1 (2.1)
For each input xi we are certain that something will come out.
• If P(xi) is the probability of the symbol input xi then:
q
∑
i=1
s
∑
j=1
P(y j|xi)P(xi) = 1 (2.2)
When something is put into the system, we are certain that something comes
out.
This supposes that the channel is stationary i.e. the probabilities do not change with
time and the errors that occur are independent of each other.
Conditional probability rules give us that either:
P(xi,y j) = P(xi)P(y j|xi) (2.3)
or
P(xi,y j) = P(y j)P(xi|y j) (2.4)
By Bayes’ Theorem,
P(xi|y j) = P(y j|xi)P(xi)P(y j) (2.5)
or
P(y j|xi) = P(xi|y j)P(y j)P(xi) (2.6)
P(y j|xi) are known as the forward conditional probabilities, since they start at the front
with the xi given and express the probabilities of occurrence of the y j. P(xi|y j) are
known as the backward conditional probabilities: given the output, what symbol caused
it?
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2.2 The Binary Symmetric Channel
The Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC) represented in Figure 2.2 (Hamming 1980,
p. 133) is an idealised channel that relies on the ‘cross-over’ probability pe of a different
symbol being received than was transmitted for either transmitted symbol. Messages
M are encoded as codewords X and transmitted across a noisy channel (Figure 2.3)
that has a cross-over probability of pe. The channel is described as symmetric because
the cross-over error probability is the same for each of the input symbols. Estimates Y
of the encoded message are received and decoded to estimates of the original mes-
sage, Mest .
1 1
0 0
1− pe
pe
pe
1− pe
X Y
Figure 2.2: The Binary Symmetric Channel
Alice
(encoder)
Bob
(decoder)
noisy
channel
M X Y Mest
Figure 2.3: Code Transmission Across a Noisy Channel
Considering the probabilities with which the input symbols are chosen,
P(X = 1) = 1−P(X = 0)
=⇒ P(Y = 0) = P(X = 0)(1− pe)+(1−P(X = 0))pe
and P(Y = 1) = P(X = 0)pe+(1−P(X = 0))(1− pe)
If input symbols are equally likely, P(X = 0) = P(X = 1) = 12
=⇒ P(Y = 0) = 12(1− pe)+(1− 12)pe = 12 − pe2 + pe2 = 12
and P(Y = 1) = pe2 +(1− 12)(1− pe) = pe2 + 12 − pe2 = 12
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i.e. If the input symbols are equally likely, then so too are the output symbols.
If there is no repetition and the order doesn’t matter, the number of r-combinations of
a set of n symbols in a codeword is denoted by the combinatorial coefficient
Cnr =
n!
(n− r)!r! =
n
r
 (2.7)
Using this, if the BSC is assumed and a particular binary code word is transmitted:
• The probability that no error will occur is (1− pe)n
• The probability that one error will occur in a specified position is pe(1− pe)n−1
• The probability of a particular received word that differs from the transmitted word
in i specified positions is pie(1− pe)n−i.
• The probability of exactly 1 error in any position is
n.pe(1− pe)n−1
• The probability of exactly 2 errors in arbitrary positions is:
n(n−1)
2
.(1− pe)n−2p2e
• The probability of exactly i errors in any positions is:
n
i
(1− pe)n−ipie
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2.3 The Binary Erasure Channel (BEC)
The Binary Erasure Channel (BEC) in Figure 2.4, adapted from (Moser & Chen 2012,
p. 135) where ps is the probability of an erasure occurring, is an idealised channel in
which data may be transmitted containing erasures. These are symbols that are known
to be erroneous in known locations and that are just in need of correction, making the
correction of erasures easier than the correction of errors.
1 1
0 0
1− ps
ps
ps
1− ps
X Y?
Figure 2.4: The Binary Erasure Channel
Again, considering the probabilities with which the input symbols are chosen,
P(X = 1) = 1−P(X = 0)
=⇒ P(Y = 0) = P(X = 0)(1− ps)
and P(Y =?) = P(X = 0)ps+P(X = 1)ps
= P(X = 0)ps+(1−P(X = 0))ps
= ps
and P(Y = 1) = P(X = 1)(1− ps)
If input symbols are equally likely, P(X = 0) = P(X = 1) = 12
=⇒ P(Y = 0) = 12(1− ps)
and P(Y =?) = ps
and P(Y = 1) = 12(1− ps) = P(Y = 0)
As for the BSC, the probability of exactly i erasures in any positions is:
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n
i
(1− ps)n−ipis
2.4 The Binary Deletion Channel (BDC)
In some respects, the Binary Deletion Channel (BDC) in Figure 2.5 is an extension
of the BEC. Erasures involve the value of bits being unknown but in known locations.
Deletions still involve bits of ambiguous value however the location of the missing bi-
nary digits (bits) is now also unknown. The BEC must consider the possible values of
an erased bit in a single position while the BDC must effectively consider the possible
values of an erased bit in every location. This brings an extra layer of complexity to the
problem and increases calculation times.
Source Encoder BDC Decoder
Figure 2.5: Code transmission across a Binary Deletion Channel
Referring to the BDC, Mitzenmacher (2009) notes that:
Currently, we have no closed-form expression for the capacity, nor do we
have an efficient algorithmic means to numerically compute this capacity.
If δ deletions of transmitted symbols xi ∈ X with deletion probability pd are introduced
then the positions of the received bits yi may differ from the transmitted positions, such
that {x0x1....xn−1} 7→ {y0y1....yn−δ−1}.
Ullman (1967) defines a deletion error at position j as an operator which takes the
vector x into the vector y, where yi = xi for i < j, yi = xi+1 for n > i > j and yn is either
fixed at 0 or fixed at 1. He pictures a deletion as causing a shift left of all the bits to its
right as in Figure 2.6.
The deletion of different bits may yield the same outcome. As an example, consider the
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x0x1x2...x j−1x j x j+1...xn−2xn−1
y0y1y2...y j−1y j+1...yn−2yn−1
Figure 2.6: The Binary Deletion Channel
8-bit codeword
(
11 02 03 14 05 16 17 18
)
being transmitted across the BDC
and a single deletion occurring. If the bit deleted was in position 6, 7 or 8, the outcome(
1 0 0 1 0 1 1
)
will be the same for each position. Similarly, a deleted bit in
position 2 or 3 both give the same outcome
(
1 0 1 0 1 1 1
)
. With n possible
deletion positions, the 7-bit word received could be any of those shown in Table 2.1.
The BDC itself is not directly studied here but Chapter 7 looks at the impact on equiv-
ocation of intentional deletions on the BSC.
Received word Probability(
1 0 0 1 0 1 1
)
3/8= 0.375(
1 0 0 1 1 1 1
)
1/8= 0.125(
1 0 0 0 1 1 1
)
1/8= 0.1255(
1 0 1 0 1 1 1
)
2/8= 0.25(
0 0 1 0 1 1 1
)
1/8= 0.125
Table 2.1: Received word options for a single deletion of transmitted codeword
10010111
2.5 The Binary Symmetric Erasure Channel (BSEC)
A further channel discussed by Michelson & Levesque (1985) but not examined in detail
here is the Binary Symmetric Erasure Channel (BSEC). This is a binary input, ternary
output channel that includes a symmetric cross-over probability of pe and a symmetric
erasure of probability ps from either input symbol to an output symbol whose state is
ambiguous. If the outputs are judged to be unreliable due to factors such as a weak
received signal, those outputs are erased as they leave the demodulator. This channel
model is depicted in Figure 2.7.
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1 1
0 0
1− pe− ps
ps
ps
1− pe− ps
pe
pe
X Y?
Figure 2.7: The Binary Symmetric Erasure Channel
Once more considering the probabilities with which the input symbols are chosen,
P(X = 1) = 1−P(X = 0)
=⇒ P(Y = 0) = P(X = 0)(1− pe− ps)+P(X = 1)pe
= P(X = 0)(1− pe− ps)+(1−P(X = 0))pe
and P(Y =?) = P(X = 0)ps+P(X = 1)ps
= P(X = 0)ps+(1−P(X = 0))ps
= ps
and P(Y = 1) = P(X = 0)pe+P(X = 1)(1− pe− ps)
= P(X = 0)pe+(1−P(X = 0))(1− pe− ps)
If input symbols are equally likely, P(X = 0) = P(X = 1) = 12
=⇒ P(Y = 0) = 12(1− pe− ps)+ 12 pe
= 12(1− ps)
and P(Y =?) = ps
and P(Y = 1) = 12 pe+
1
2(1− pe− ps)
= 12(1− ps) = P(Y = 0)
2.6 The Wire-Tap Channel (WTC)
Wyner (1975) introduced the concept of the “Wire-Tap Channel" shown in Figure 2.8.
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Source Main Channel
QM
Encoder Decoder
Wire-Tap Channel
QW
SK XN YN SK
ZN
Figure 2.8: Code Transmission Across a Noisy Channel
His results showed that one could obtain perfect secrecy as described in Section 1.3
when a receiver enjoys a better channel than the wire-tapping opponent does.
The source is identified by the sequence {Sk}∞1 where the Sk are independent, identi-
cally distributed random variables that take values in the finite set S. The Main Chan-
nel is a discrete memoryless channel with finite input alphabet X , finite output alpha-
bet Y and probability of a cross-over error, where 0 becomes 1 and vice versa, of
QM(y|x), x ∈ X , y ∈ Y . Since the channel is memoryless, the probability of a cross-over
error for N vectors is:
Q(N)M (y|x) =ΠNn=1QM(yn|xn) (2.8)
The Wire-Tap Channel is also a discrete memoryless channel with finite input alphabet
Y , finite output alphabet δ and probability of cross-over error QW (z|y), y ∈Y, z ∈ Z. The
cascade of the main channel and the wire-tap channel is another memoryless channel
with probability of cross-over error:
Q(N)MW (z|x) =Πy∈YQW (z|y)QM(y|x) (2.9)
So if the main channel has an error probability of 0.01 and the wire-tap channel had
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an error probability of 0.1, the legitimate receiver will receive correct symbols with an
average probability of 0.99, while the eavesdropper will only receive correct symbols
with an average probability of 0.99×0.9= 0.891.
There is a trade-off between the transmission rate R and the minimum number of bits
that differ between any two codewords of the code (the Hamming distance d), assum-
ing essentially perfect (‘error-free’) transmission. Wyner’s results implied that there
exists a channel secrecy capacity (discussed in Section 4.7), CS > 0, such that reliable
transmission at rates up to CS is possible in levels approaching perfect secrecy. How-
ever, we are less concerned here with the assumption of error-free transmission and
focus more on the comparison of equivocation values between the legitimate recipient
and the eavesdropper. Hence more emphasis is placed in the number of transmitted
bits and the length of code for which equivocation can be calculated using the methods
discussed than the rate at which the data is transmitted.
The concept of the Wire-Tap Channel will be used throughout this thesis to highlight the
difference in the equivocation levels for a legitimate recipient and for an eavesdropper.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter has introduced a few of the many theoretical models of channels for data
transmission. The simple BSC works on a cross-over error probability where the intro-
duction of an error results in a transmitted 0 being received as 1 and vice versa. The
BEC, with a given erasure probability, results in a bit of unknown value but in a known
position, while the BDC yields a bit of unknown value in an unknown location. The
BDC, about which relatively little is known, causes a substantial increase in the com-
plexity of finding a solution. As its name suggests, the BSEC is a hybrid of the BSC
and the BEC, however BSEC will not be examined in any further detail here. The WTC
extends each scenario to include differing channel conditions for each of a legitimate
recipient and an illegitimate eavesdropper.
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Chapter 3
Codes
3.1 Introduction
This chapter develops some of the concepts and tools that will either be used in subse-
quent chapters, in the calculation of code equivocation, or that contribute to the general
code picture. These include:
• Terminology
• Code distance and weight
• Classes and types of code including linear, error correcting, simple, dual, turbo,
interleaved, punctured, cyclic, best known linear, perfect, Hamming and Golay
codes
• Generator and parity check matrices
• Codes and their relationship to sphere packing problems
3.2 Coding Terminology
The terminology below will be used when referring to the characteristics of a code:
• q Number of distinct symbols employed on the channel
(e.g. for binary codes, q= 2)
• n Number of symbols in the codeword
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• k Number of symbols in the message.
Also known as the information dimension of the code C
• m Number of parity check symbols added to the message to give the code-
word (k+m= n)
• M Number of possible messages in a q-ary code of message length k
• b x c The floor of x. The largest integer less than or equal to x.
• d x e The ceiling of x. The smallest integer greater than or equal to x.
• Redundancy r is the proportion of a code that is sent in addition to the actual
message. r = n−kn =
m
n
• Code Rate R = k/n is the proportion of information in the transmitted codeword.
The fraction should be given in its simplest form. More generally, R =
1
n
log2M =
k
n
log2 q bits per symbol (where M = qk for a linear code)
• The Bit Error Rate (BER) is a measure of how badly a signal is affected by errors.
It is given by how many errors exist for a given number of bits transmitted.
Encoding is the process where the k message bits are converted to n bits of the code-
word (Hill 1986). Decoding is the reverse process, where the k bits of the message are
retrieved from the n bits of the codeword. A code is often described by parameters giv-
ing the number of symbols in the codeword and the number of symbols in the message
in the form [n,k]. For example, a [6,4] code is a code in which the process of encoding
adds 2 parity check bits to a 4-bit message, giving a 6-bit codeword.
Two q-ary codes are equivalent if one can be obtained from the other by means of:
• A permutation of the positions of the code or
• A permutation of the symbols appearing in one particular position.
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3.3 Linear Codes
All the codes studied will be drawn from the F2 Galois Field i.e. they will be binary
codes represented by the symbols 0 and 1.
Linear codes are codes for which any linear combination of codewords is also a code-
word (Ryan & Lin 2009). Linear codes can be defined with symbols chosen from a set
of arbitrary size, but most significant results have been derived from assuming that the
code symbols are elements of a finite field.
In general, if we let Fnq denote an n-dimensional vector space over a finite field of q
symbols Fq, for example:
[0,1,1,0, · · · ,0]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(n−elements)
then an [n,k,d]q linear code C is a k-dimensional subset of Fnq. The linear code C has
qk codewords. d is the minimum Hamming distance of the code. Each vector in the
k-dimensional subset of Fnq, which has a length of n symbols, is called a codeword.
For a code to be linear the following rule applies: If c1 and c2 are codewords and α1
and α2 are field elements, then c3 = α1c1+α2c2 is also a codeword.
e.g. If a code is binary and linear and c1 and c2 are codewords, where c1 = 0101,
c2 = 0011 then c3 = c1+ c2 = 0101+0011= 0110 is also a codeword.
Linear codes have several advantages over arbitrary codes: (Baylis 1998)
1. Evaluation of the distance of a code is easier
2. Encoding is fast and requires little storage
3. It is much easier to determine which errors are detectable / correctable
4. The probability of correct decoding is much easier to calculate
5. Very slick decoding techniques exist for linear codes
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3.4 Hamming Distance
The Hamming distance of two codewords is the number of positions in which two valid
codewords differ. The Hamming distance of a code is the minimum Hamming distance
between any two codewords. In Table 3.1, the minimum distance between any two
codewords (of the Hamming [7,4] code) is 3. That is, the Hamming distance of the
code is 3, so the code can be written as the Hamming [7,4,3] code.
Message Codeword
0000 0000000
0001 0001111
0010 0010110
0011 0011001
0100 0100101
0101 0101010
0110 0110011
0111 0111001
1000 1000011
1001 1001100
1010 1010101
1011 1011010
1100 1100110
1101 1101001
1110 1110000
1111 1111111
Table 3.1: Hamming [7,4,3] Code - Messages and their Codewords
If a code is used only for error detection, for the code to be able to detect all patterns
of t or fewer errors, it is necessary and sufficient to have t ≤ d−1 (or t < d), where d is
the minimum Hamming distance between codewords (Sweeney 2002, p.26).
It is possible to correct all patterns of e or fewer errors if and only if 2e+1≤ d.
In Figure 3.1, a filled circle represents a valid codeword and an empty circles repre-
sents an invalid codeword that contains at least one error. A code that has a Hamming
distance of 3 is able to detect 1 or 2 errors, but can only correct a single error by
choosing the closest valid codeword to the sequence received.
In Figure 3.2, a code that has a Hamming distance of 5 is able to detect up to 4 errors
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1 error corrected at most
number of errors
3 errors undetected 3 errors undetected 6 errors undetected
transmitted codeword
3 2 1 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 or 2 errors detected 1 or 2 errors detected 1 or 2 errors detected
Figure 3.1: Codes with Hamming distance=3
and correct up to 2.
2 errors corrected at most
up to 4 errors detected
Figure 3.2: Codes with Hamming distance=5
In Figure 3.3, a code that has a Hamming distance of 6 is able to detect up to 5 errors
and correct up to 2. A received sequence that is an equal distance of 3 from two valid
codewords could not be reliably corrected.
equidistant between two valid codewords
up to 5 errors detected
Figure 3.3: Codes with Hamming distance=6
The relative distance of a code C is a measure of the minimum distance of the code as
a fraction of the code length:
δ (C) = d/n (3.1)
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Code C′ can be said to be a better code than code C if δ (C′)≥ δ (C).
3.5 Weight
Let c∈Fn. Then the weight of c, denoted w(c), is the number of non-zero coordinates in
c. The weight of a code is the minimum weight of any of its codewords. By inspection
of Table 3.1, it can be seen that the minimum weight of any non-zero codeword of the
Hamming [7,4] code is 3 (e.g. 0010101 has a weight of 3). If C is a linear code then
d(C) = w(C). A constant weight code is one in which all codewords have equal weight.
The weight distribution of a code is the set of numbers {Ai(c)} where Ai(c) denote
the number of codewords at Hamming distance i from a codeword c ∈ C. A0(c) = 1,
Ai(c)≥ 0 and ΣiAi(c) =M. For Ham[7,4,3], the weight distribution is:
i 0 3 4 7
Ai 1 7 7 1
and ΣiAi = 16.
3.6 Error Correcting Codes
Codes that build in the ability to correct errors are known as forward error correction
codes.
When a two way channel is used, an error-detecting code can be used to initiate back-
ward error correction. When an error is detected at one terminal, a request for a repeat
transmission can be given, and thus errors can effectively be corrected. Error detection
is by its nature a much simpler task than error correction and requires much simpler
decoding equipment. Error detection with retransmission is adaptive, in that the trans-
mission of redundant information is increased when errors occur, limiting the efficiency
of a simple error detection system. This makes it possible to get a better performance
than is theoretically possible on a one-way channel. Whilst there are true examples
of one-way channels in which error probabilities can be reduced using error correcting
codes, this is not true for error detection and retransmission. Furthermore, systems
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can use a combination of error correction and detection with feedback.
3.7 The Error Correcting Code Problem
Three key aspects of general coding problems are:
1. Finding codes that have the required error correcting ability (this usually makes
them long)
2. Finding a practical method of encoding the messages
3. Finding a practical method of making the decision at the receiver i.e. a method
of error correction.
The Error-Correcting Code Problem can be stated (Conway & Sloane 1999) as:
Given a q-ary alphabet, a length n and a minimum distance d, find a code
with these parameters and the maximal possible number of codewords,
Aq(n,d)
e.g. If A2(5,3) = 4 then the maximal possible number of codewords in a (5,3) binary
code is 4.
Many upper and lower bounds have been found for A(n,d); a summary of these, col-
lated by Conway and Sloane, is shown in Table 3.2.
For example, for a code of length n= 10 with minimum distance 4, the maximal possi-
ble number of codewords is 40. It is worth noting that many code length and minimum
difference combinations exist for which the maximal number of codewords is only im-
precisely bounded, even for quite short length codes.
3.8 Dual Code (or orthogonal vector space)
• Given a linear codeC∈Fn, then the dual code ofC,C⊥= {v∈Fn|v.c= 0 for every c∈
C}
• IfC is a linear code in Fn with generator matrix G, then v∈C⊥ if and only if vG= 0.
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n d = 4 d = 6 d = 8 d = 10
6 4 2 1 1
7 8 2 1 1
8 16 2 2 1
9 20 4 2 1
10 40 6 2 2
11 72 12 2 2
12 144 24 4 2
13 256 32 4 2
14 512 64 8 2
15 1024 128 16 4
16 2048 256 32 4
17 2720-3276 256-340 36-37 6
18 5312-6552 512-680 64-72 10
19 10496-13104 1024-1288 128-144 20
20 20480-26208 2048-2372 256-279 40
21 36864-43690 2560-4096 512 42-48
22 73728-87380 4096-6942 1024 50-88
23 147456-173784 8192-13774 2048 76-150
24 294912-344636 16384-24106 4096 128-280
Table 3.2: Maximum Possible Number of Codewords for Codes of Length n (Conway
& Sloane 1999)
• dim(C) + dim(C⊥) = n. Thus if C is an [n,k] code then C⊥ is an [n,n− k] code.
• (C⊥)⊥ = C.
• A code is self-dual if C =C⊥
3.9 Simple codes
• The Zero code [n,0,n] of length n contains just the codeword 00....0.
• The Universe code [n,n,1] Fnq is the dual of the Zero code and will contain qn
codewords, with a minimum distance for the code of 1.
• Triplication codes - Every message is repeated 3 times and the receiver takes a
majority vote. The code only corrects single errors and is very inefficient.
• The Repetition code [n,1,n] contains all codewords, aa....a, a ∈ Fq.
• Rectangular codes - The information is arranged in an (m−1)×(n−1) rectangle.
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A parity bit is added to each row and to each column, making an m× n rect-
angle. Rectangular codes are also known as product codes. An example of a
rectangular code is shown in Table 3.3.
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
Table 3.3: A Rectangular Code with Word and Block Parity Check Bits
• The [n,n−1,2] zero-sum code contains all vectors such that Σci = 0. It is the dual
of the [n,1,n] repetition code. When q = 2 this is called the even weight code,
since it consists of all binary vectors containing an even number of 1’s.
For example, the [5,4,2] zero-sum code contains the codewords shown in Ta-
ble 3.4.
00000 00011 00101 00110
01001 01010 01100 10001
10010 10100 11000 01111
10111 11011 11101 11110
Table 3.4: Codewords for a [5,4,2] Zero-sum Code
3.10 Turbo Codes
Turbo codes are high-performing error correction codes that approach Shannon’s The-
orem for the Channel Capacity (Shannon 1949, p. 47) in Equation 3.2. This gives the
maximum rate at which information can be transmitted over a communication channel
given a specific noise level.
Ca = B log2(1+
S
N
) (3.2)
where Ca is the capacity of the channel in bits per second, B is the bandwidth of the
channel in Hertz, S is the average received signal power over the bandwidth (measured
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in Watts) and N is the average noise over the bandwidth (measured in Watts). Channel
capacity will be discussed further in Chapter 4.
Turbo codes are so named because, in a similar manner to mechanical turbos feeding
back power to the engine system, turbo codes work on an iterative process, feeding
back the decoded output as a joint input with the original data. This enables further
decoding and thereby reduces the number of errors with each iteration.
Turbo codes use extrinsic information in a recursive or iterative manner. This informa-
tion is shared between different component decoders. The decoder of the overall code
is computationally complex but the individual or component decoders are not. The
component decoding algorithms are exact, but the overall decoding method is approx-
imate.
3.11 Interleaving
Interleaving enables a burst of errors to be spread throughout the message by rear-
ranging the order in which the code digits are transmitted, which then allows single er-
rors to be corrected (two consecutive errors if they are in adjacent codewords). Spread-
ing out a burst of errors increases the likelihood of being able to correct the errors. The
process of interleaving/de-interleaving the information increases transmission delays
(latency), processing and storage.
3.12 Puncturing Codes
Let C be an [n,k,d] code over Fq. We can puncture C by deleting the same coordinate
i in each codeword (Jones & Jones 2002, p. 104). The resulting code is still linear;
its length is n− 1 and is often denoted by C∗. If G is a generator matrix for C, then a
generator matrix C∗ is obtained from G by deleting column i (and omitting a zero or
duplicate row that might occur).
If d > 1, C∗ is an [n−1,k,d∗] code where d∗ = d−1 if C∗ has a minimum weight code-
word with a non-zero i’th coordinate and d∗ = d otherwise. When d = 1, C∗ is an
[n−1,k,1] code if C has no codeword of weight 1 whose non-zero entry is in coordinate
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i; otherwise, if k > 1, C∗ is an [n−1,k−1,d∗] code with d∗ ≥ 1.
3.13 Cyclic Codes
A code is cyclic if whenever c0c1 · · ·cn−1 is a codeword, so is cn−1c0c1 · · ·cn−2 (Morelos-
Zaragoza 2002) i.e. A linear block code is cyclic if and only if every cyclic shift of a
codeword is another codeword.
To understand cyclic codes, it is best to represent the codewords as polynomials. Thus
a codewordC1= {c0,c1, · · · ,cn−1} can be represented by the polynomial c0α0,c1α1 · · ·cn−1αn−1.
Cyclic shifts then are a multiplication of a codeword with the variable α and the result of
the multiplication modulo αn−1. All the codewords can be obtained from one generator
polynomial g(α) as long as the information is also represented as a polynomial. Thus
encoding is done by polynomial multiplication or convolution using shift registers. The
degree of the information polynomial is k− 1 and the degree of the codeword is n− 1
which means that the degree of the generator must be n− k. Similarly the parity check
polynomial h(α) has the property that:
g(α)h(α) = αn−1 (3.3)
Consider length 7 binary cyclic codes. With binary codes, we have the following fac-
torisation into primitive (irreducible) polynomials:
α7+1= (α+1)(α3+α+1)(α3+α2+1) (3.4)
Therefore possible generator polynomials are shown in Table 3.5.
Taking the primitive polynomial α3+α+1 and setting to zero, we get α3 = α+1 which
can be used to generate the other polynomials.
α0 = 1
α1 = α
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α2 = α×α = α2
α3 = α+1
α4 = α3×α = (α+1)α = α2+α
α5 = α4×α = (α2+1)α = α3+α2 = α2+α+1
α6 = α5×α = (α2+α+1)×α = α3+α2+α = α+1+α2+α = α2+1
α7 = α6×α = (α2+1)×α = α3+α = α+1+α = 1
These polynomials and their related vectors are shown in Table 3.6.
Element Polynomial Vector
0 0 {0, 0, 0}
α0 1 {0, 0, 1}
α1 α {0, 1, 0}
α2 α2 {1, 0, 0}
α3 α+1 {0, 1, 1}
α4 α2+α {1, 1, 0}
α5 α2+α+1 {1, 1, 1}
α6 α2+1 {1, 0, 1}
α7 1 {0, 0, 1}
Table 3.6: Polynomials in GF(23)
3.14 Generator Matrices
A generator matrix is a matrix whose rows form the basis for a linear code. The code-
words are all of the linear combinations of the rows of the matrix i.e. the linear code is
the row space of its generator matrix.
For a block code with q = 2 and n = 5, the set of vectors ( 0 0 0 0 0 ), ( 1 0 0 1 1 ), (
0 1 0 1 0 ), ( 1 1 0 0 1), ( 0 0 1 0 1), ( 1 0 1 1 0 ), ( 0 1 1 1 1 ) and ( 1 1 1 0 0 ) form
a vector space V1 and hence a linear or group, binary code. The minimum weight is 2
and hence the minimum distance is 2.
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Any set of basis vectors for a linear block code V can be considered as rows of a ma-
trix G, called a Generator Matrix of V . The code V1 is the row space of either of the
following matrices:
G1 =

1 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 1

or
G2 =

1 0 0 1 1
1 1 0 0 1
1 1 1 0 0

If G is a matrix, it generates the codewords of a linear code C by w = sG, where w
is a codeword of the linear code C and s is any vector. A generator matrix for an
[n,k,d] q-code is a k×n matrix, where n is the length of a codeword, k is the number of
information bits (the dimension of C as a vector subspace), d is the minimum distance
of the code and q is the size of the finite field, that is, the number of symbols in the
alphabet.
The standard form for a generator matrix is:
G = [Ik|A]
where Ik is the k× k identity matrix and A is a k×m matrix. m is the number of re-
dundant bits in each codeword, m = n− k. For any set of k independent columns of a
generator matrix G the corresponding set of coordinates form an information set for C.
The remaining m= n− k coordinates form a redundancy set.
Whilst there can be many generator matrices for a given code, if the first k coordinates
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form an information set, the code has a unique generator matrix of the form G = [Ik|A].
3.15 Parity Check Matrices
Because a linear code is a subspace of a vector space, it is the kernel of some linear
transformation. In particular there is an (n−k)×n matrix H, called a parity check matrix
for the [n,k] code C, defined by :
C = {x ∈ Fnq|HxT = 0} (3.5)
The matrix H is called a parity-check matrix for a linear code C if the columns of H form
a basis for the dual code C⊥. As with the generator matrix for an [n,k] code C, the rows
of the (n− k)×n parity check matrix H are independent and H is the generator matrix
of the dual code or orthogonal of C.
The rows of H will also be independent. In general, there are also several possible
parity check matrices for C. If G = [Ik|A] is a generator matrix for the [n,k] code C in
standard form, then H = [−AT |In−k] is a parity check matrix for C.
Taking the [7,4,3] Hamming Code with the generator matrix below as an example,
G = [I4|A] =

1 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 1 1 1

(3.6)
a parity check matrix would be:
H = [AT |I3] =

0 1 1 1 1 0 0
1 0 1 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 1 0 0 1
 (3.7)
A linear code can be presented with either a generator matrix or a parity check matrix.
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A simple parity check for a binary message is achieved by counting the number of
1’s in the message and appending a final binary digit, so that the entire message is
designed to have either an odd or even number of 1’s in it. This only enables an odd
number of errors to be detected. The rows of a parity check matrix are parity checks
on the codewords of a code. They show how linear combinations of certain digits of
each codeword equal zero. For example, the parity check matrix:
 01 02 13 14
11 12 03 04

shows that there are two parity checks. The first row specifies that for each codeword,
digits 3 and 4 should sum to zero, whilst the second row specifies that for each code-
word, digits 1 and 2 should sum to zero. The parity check matrix for a given code can
be derived from its generator matrix and vice versa.
3.16 Best Known Linear Codes
Many of the codes used here as examples in the calculation of equivocation are Best
Known Linear Codes (BKLCs), i.e. they have the highest minimum weight among all
[n,k] codes. Suitable codes were identified from code tables of BKLCs compiled by
Grassl (2015), while the generator and parity check matrices for these codes were
obtained using the online calculating software Magma provided by the University of
Sydney (2015). For example, to obtain the generator and parity check matrices for the
BKLC [15,11,3] (i.e. Hamming) code, the instructions were submitted to the program
as shown in Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5.
C:=BKLC(GF(2),15,11);
C;
Figure 3.4: Magma code for obtaining BKLC generator matrix
These inputs yielded the Magma outputs shown in Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.7 respec-
tively. The Magma output is displayed line by line as a sequence of row vectors that,
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C:=BKLC(GF(2),15,11);
P:=ParityCheckMatrix(C);
P;
Figure 3.5: Magma code for obtaining BKLC parity check matrix
when combined, form the overall matrix.
[15,11,3] Linear Code over GF(2)
Generator matrix
[1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1]
[0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1]
[0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0]
[0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1]
[0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0]
[0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0]
[0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0]
[0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1]
[0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1]
[0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1]
[0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1]
Figure 3.6: Magma generator matrix output
[1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1]
[0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1]
[0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1]
[0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1]
Figure 3.7: Magma parity check matrix output
3.17 Perfect Codes
A code C ⊂ Fnq with minimum distance 2e+1 is defined (van Lint 1999, p.34) as Perfect
if every x ∈ Fnq has distance ≤ e to exactly one codeword. A minimum distance of 2e+1
enables the code to correct e errors. Hamming codes and the Golay code are the only
non-trivial examples of perfect codes.
A code C of length n and odd distance d = 2t+1 (where t is the number of errors to be
corrected) is perfect if C attains the Hamming bound (van Lint 1999):
|C| ≤ 2
n(n
0
)
+
(n
1
)
+ ...+
(n
t
) (3.8)
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3.18 Hamming Codes
For any integer m, it is possible to construct a perfect, single error-correcting, binary
Hamming code Ham(m,2) with Hamming distance 3 (Hamming 1950). Such a code
uses m parity digits to correct any single error in a codeword of size n digits, where n=
2m−1. The message length is k, where k= n−m. The Hamming code Ham(m,2) can be
described by the parameters Ham[n,k,d]. The generator matrix will have dimensions
k× (2m−1) and the parity check matrix has dimensions m× (2m−1).
Consider the binary Hamming code with message length m = 4. Since n = (2m− 1),
n=(24−1)= 15 and k= 15−11= 4. Ham(4,2) is a GF2-code with parameters [15,11,3].
Hamming codes are cyclic codes, as can be seen by considering the Hamming [15,11,3]
code. Looking at the GF(24) field, α24−1−1= α15−1 This can be factorised as:
α15−1= (α−1)(α4+α+1)(α4+α3+1)(α2+α+1)(α4+α3+α2+α+1)
Therefore since (α4+α+1) is a primitive polynomial factor and α4+α+1= 0, we can
use the polynomial α4 = α+1 to generate the other polynomials.
α0 = 1
α1 = α
α2 = α×α = α2
α3 = α×α×α = α3
α4 = α+1
α5 = α4×α = (α+1)α = α2+α
α6 = α5×α = (α2+α)×α = α3+α2
α7 = α6×α = (α3+α2)×α = α4+α3 = α3+α+1
α8 = α7×α = (α3+α+1)×α = α4+α2+α = α2+α+α+1= α2+1
α9 = α8×α = (α2+1)×α = α3+α
α10 = α9×α = (α3+α)×α = α4+α2 = α2+α+1
α11 = α10×α = (α2+α+1)×α = α3+α2+α
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α12 = α11×α = (α3+α2+α)×α = α4+α3+α2 = α3+α2+α+1
α13 = α12×α = (α3+α2+α+1)×α = α4+α3+α2+α = α3+α2+α+α+1= α3+
α2+1
α14 = α13×α = (α3+α2+1)×α = α4+α3+α = α3+α+α+1= α3+1
α15 = α14×α = (α3+1)×α = α4+α = α+1+α = 1
These polynomials and their contribution to the matrix are shown in Table 3.7.
Element Polynomial Vector
0 0 {0, 0, 0, 0}
α0 α0 = 1 {0, 0, 0, 1}
α1 α1 = α {0, 0, 1, 0}
α2 α2 {0, 1, 0, 0}
α3 α3 {1, 0, 0, 0}
α4 α4 = α+1 {0, 0, 1, 1}
α5 α5 = (α+1)α = α2+α {0, 1, 1, 0}
α6 α6 = α3+α2 {1, 1, 0, 0}
α7 α7 = α3+α+1 {1, 0, 1, 1}
α8 α8 = α2+1 {0, 1, 0, 1}
α9 α9 = α3+α {1, 0, 1, 0}
α10 α10 = α2+α+1 {0, 1, 1, 1}
α11 α11 = α3+α2+α {1, 1, 1, 0}
α12 α12 = α3+α2+α+1 {1, 1, 1, 1}
α13 α13 = α3+α2+1 {1, 1, 0, 1}
α14 α14 = α3+1 {1, 0, 0, 1}
α15 α15 = 1 {0, 0, 0, 1}
Table 3.7: Polynomials in GF(24)
Which yields a parity check matrix of:
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H = (α14,α13,α12,α11,α10,α9,α8,α7,α6,α5,α4,α3,α2,α1,1)

1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1

3.18.1 Encoding Using Hamming Codes
To encode a message m=
(
0 1 0 0
)
using the Hamming [7,4,3] code, multiply the
message by the generator matrix given in Equation 3.6 to obtain the codeword x, so
that x= m×G :
(
0 1 0 0
)

1 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 1 1 1

=
(
0 1 0 0 1 0 1
)
Since the first k (=4) columns of the generator matrix consist of the identity matrix,
the original message is represented by the first k (=4) bits of the codeword.The Ham-
ming [7,4,3] codewords corresponding to each possible 4-bit message are shown in
Table 3.1. Once the message has been encoded, the codeword can be transmitted via
the channel.
3.18.2 Decoding Hamming Codes
If an error occurs during transmission (via a binary symmetric channel), the transmitted
codeword x will be received as y. If the the codeword x=
(
01 12 03 04 15 06 17
)
incurs an error in bit 3 during transmission, where bit 1 is the left-most bit and bit 7 is the
right-most bit, then the codeword would be received as r=
(
01 12 13 04 15 06 17
)
.
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The codeword can be corrected by calculating the syndrome associated with the re-
ceived codeword. The syndrome is the set of parity check results obtained by multiply-
ing the received codeword by the parity check matrix. The parity check matrix could be
used in its standard form, however for Hamming codes, the syndrome can represent
a binary number by re-ordering the columns of the parity check matrix appropriately.
This gives not only the result of the checks but also the position of the error. This is
because as a Perfect code, exactly one syndrome exists for every possible codeword.
A syndrome of 0 indicates that no error has been detected.
The parity check matrix used to decode the codeword is therefore:

0 0 0 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 1 0 1

Multiplying the received codeword by the transpose of the parity check matrix, so that
s= r×HT , yields a syndrome of:
(
0 1 1 0 1 0 1
)

0 0 1
0 1 0
0 1 1
1 0 0
1 0 1
1 1 0
1 1 1

=
(
0 1 1
)
(
0 1 1
)
is the binary equivalent of 3 and therefore the syndrome indicates that a
transmission error has occurred in the third bit of the codeword. The codeword can be
corrected to give an estimate of the transmitted codeword y=
(
0 1 0 0 1 0 1
)
.
Since the message is contained by the first 4 bits of the codeword, an estimate of the
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original message is decoded to be mest =
(
0 1 0 0
)
. The received codeword has
been correctly decoded.
Codes with a minimum Hamming distance of n can correct up to (n− 1)/2 errors if n
is odd or up to n2 − 1 errors if n is even; else it can detect up to n− 1 errors without
correcting them. With its minimum distance of 3, the Hamming [7,4,3] code only has
the capability to correct single bit errors. If two errors occurred during transmission of
the codeword x =
(
0 1 0 0 1 0 1
)
then the codeword would probably not be
decoded correctly. If the two errors occurred at position 1 and position 6, then the
received codeword would be r =
(
1 1 0 0 1 1 1
)
.
Multiplying the received codeword by the transpose of the parity check matrix, so that
s= r×HT , yields a syndrome of:
(
1 1 0 0 1 1 1
)

0 0 1
0 1 0
0 1 1
1 0 0
1 0 1
1 1 0
1 1 1

=
(
1 1 1
)
This syndrome of
(
1 1 1
)
suggests that the codeword has been received with a sin-
gle error in position 7. The codeword would be corrected to y=
(
1 1 0 0 1 1 0
)
,
the first four bits of which give an estimate of the original message as mest =
(
1 1 0 0
)
.
The message has been incorrectly decoded due to the limited ability of the code to cor-
rect at most one error.
3.19 Golay Codes
Golay (1949) noticed that: C230 +C
23
1 +C
23
2 +C
23
3 = 2
11. This equality shows the possible
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existence of a perfect binary [23,12,7] code, that achieves the Hamming bound and is
capable of correcting all possible patterns of at most 3 errors in 23 bit positions.
There are two closely related binary Golay codes. The perfect binary Golay code
encodes 12 bits of message data as a 23-bit codeword in such a way that any 3-bit
errors can be corrected or any 6-bit errors can be detected.
The binary Golay code is the [23,12,7] cyclic code generated by the polynomial:
α11+α10+α6+α5+α4+α2+1
The weight distribution of the 212 = 4096 codewords is:
i 0 7 8 11 12 15 16 23
Ai 1 253 506 1288 1288 506 253 1
Both the code and its dual are proper i.e. the probability P(ε) of an undetected error for
the block code is monotonically increasing in ε for 0≤ ε ≤ 12 , where ε is the probability
of a symbol error (Leung-Yan-Cheong et al. 1979).
The [24,12,8] extended binary Golay code is obtained from the perfect binary Golay
code by adding a parity bit.
A generator matrix for the extended binary Golay code in standard [I|A] form is:
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
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1

The extended binary Golay code was used by the Voyager spacecraft programme in
the 1980’s for transmitting images of Saturn and Jupiter back to Earth.
There are also two closely related ternary Golay codes. The ternary Golay code is
an [11,6,5]3 linear code over a ternary alphabet; the relative distance of the code is as
large as it possibly can be for a ternary code, and hence, the ternary Golay code is a
perfect code. The extended ternary Golay code is a [12,6,6]3 linear code obtained by
adding a zero-sum check digit to the [11,6,5]3 code.
The ternary Golay code is the [11,6,5] CRC code (van Lint 1999) generated by the
polynomial:
α5+α4−α3+α2−1
It has a parity check matrix of:
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
1 1 1 2 2 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 2 1 0 2 0 1 0 0 0
1 2 1 0 1 2 0 0 1 0 0
1 2 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 1

Its weight distribution is:
i 0 5 6 8 9 11
Ai 1 132 132 330 110 24
Both the code and its dual are proper.
3.20 Codes and Sphere Packing
3.20.1 Geometric Sphere Packing
In a lattice packing, if the lattice has its origin as a centre and there are spheres with
centres u and v, then there are also spheres with centres u+ v and u− v. i.e. the set
of centres form an additive group (Conway & Sloane 1999). In n-dimensional space, if
we can find n centres v1,v2, · · · ,vn, such that the set of all centres consists of the sums
∑kivi, where the ki are integers, then the vectors v1,v2, · · · ,vn form a basis for the lattice.
In the lattice in Figure 3.8, the n-dimensional space contains the following features:
• a is a lattice point
• b is a deep hole
• ρ is the packing radius of the lattice
• R is the covering radius of the lattice
If the sphere radius was R then the whole space would be covered (in this lattice,
R= 2ρ/
√
3).
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Figure 3.8: A Hexagonal Lattice (Conway & Sloane 1999)
A fundamental region for a lattice is a building block which when repeated many times
fills the whole space with just one lattice point in each copy. The lattice in Figure 3.8
shows a hexagonal fundamental region.
The packing density is a measure of what fraction of the total space is taken up by the
spheres.
∆= Proportion of the space that is occupied by spheres
=
Volume of one sphere
Volume of fundamental region
(3.9)
3.20.2 Sphere Packing and Error Correcting Codes
Remembering that an [n,k,d] code C over Fq can correct t = b(d− 1)/2c errors, if t or
fewer errors are made then the received vector can be uniquely decoded. If the number
of errors is more than t but no more than the covering radius R, sometimes these errors
can still be uniquely decoded.
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3.20.3 Example of Sphere Packing and Error Correcting Codes
An example of the relationship between error-correcting codes and sphere packing
can be seen with the Hamming [7,4,3] code (Moser & Chen 2012). The code has
24 = 16 valid codewords out of the 27 = 128 possible code vectors. Each distinct pair
of codewords of the Hamming [7,4,3] code is separated by a Hamming distance of at
least 3.
Geometrically, we can think of each valid Hamming codeword as a point in n-dimensional
space with distance at least 3 from any other codeword. If each codeword is consid-
ered as being the centre of a sphere of radius r = 1, then the spheres will contain all
the code vectors that have a Hamming distance of 1 from the valid codeword. In other
words, the code vectors differ from the valid codeword in exactly 1 bit, or they contain
a single error. No code vector can lie within two spheres as the spheres are too well
separated.
For each valid codeword in the Hamming [7,4,3] code, there are 7 code vectors that
differ by 1 bit so, along with the codeword itself, there are 8 code vectors within each of
the 16 spheres. Therefore every code vector containing a single bit error will lie closer
to one particular valid codeword than to any other. Thus, correcting a single bit error
is always possible for the Hamming [7,4,3] code. Since every possible code vector is
included within the 16 non-overlapping spheres, the Hamming [7,4,3] code is a perfect
code with the tightest possible packing of radius-1 spheres in the 7-dimensional binary
space.
3.20.4 The Sphere Packing Problem
The Sphere Packing Problem (Conway & Sloane 1999, p. 1) seeks to investigate how
densely a large number of identical spheres can be packed together. Finding the
maximal number of non-overlapping radius-t spheres that can be packed into an n-
dimensional binary space is the geometric equivalent of finding the maximal number of
codewords that a t-error correcting code can have.
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3.20.5 The Hamming Bound
For any non-negative integer R and codeword u ∈ Fn, then SR(u) denotes the sphere of
radius R and centred on u (Hill 1986, p. 18), where:
SR(u) = {v ∈ Fn|d(u,v)≤ R} (3.10)
The sphere is the set of code vectors for which the Hamming distance between the
code vector and the original codeword is less than the sphere radius.
Working in n-dimensional space, each vertex of an n-dimensional cube is represented
by a codeword of n 0’s and 1’s. The vector space consists only of the 2n vertices -
there is nothing else in the space of all possible messages except the 2n vertices. The
surface of a sphere of radius 1 about the point (0, 0,. . . , 0) is the set of all vertices in the
space which are one unit away i.e. all vertices which have a single 1 in their coordinate
representation. There are
(n
1
)
such points.
As with the Hamming [7,4,3] code, the volume of a sphere of radius 1 is the centre
point itself plus the n points with just one coordinate changed; a volume of 1+n.
The total volume of the n-dimensional space is 2n, the total number of possible points.
Since the spheres do not overlap, the maximum number of message points k must
satisfy (Hamming 1980, p. 46)
total volume
volume of a sphere
≥maximum number of spheres (3.11)
So
2n
n+1
≥ 2k (3.12)
Or, (for a sphere of radius 1) since n= m+ k
n+1≤ 2m (3.13)
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Extending to a sphere of radius R and a field Fq, for R< n, SR(u) contains exactly:
|SR(u)|=
 n
0
+
 n
1
(q−1)+ · · ·+
 n
r
(q−1)R = r∑
i=0
 n
i
(q−1)i (3.14)
points of Fn.
Summing across all codewords within the code, if there is a q-ary (n,M,d)-code and
t = b(d−1)/2c (t is the number of errors transmitted in the codeword) then the following
inequality is satisfied:
M

t
∑
i=0
 n
i
(q−1)i
≤ qn (3.15)
Or:
M ≤ q
n
∑ti=0
 n
i
(q−1)i
(3.16)
In addition to earlier definitions relating to codewords and codeword distances, a Per-
fect code can be defined (Hoffman 1991) as a code that satisfies this equation with
equality. For a binary code, this simplifies to:
M ≤ 2
n
∑ti=0
 n
i

(3.17)
Thus, the number of codewords in a code is limited by the number of distinct sym-
bols employed by the channel (q), the number of symbols in the codeword (n) and the
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number of errors that the code is to be able to correct (t). This can be written as
M|St | ≤ qn (3.18)
For example with a [5,3,2] binary code (q=2, n=5):
M
(
1+
(n
1
))≤ 25 i.e. 6M ≤ 32, so M ≤ 5
For a [23,12] code, there would be 223 = 8388608 possible code vectors. Of these,
212 = 4096 would be valid codewords, corresponding to 4096 possible messages. For
each valid codeword (of length 23), there will be 1 code with with a Hamming distance
of 0 (i.e. the codeword itself),
(23
1
)
= 23 code vectors that differ by 1 bit,
(23
2
)
= 253 code
vectors that differ by 2 bits and
(23
3
)
= 1771 code vectors that differ by 3 bits. Overall
there will be 1+23+253+1771= 2048 code vectors that have a Hamming distance of
3 or less to each valid codeword. This is true for each codeword, therefore there will be
4096× 2048 = 8388608 codewords in total. In other words and as noted earlier, every
possible code vector of a [23,12] code has a Hamming distance of 3 or less.
Since the Golay [23,12,7] code has a minimum distance of 7, it has the ability to correct
all code vectors that contain t = b(d−1)/2c= b(7−1)/2c= 3 or fewer errors. Hence the
Golay code can correct every possible code vector. Applying k= 12,n= 23 and t = 3 to
the Hamming bound,
212 ≤ 2
23(23
0
)
+
(23
1
)
+
(23
2
)
+
(23
3
)
≤ 2
23
1+23+253+1771
≤ 8388608
2048
≤ 4096 (3.19)
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The equation holds with equality and therefore by Equation 3.16, the Golay code is a
perfect code.
If a code C has the property that there is an integer t such that the t-spheres around
the codewords are disjoint and cover the whole of Fn then the code achieves equality
in Equation 3.18. Tthe code is again perfect and possesses perfect packing.
A code with odd distance d = 2t+1 is perfect if and only if there is equality in the sphere
packing bound i.e. M|St(0)| ≤ qn. Conversely for any perfect code, the distance d must
be odd and d = 2t+1.
The difference between the two sides of the sphere packing bound is equal to the
number of points that are not covered by the spheres.
If a code has minimal distance d, the ‘Hamming Spheres’ of radius ρ = 12(d−1) around
the codewords are disjoint i.e. they have no element in common, (so ρ is the packing
radius of the code) and therefore the code can correct ρ errors.
3.20.5.1 Perfect Codes
Tietäväinen (1973) showed that the only parameters satisfying the Hamming bound
with equality are:
n= 2u−1, k = 2u−u−1, t = 1 for any positive integer u
n= 23, k = 12, t = 3
n= 2u+1, k = 1, t = u for any positive integer u
The first case is a general Hamming code of order u. The second case has been
shown (Pless 1968) to only hold for the Golay code. The third case is the (2u+ 1)-
times repetition code i.e. repeating the message (2u+1) times.
3.20.6 Other Geometric Properties of Lattices
Around each lattice point ai is its Voronoi cell, V (ai), consisting of those points Rn that
are at least as close to ai as to any other Pj. Voronoi cells are also known as nearest
neighbour cells. For a hexagonal lattice, the Voronoi cell is the hexagon (Conway &
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Sloane 1999, p. 6).
The kissing number (τ) of a sphere packing in any dimension is the number of spheres
that touch one sphere (Conway & Sloane 1999, p. 21). For a lattice packing, τ is the
same for every sphere, but for an arbitrary packing, τ may vary from one sphere to
another. The kissing number is also known as the Newton number, contact number,
coordination number or ligancy. Values for the kissing number in the first 10 dimensions
are shown in Table 3.8.
Dimension (n) τn
1 2
2 6
3 12
4 24-25
5 40-46
6 72-82
7 126-140
8 240
9 306-380
10 500-595
...
...
Table 3.8: Kissing Number Values in Different Dimensions (Conway & Sloane 1999)
The covering density (or sparsity of the covering or thickness) (Conway & Sloane 1999,
p. 31) is:
Θ= Average number of spheres that contain a point of the space
The covering problem asks for the thinnest covering of n-dimensional space by spheres.
For a plane, no other arrangement of circles (e.g. square lattice) can cover the plane
more efficiently than the hexagonal lattice arrangement. However, as for packings, the
optimal coverings are not known in higher dimensions.
A binary analogue to the covering problem is to find the smallest number of overlapping
Hamming spheres that will cover Fnq. Equivalently, let the covering radius of a code C
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be:
maxxmincd(x,c)(x ∈ Fn2,c ∈C)
Then the coding equivalent of the covering problem is, for a given code length and
covering radius, to find the smallest possible number of codewords such that every
possible codeword is within a fixed distance of a valid codeword.
3.21 Complexity Theory
Many of the algorithms in this work are highly intensive, requiring many calculations.
Complexity theory gives some indication of the relative difficulty of different calcula-
tions. A deterministic algorithm, model or process is one whose resulting behaviour is
entirely determined by its initial state and inputs, and which is not random or stochastic.
A Turing machine is a hypothetical machine that can simulate any computer algorithm,
no matter how complex. Most of the processes considered here are deterministic. Two
important and relevant classes of complexity are:
• PTIME - Contains all decision problems that can be solved by a deterministic
Turing Machine in Polynomial Time i.e. Using ’big O’ notation to classify such
problems in terms of how their run time or space requirements grow as the input
size of n grows, such problems can be solved in O(p(n)) time where p(n) is a
polynomial of n. Cobham’s thesis (Cobham 1965) holds that P is the class of
computational problems that are efficiently solvable or tractable.
• EXPTIME - is the set of all decision problems that can be solved in exponential
times (O(2p(n)) time) by a deterministic Turing machine. EXPTIME problems are
intractable in that no efficient algorithms exists for solving them, only a brute force
approach.
Consider the functions y= x2 and y= 2x shown in Figure 3.9. Visually, provided x & 3,
the exponential curve increases at a faster rate than the polynomial curve, crudely sym-
bolising the difference in complexity between PTIME problems and EXPTIME prob-
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lems. For y = x2, dydx = 2x and for y = 2
x, dydx = 2
x ln2. The gradient of the polynomial
increases at a constant rate of d
2y
dx2 = 2, whereas the gradient of the exponential curve is
itself continuing to increase exponentially at a rate of d
2y
dx2 = 2
x(ln2)2. Whilst the actual
value of the exponential function will be greater than that of the polynomial function if
x> 4, above approximately x= 3.21 the gradient of the exponential curve will always be
greater than that of the polynomial function. This represents the more rapidly increas-
ing complexity of an EXPTIME problem over a PTIME problem.
Figure 3.9: Polynomial rate versus Exponential rate
As an example, consider the determination of whether a number is prime or not. The
number of steps in the calculation increases relatively slowly in comparison with the
number of digits n in the number. Agrawal et al. (2004) showed that the calculation of
whether a number is prime is a PTIME problem. Whilst not increasing at a constant
rate, in general the number of steps increases according to something approaching the
polynomial n2 i.e. in polynomial time. Board games such as the generalised version
of Go (with Japanese ko rules) are considered (Robson 1983) to be an EXPTIME
problem because the number of moves available increases exponentially with the size
of the board.
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The calculations of equivocation for the different channel arrangements encountered
in this thesis involve EXPTIME problems. For example, the calculation of equivocation
for the Binary Symmetric Channel in Chapter 5 for an [n,k,d] binary linear code must
consider 2k possible messages of length k and corresponding codewords of length
n. For each of these, there are 2n possible errors that could occur during transmis-
sion. Therefore to calculate the probabilities of all possible output messages for all
input messages, there are 2k×2n = 2n+k possible calculations to perform. The number
of calculations increases exponentially with both the code length n and the message
length k, rendering it an EXPTIME problem. Few shortcuts to reduce the calculation
time were identified, thereby requiring a brute force approach to the calculation. This
makes the calculations extremely labour intensive and formed a time-bounded con-
straint to the length of codes for which results could be evaluated. Such limitations
formed a key constraint on the length of codes able to be analysed.
3.22 Conclusion
The fields of coding, sphere packing and complexity theory are each very large and
full justice cannot be given to them in this chapter. Instead the aim of this chapter has
been to give an overview of the most salient and relevant points in order to help place
the main body of the thesis within the wider field. Of the code types discussed, per-
fect codes and BKLCs will be given the most attention in subsequent chapters. This
is primarily to restrict the code choice to a manageable set of relatively straightfor-
ward codes that enable slightly more simple calculations to be completed by a single-
purpose program in an acceptable time-frame, e.g. less than 2 days. This approach
could potentially be extended in future work to other codes such as Hadamard codes,
other Reed-Muller codes or Low Density Parity Check Codes (LDPC), although the
size of LDPC codes would most likely prove problematic. The use of the approach
with an iterative process such as that used for turbo codes would also be likely to be
problematic in terms of the resulting calculation complexity; a factor which also affects
the method’s effectiveness at coping with deletions in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 4
Channel Metrics
4.1 Introduction
Chapter 4 looks at some of the tools and measures that will be used to evaluate the
information characteristics of a variety of codes when transmitted across different chan-
nels. This includes the definition and discussion of:
• Information
• Entropy
• Equivocation
• Mutual Information
• Capacity
• Information leakage
4.2 Information
The amount of information conveyed by a symbol was introduced by Shannon (1949)
and developed further by Woodward & Davies (1952). Information is closely related to
the amount of uncertainty or the amount of surprise in that event occurring and in an
event xi with probability pi, it can be defined (Hamming 1980, p. 102) as:
I(xi) = log2
1
pi
(4.1)
61
4.3. ENTROPY
When using base 2 logarithms, the unit of information is the ‘bit of information’. If
surprise is additive and the probabilities of two independent choices are multiplied
together to get the probability of the compound event, then:
I(x1)+ I(x2) = log2
1
p1p2
= I(x1,x2) (4.2)
On average, for each symbol xi, we get piI(xi) bits of information. Over the whole
alphabet of q symbols xi we will get an average amount of information (Hamming 1980,
p. 104) of:
q
∑
i=1
pi log2
(
1
pi
)
(4.3)
4.3 Entropy
The average amount of information per symbol xi of an information source X is known
as the entropy of the information source, or equivalently, the uncertainty associated
with the source. H(X) = 0 when the source is certain and H(X) is maximal when all the
xi are equally likely.
The entropy is given by (Jones & Jones 2002):
Hr(X) =
q
∑
i=0
p(xi) logr
1
p(xi)
(4.4)
where r is the radix or root of the code. For a binary code, r = 2 and the entropy is:
H(X) =
q
∑
i=0
p(xi) log2
1
p(xi)
(4.5)
The entropy function has the following properties:
• H(X)≥ 0
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• H(X)≤ log2 q where q is the number of input symbols
• H(X) = log2 q when all the source symbols are equally likely
Note that ‘the entropy of a source’ has no meaning unless a model of the source is
included e.g. for a Pseudo Random Number Generator, the numbers generated by a
source would come very much as a surprise unless the formula used for generating
them is known.
e.g. for a channel with q = 4 symbols (e.g. 00, 01, 10 & 11) occurring with equal
probability, the entropy will take a maximal value of 2 (= log24):
H(X) =
4
∑
i=1
p(xi) log
(
1
p(xi)
)
= 0.25log2
(
1
0.25
)
+0.25log2
(
1
0.25
)
+0.25log2
(
1
0.25
)
+0.25log2
(
1
0.25
)
= 0.5+0.5+0.5+0.5
= 2
However if the 4 symbols occur with the probabilities 0.4, 0.3, 0.2, and 0.1, the entropy
will be 1.846:
H(X) = 0.4log2
(
1
0.4
)
+0.3log2
(
1
0.3
)
+0.2log2
(
1
0.2
)
+0.1log2
(
1
0.1
)
= 0.52877+0.52109+0.46439+0.33219
= 1.84644
Similarly for the received symbols (where s is the number of output symbols):
I(y j) = p(y j) log2
1
p(y j)
(4.6)
H(Y ) =
s
∑
j=1
p(y j) log2
1
p(y j)
(4.7)
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4.3.1 Binary Entropy Function
Supposing that X is a binary random variable such that:
X =

1 with probability pe
0 with probability 1− pe
(4.8)
Then the entropy of X is in Equation 4.9 and plotted in Figure 4.1. Clearly there is little
practical use in a channel with pe > 0.5, since it has become more likely that an error
will occur than not. When pe = 0.5, the received bit has become random.
H(X) =
2
∑
i=1
pi log
1
pi
=−pe log2 pe− (1− pe) log2(1− pe) (4.9)
Figure 4.1: The Binary Entropy Function
This can also be written as H(pe) since the function depends solely on pe
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4.4 System Entropies
The relationships between input and output entropies, joint entropy, conditional en-
tropies and mutual information are shown in Figure 4.2.
H(X |Y ) H(Y |X)I(X ,Y )
H(X) H(Y )
H(X ,Y )
Figure 4.2: Relationship between entropy and mutual information
The joint entropy of a binary system can be given as
H(X ,Y ) = ∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
P(xi,y j) log2
(
1
P(xi,y j)
)
(4.10)
while the conditional entropy is
H(Y |X) = ∑
x∈X
P(xi)H(Y |xi)
= ∑
x∈X
P(xi)∑
y∈Y
P(y j|xi) log2
(
1
P(y j|xi)
)
= ∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
P(xi,y j) log2
(
1
P(y j|xi)
) (4.11)
If input and output symbols are dependent, in the same way to that for probabilities
P(X) and P(Y ), where P(Y |X) = P(X ,Y )−P(X),
H(X |Y ) = H(X ,Y )−H(Y ) (4.12)
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or
H(Y |X) = H(X ,Y )−H(X) (4.13)
The conditional entropy is the difference between the joint entropy and the source or
output entropy. The conditional entropy H(Y |X) represents the information loss in the
channel going from input to output. It is how much must be added to the source entropy
to get the joint entropy.
It is worth noting that in situations where H(X) = H(Y ), then H(X |Y ) = H(Y |X).
If the input X and output Y are statistically independent (i.e. what comes out doesn’t
depend on what goes in), then:
H(X ,Y ) = H(X)+H(Y ) (4.14)
4.5 Equivocation
In spoken English, one definition (Dictionary.com 2017) of the verb ‘to equivocate’ is
‘using ambiguous language so as to conceal the truth or avoid committing oneself.’
Hence when someone speaks clearly and unambiguously, they are said to be ‘un-
equivocal’.
Similarly in information theory, equivocation was described by Shannon (1948, 1949)
as a measure of the average amount of uncertainty in a received signal. It was defined
as the conditional entropy of the system, since that represents the information loss of
the channel going from input to output.
Shannon also demonstrated that the conditional entropy H(X |Y ) of the transmitted sig-
nal when the received signal is known is a natural measure of the uncertainty of what
was actually transmitted, knowing only the perturbed version given by the received sig-
nal. Thus the equivocation of a channel is an appropriate mechanism for measuring
the level of secrecy involved in the use of that channel. Shannon defined the Secrecy
of the system as the conditional entropy, H(X |Y ) = H(X ,Y )−H(Y ).
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Shannon’s equivocation remains an important analysis tool for information security.
Whilst other metrics for assessing secrecy have been proposed such as the security
gap (Klinc et al. 2009) and a value function (Cuff 2010), equivocation continues to be
recognised as an established metric (Klinc et al. 2009) and will be used in this work.
The probabilities of input codewords (xi) and output codewords (y j) can be used to cal-
culate a set of entropies. In turn, these entropies can be used to calculate the equivo-
cation of the code. For each given input message, the conditional probabilities P(y j|xi)
of each decoded message can be calculated. From the conditional probabilities, the
overall joint probability P(X ,Y ) can be calculated.
To improve communication security, the best codes can be the codes which have the
highest value of the information secrecy (the equivocation rate), for a given code length
and code rate, and are well-packed schemes. Such codes are known as the best binary
equivocation codes and have been studied in more detail by Zhang et al. (2014).
4.5.1 Normalised Equivocation
Once the equivocation for a code has been calculated, it is useful to be able to make
meaningful comparisons between the equivocation levels of different codes. To achieve
this, it must be possible to compare like-for-like measures. This is done by calculating
the normalised equivocation values by dividing the equivocation by the message length
to give the normalised equivocation H(X |Y ) as:
H(X |Y ) = H(X |Y )
k
(4.15)
This has the effect of scaling the equivocation value to lie between 0 and 1, to give
the mean equivocation per bit of transmitted data. Since the equivocation represents
the information loss of the channel, the maximum possible amount of information that
could be transmitted (and/or lost) by the channel is k. Therefore dividing the equiv-
ocation values by k will produce a normalised equivocation value for an [n,k,d] code
as required. For example while a Hamming[31,26,3] code could have an equivocation
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value in the range 0≤H(X |Y )≤ 26 and the Golay[23,12,7] code could have an equiov-
cation in the range 0≤ H(X |Y )≤ 12, the normalised equivocation of both codes would
be in the range from 0 to 1, enabling a more direct comparison of the relative merits of
each codes for a specific error probability.
4.6 Mutual Information
The a priori probability P(xi) is the probability of the input symbol xi prior to reception
(Hamming 1980, p. 138). The a posteriori probability P(xi|y j) of the input symbol xi is
the conditional probability that xi was sent given that y j was received.
The change in probability measures how much the receiver learned from the reception
of the symbol y j. In an ideal channel with no noise, the a posteriori probability is 1,
since we are certain from the received y j exactly what was sent.
Mutual Information I(xi,y j) is the difference between the information uncertainty before
(the a priori probabilities) and after reception of a y j (the a posteriori probabilities). It
is the gain in information due to the receipt of y j.
I(xi,y j) = log2
1
P(xi)
− log2
1
P(xi|y j) = log2
P(xi|y j)
P(xi)
(4.16)
Similarly:
I(y j,xi) = log2
P(y j|xi)
P(y j)
(4.17)
• I(xi,y j)≥ 0
• I(xi,y j) = 0 if and only if xi and y j are independent
• I(xi,y j) = I(y j,xi)
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The average mutual information is:
I(X ,Y ) =

H(X)+H(Y )−H(X ,Y )
H(X)−H(X |Y )
H(Y )−H(Y |X)
(4.18)
4.7 Channel Capacity
The Channel Capacity is the maximum amount of information that can be conveyed
over all possible assignments of the P(x) or the maximum possible error-free informa-
tion transmission rate across the channel.
Ca =max
P(x)
{I(X ,Y )} (4.19)
4.7.1 Capacity of the Binary Symmetric Channel
On the BSC and considering all possible input and output options,
I(X ,Y ) =−P(x= 0,y= 0) · log2(P(x= 0,y= 0))−P(x= 0,y= 1) · log2(P(x= 0,y= 1))
−P(x= 1,y= 0) · log2(P(x= 1,y= 0))−P(x= 1,y= 1) · log2(P(x= 1,y= 1))
=−P(x= 0) ·P(y= 0|x= 0) · log2(P(x= 0) ·P(y= 0|x= 0))
−P(x= 0) ·P(y= 1|x= 0) · log2(P(x= 0) ·P(y= 1|x= 0))
−P(x= 1) ·P(y= 0|x= 1) · log2(P(x= 1) ·P(y= 0|x= 1))
−P(x= 1) ·P(y= 1|x= 1) · log2(P(x= 1) ·P(y= 1|x= 1))
(4.20)
Referring to Figure 2.2, on the BSC with error probability pe, this will achieve its maxi-
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mum value when X (and Y ) is uniform, i.e. when P(x0) = P(x1) = 12 ,
Ca =max
P(x)
{I(X ,Y )}=−1
2
(1− pe) log2
(
1− pe
2
)
− 1
2
pe log2
( pe
2
)
− 1
2
pe log2
( pe
2
)
− 1
2
(1− pe) log2
(
1− pe
2
)
=−pe log2
( pe
2
)
− (1− pe) log2
(
1− pe
2
)
=−pe log2 (pe)− (1− pe) log2 (1− pe)+ pe log2 2+(1− pe) log2 2
=−pe log2 (pe)− (1− pe) log2 (1− pe)+ log2 2
= 1− pe log2 (pe)− (1− pe) log2 (1− pe)
= 1−H(X)
(4.21)
4.7.2 Capacity of the Binary Erasure Channel
On a BEC with probability of erasure ps, if n bits are transmitted then (1− ps)n bits are
received correctly on average. For large n, it is very likely that the actual number of
(correctly) received bits will be close to this average. Information can be transmitted
reliably at a rate of at most 1− ps bits per channel use i.e. for the BEC, Ca = 1− ps.
4.7.3 Capacity of the Binary Deletion Channel
Mitzenmacher (2006) notes that:
Currently, we have no closed-form expression for the capacity, nor do we
have an efficient algorithmic means to numerically compute this capacity.
4.7.4 Capacity of other Channels
As the equivocation of codes transmitted across the BSEC channel is not directly exam-
ined here and the focus is on comparing code equivocations rather than capacity, the
capacity of the other channels previously mentioned in Chapter 2, namely the BSEC
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and WTC will not be discussed further here.
4.8 Information Leakage
Smith (2011) discusses how, for an eavesdropper, comparing the uncertainty about a
source X before and after seeing the value of the output Y can indicate the information
leakage available to the eavesdropper:
leakage = initial uncertainty− remaining uncertainty (4.22)
which leads to defining leakage as mutual information
leakage = H(X)−H(X |Y ) = I(X ;Y ) (4.23)
4.9 Conclusion
This chapter has introduced the notion of information and extended it to consider the
conditional entropy or equivocation of a code being transmitted across a channel in
order to gain a measure of the level of ambiguity and inherent secrecy of the arrange-
ment. Whilst equivocation and channel capacity are closely related, the main focus will
be on calculating the normalised equivocation. Equivocation will be used extensively
over the next 3 chapters to compare the qualities of different codes when transmitted
across BSC, BEC and modifications of these.
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Chapter 5
Calculation of Equivocation through Paral-
lel Processing
5.1 Introduction
Chapter 5 details the methods used to calculate the equivocation of various codes
when transmitted across the BSC. Subsequent chapters will extend the programming
techniques used in this chapter to examine modifications of the BSC that incorporate
intentional erasures and deletions as well as looking at the BEC. With adaptation, the
techniques could potentially be transferred to the other arrangements well. Future work
could investigate extending onwards to other channels such as the BSEC, BDC, Ad-
ditive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) Channel or Fading channels. The BDC would
create technical challenges due to the difficulty of identifying the locations of deleted
bits and the complexity of ensuing calculations, whilst the AWGN or Fading channels
would potentially require a substantially revised approach to the calculation of condi-
tional probabilities and equivocation values. Two slightly different routes through the
calculations are taken in this chapter in order to reduce the time taken to perform the
calculations. Once the initial process had been established, the process was adapted
to enable parallel processing to be used. The use of a parallel processing method per-
mitted substantial increases in efficiency and the calculation of equivocation for longer
codes. Code expansion will also be introduced as a simple method for increasing the
equivocation of a code, although the method brings with it a significant increase in the
number of bits that need to be transmitted and received and a significant time penalty.
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The key outcomes of Chapter 5 were published by Schofield et al. (2015).
5.2 Equivocation Calculations
Full calculation of the equivocation for a code can be very intensive. For an [n,k,d] bi-
nary linear code, there are 2k possible messages of length k and corresponding code-
words of length n. For each of these, there are 2n possible errors that could occur
during transmission. Therefore to calculate the probabilities of all possible output mes-
sages for all possible input messages, there are 2k×2n = 2n+k possible calculations to
perform, which renders it an EXPTIME problem. So even for the very simple Hamming
[7,4,3] code, with only 16 possible messages, there are 24+7 = 211 = 2048 calculations.
For the Golay [23,12,7] code, there are 235 = 3.436×1010 calculations: over 34 billion.
This increases exponentially as the code lengths increase.
In order to perform these calculations for any significant length of code, a software
solution was implemented. The solution uses some symmetrical properties of codes
and parallel processing to achieve a more efficient calculation.
The development of a software solution using parallel processing for calculating the
equivocation of a code was done in three stages:
1. Develop the calculation on a spreadsheet for a very short code as a proof of
concept.
2. Develop the calculation in C++ using linear programming.
3. Develop the calculation in C++ / CUDA using parallel processing.
5.2.1 Calculating Equivocation - Method 1
Two main linear methods for calculating equivocation were implemented. Each yields
the same net calculation via slightly different pathways. A summary of the encoding
/ correction / decoding process is shown in Figure 5.1. The original message m is
encoded as the codeword x before transmission across the BSC. Upon receipt, the
codeword r may have been affected by an error vector v and must be corrected by
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BSCEncoder Correction Decoderm x= mG r = x+ v y= r+ c mest
Figure 5.1: BSC encoding / decoding process
the addition of a vector c to obtain the codeword y. Finally, the corrected codeword
is decoded to the message estimate mest . If the generator matrix was in standard
form, then the decoding process is just a case of taking the first k bits of the received,
corrected codeword. Compared to the earlier description of the BSC in Figure 2.3,
the processes carried out on the received codeword r to obtain the message estimate
have been separated into two clear components; the attempt to correct any error and
the decoding of the corrected codeword to obtain the message. This is to enable a
clearer description of the two processes. hannon
The first algorithm which was used to calculate the equivocation of a code during early
iterations of developing a software solution to the calculation is shown below:
1. Take an input message, mi and its codeword, xi = miG.
2. Add each of the 2n possible error vectors e j to find each of the 2n possible received
codewords, r j = xi+ v j and their respective syndromes, s j = r jHT .
3. Using the syndromes as a guide, calculate the correction c j to be applied to each
received vector.
4. Calculate the corrected version, y j = r j+ c j of each of the possible 2n received
codewords and decode to find the message estimate, mest .
5. Find the probability, P(y j|xi) of receiving that message (or codeword), given the
input message.
6. Use these probabilities to find the equivocation, H(Y |X).
A working spreadsheet example was produced for both the Hamming [7,4,3] Code
and the Extended [8,4,4] version of the code. Even for these small codes, with either
27= 128 or 28= 256 possible errors, the full calculation is becoming difficult to reproduce
in document format.
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For the Extended Hamming [8,4,4] code, there are 24 = 16 different possible input
messages. Once encoded and transmitted as an 8-bit codeword, there are 28 = 256
different possible combinations of errors that could be introduced during transmission
across the channel:
v0 =
(
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
)
v1 =
(
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
)
...
v254 =
(
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
)
v255 =
(
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
)
When transmitting the codeword via a binary symmetric channel, the probability of an
error occurring in any single bit takes a constant value of pe. Thus the probability of
an 8-bit codeword being transmitted and there being no errors introduced is: (1− pe)8.
So if pe = 0.01, the probability of the codeword being received without any errors is
(1−0.01)8 = 0.998 = 0.9227 (4 s. f .).The probability of an error being transmitted only in
a single specified position is 0.01×(1−0.01)7= 0.01×0.997= 0.00932 (5 s. f .). But since
a single error is equally likely to occur in any position, the probability of a single error be-
ing transmitted in any position is:
8
1
0.01×(1−0.01)7 = 0.07456 (5s. f .). Similarly, the
probability of two errors occurring at any location is
8
2
0.012× (1− 0.01)6 = 0.00264
(5 s. f .). More generally, for an n-bit codeword, the probability of there being exactly ε
errors transmitted is
P(ε) =
n
ε
 pεe(1− pe)n−ε (5.1)
Once the probability of errors occurring is known, this can be used to find the entropy
and the equivocation of the code.
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For the Extended Hamming [8,4,4] code, in standard format, the generator and parity
check matrices are shown in Equation 5.2 and Equation 5.3.
G =

1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1

(5.2)
H =

1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1

(5.3)
If the message m0 =
(
0 0 0 0
)
is encoded as the input codeword
x0=
(
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
)
, then there are 28= 256 possible error vectors v j,where j=
0,1, ...,(28−1) that could be introduced during transmission with corresponding vectors
r j = x0+ v j that could be received. However only 24 = 16 of the vectors will yield valid
codewords. The probability of all of these outcomes can be calculated and recorded
and is best done by considering the error vectors in increasing weight order, as in
Table 5.1. When multiplied by the transpose of the parity check matrix, each received
codeword will give one of the 24 = 16 different possible syndromes, s= yHT .
The error vector with the lowest weight that yields each syndrome will be correctly
decoded. This error vector c is then used as the correction that is ‘subtracted’ (or added
in base 2) from the received vector each time that syndrome is obtained, giving the
corrected version of the received vector y= r+c. An estimate of the original message,
mest can then be obtained from the ‘corrected’ codeword y.
However, if more than one error occurred during transmission, some of the corrections
that are applied to the received codeword will be wrong, because the code can only
correct 1 error. Hence in some cases the wrong estimate of the original message will be
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obtained. For the 256 possible output messages, 16 will have been correctly ‘corrected’
to the message m0 =
(
0 0 0 0
)
and, for the remaining 240 possible outputs, 16
will have been incorrectly ‘corrected’ to each of the 15 other possible messages, from
m1 =
(
0 0 0 1
)
to m15 =
(
1 1 1 1
)
.
For example,
• the error vector
(
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
)
with weight 1 is the first vector that
yields a syndrome of
(
0 1 0 1
)
.
• the error vector
(
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
)
with weight 2 also yields a syndrome
of
(
0 1 0 1
)
.
• therefore
(
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
)
is corrected by subtracting (or adding)(
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
)
to give a ‘corrected’ codeword of(
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
)
• this gives an incorrect message estimate of mest = m1 =
(
0 0 0 1
)
Message Transmitted Codeword
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Received Probability Syndrome Corrected Message
Codeword P(r j|x0) Codeword Estimate
Estimate y j
00000000 0.922744694428 0000 00000000 0000
00000001 0.009320653479 0001 00000000 0000
00000010 0.009320653479 0010 00000000 0000
00000100 0.009320653479 0100 00000000 0000
00001000 0.009320653479 1000 00000000 0000
00010000 0.009320653479 0101 00000000 0000
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Message Transmitted Codeword
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Received Probability Syndrome Corrected Message
Codeword P(r j|x0) Codeword Estimate
Estimate y j
00100000 0.009320653479 0110 00000000 0000
01000000 0.009320653479 1001 00000000 0000
10000000 0.009320653479 1010 00000000 0000
00000011 0.000094148015 0011 00000000 0000
00000101 0.000094148015 0101 00010101 0001
00000110 0.000094148015 0110 00100110 0010
00001001 0.000094148015 1001 01001001 0100
00001010 0.000094148015 1010 10001010 1000
00001100 0.000094148015 1100 00000000 0000
00010001 0.000094148015 0100 00010101 0001
00010010 0.000094148015 0111 00000000 0000
...
...
...
...
...
10111111 9.90E-15 0110 10011111 1001
11011111 9.90E-15 1001 10011111 1001
11101111 9.90E-15 1010 01101111 0110
11110111 9.90E-15 0111 11100101 1110
11111011 9.90E-15 1011 10111001 1011
11111101 9.90E-15 1101 11100101 1110
11111110 9.90E-15 1110 11010110 1101
11111111 1.00E-16 1111 10011111 1001
Table 5.1: Hamming [8,4,4] Code - Error Dependent Syndrome Decoding
Once all possible message estimates have been established, the probability of getting
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each output codeword given the input codeword, P(y j|xi) can be calculated by summing
the individual probabilities. So:
P(y j|x0) = ∑
y j=x0
P(r j|x0) (5.4)
=⇒
P(y0|x0) = 0.9227+8×0.00932+7×9.41×10−5 = 0.997969
P(y1|x0) = 3×9.41×10−5+5×9.51×10−7+5×9.61×10−9
+3×9.70×10−11 = 0.000287
...
...
P(y15|x0) = 9.41×10−5+4×9.51×10−7+5×9.61×10−9
+4×9.70×10−11+2×9.80×10−13 = 9.80×10−5
Similarly, the other possible message estimates generate Table 5.2.
Message Estimate Probability
P(y0|x0) = 0.997969
P(y1|x0) = 0.000287
P(y2|x0) = 0.000289
P(y3|x0) = 0.000192
P(y4|x0) = 0.000289
P(y5|x0) = 0.000192
P(y6|x0) = 4.86×10−8
P(y7|x0) = 4.80×10−6
P(y8|x0) = 0.000289
P(y9|x0) = 3.9×10−8
P(y10|x0) = 0.000192
P(y11|x0) = 1.95×10−6
P(y12|x0) = 0.000192
P(y13|x0) = 1.95×10−6
P(y14|x0) = 1×10−6
P(y15|x0) = 9.80×10−5
Table 5.2: Extended Hamming [8,4,4] Code - Conditional Probabilities
Since the output is dependent on the input, P(xi,y j) = P(xi)P(y j|xi), so to calculate
values of P(xi,y j), the probabilities must be considered as possible outcomes of the
whole data set and should be multiplied by P(xi) = 12k . Since P(xi) = 1/2
4 = 1/16, we
obtain the probabilities in Table 5.3.
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Message Estimate Probability
P(x0,y0) = 0.06237
P(x0,y1) = 1.80×10−5
P(x0,y2) = 1.81×10−5
P(x0,y3) = 1.20×10−5
P(x0,y4) = 1.81×10−5
P(x0,y5) = 1.20×10−5
P(x0,y6) = 3.04×10−9
P(x0,y7) = 3.00×10−7
P(x0,y8) = 1.81×10−5
P(x0,y9) = 2.44×10−9
P(x0,y10) = 1.20×10−5
P(x0,y11) = 1.22×10−7
P(x0,y12) = 1.20×10−5
P(x0,y13) = 1.22×10−7
P(x0,y14) = 6.25×10−8
P(x0,y15) = 6.13×10−6
Table 5.3: Hamming [8,4,4] Code - Joint Probabilities
From Equation 4.10, the joint entropy for the code is the summation of the individual
entropies, giving H(x0,Y ) as
H(x0,Y ) = 0.06237log2(
1
0.06237)
+1.80×10−5 log2( 11.80×10−5 )+1.81×10−5 log2( 11.81×10−5 )
+1.20×10−5 log2( 11.20×10−5 )+1.81×10−5 log2( 11.81×10−5 )
+1.20×10−5 log2( 11.20×10−5 )+3.04×10−9 log2( 13.04×10−9 )
+3.00×10−7 log2( 13.00×10−7 )+1.81×10−5 log2( 11.81×10−5 )
+2.44×10−9 log2( 12.44×10−9 )+1.20×10−5 log2( 11.20×10−5 )
+1.22×10−7 log2( 11.22×10−7 )+1.20×10−5 log2( 11.20×10−5 )
+1.80×10−7 log2( 11.80×10−7 )+1.80×10−8 log2( 11.80×10−8 )
+6.13×10−6 log2( 16.13×10−6 )
= 0.25717
So far, the probabilities have been calculated given that the input message was m0 =
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(
0000
)
. However these probabilities must be considered in light of all possible 2k mes-
sages, of which m0 is just one. No matter what message is input, the errors will affect
the transmission process with the same probabilities as for m0, giving a symmetry to
the probability calculations for each message and associated transmitted codeword.
Therefore the sum of the entropies of the possible inputs and outputs is as per Equa-
tion 5.5.
H(X ,Y ) = ∑
xi∈X
H(xi,Y ) = 2k×H(x0,Y ) = 16×0.25717= 4.02748 (5.5)
If the 2k input messages are equally likely, P(xi) = 12k , the entropy of the source for the
Extended Hamming [8,4,4] Code is
H(X) = ∑
xi∈X
P(xi) log2(
1
P(xi)
) = 24× 1
24
× log2
1
1/24
= log2 2
4 = 4 (5.6)
Therefore from Equation 4.13, the equivocation is
H(Y |X) = H(X ,Y )−H(X) = 4.02748−4= 0.02748 (5.7)
This process can be repeated for any pe, 0≤ pe ≤ 0.5.
5.2.2 Calculating Equivocation - Method 2
Once the first method had been developed and a sound understanding of the process
of calculating equivocation had been gained, it became important to develop an equiv-
alent method that gave the same result but with maximum efficiency and that lent itself
to parallel processing.
For one message (m0) and its codeword (x0):
1. Add successively weighted error vectors.
2. Note for which errors each syndrome is obtained first. These are the errors that
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can be correctly corrected.
3. Operating on batches of codewords at a time, add the 2n−k error vectors to each
of the 2k codewords in turn
4. Record the weights and probabilities P(r j|x0), (0 ≤ a ≤ 2n−k) of the resulting re-
ceived codewords.
5. Use these 2n probabilities to find the equivocation.
Again using the Extended Hamming [8,4,4] code as a worked example, by working
through the set of possible error vectors in order until each possible syndrome has
been obtained for the first time, Table 5.4 is produced. The first occurrence of each
syndrome is highlighted in bold.
Message Encoded Codeword
m0 = 0000 x0 = 0000000
Received Probability Syndrome
Codeword r j P(r j|x0)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.922744694428 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.009320653479 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.009320653479 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.009320653479 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.009320653479 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.009320653479 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.009320653479 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.009320653479 1 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.009320653479 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.000094148015 0 0 1 1
00000101 0.000094148015 0101
00000110 0.000094148015 0110
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Message Encoded Codeword
m0 = 0000 x0 = 0000000
Received Probability Syndrome
Codeword r j P(r j|x0)
00001001 0.000094148015 1001
00001010 0.000094148015 1010
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0.000094148015 1 1 0 0
00010001 0.000094148015 0100
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0.000094148015 0 1 1 1
00010100 0.000094148015 0001
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0.000094148015 1 1 0 1
00100001 0.000094148015 0111
00100010 0.000094148015 0100
00100100 0.000094148015 0010
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0.000094148015 1 1 1 0
00110000 0.000094148015 0011
01000001 0.000094148015 1000
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.000094148015 1 0 1 1
01000100 0.000094148015 1101
01001000 0.000094148015 0001
01010000 0.000094148015 1100
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.000094148015 1 1 1 1
Table 5.4: Hamming [7,4,3] Code - Error Dependent Syndrome Decoding
As before with Method 1, P(y j|x0) can be calculated by summing the individual proba-
bilities, so:
P(y0|x0) = 0.9227+8×0.00932+7×0.0000941= 0.997969 (5.8)
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This value is used as before to contribute towards the calculation of the entropy values
and the equivocation of the code.
Up until this point, the same algorithm has been used as for method 1. However
now that all the lowest weight error vectors that generate unique syndromes have been
found, the remainder of the process can be broken into more manageable, independent
batches. The process is therefore able to be calculated using parallel processing.
To calculate P(y1|x0), only the codewords identified in the previous step as yielding the
first occurrence of each syndrome need to be used. These are added to the codeword
generated by the message m1 =
(
0001
)
, namely x1 =
(
0010101
)
. This gives the
received codewords and associated probabilities shown in Table 5.5.
Message Encoded Codeword
m1 = 0001 x1 = 0010101
Received Codeword Probability Syndrome
r j P(r j|x1)
00010101 9.51×10−7 0000
00010100 9.41×10−5 0001
00010111 9.61×10−9 0010
00010001 9.41×10−5 0100
00011101 9.61×10−9 1000
00000101 9.41×10−5 0101
00110101 9.61×10−9 0110
01010101 9.61×10−9 1001
10010101 9.61×10−9 1010
00010110 9.51×10−7 0011
00011001 9.51×10−7 1100
00000111 9.51×10−7 0111
00001101 9.51×10−7 1101
00111101 9.70×10−11 1110
01010111 9.70×10−11 1011
01110101 9.70×10−11 1111
Table 5.5: Hamming [8,4,4] Code - Error Dependent Syndrome Decoding
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Summing these probabilities as before gives Equation 5.9.
P(y1|x0) = 3×9.41×10−5
+ 5×9.51×10−7
+ 5×9.61×10−9
+ 3×9.70×10−11
= 2.87×10−4
(5.9)
The equivalent of Table 5.2 can be constructed by repeating this process for every
possible message and its associated codeword. From this point onwards, the process
for calculating the entropies and the equivocation of the code is the same as for Method
1.
Once the code equivocation has been calculated for a single probability of error on the
BSC, the calculation can be repeated for multiple other probabilities. By doing this, a
table and graph of normalised equivocation values (or equivocation per information bit)
can be constructed as in Table 5.6 and Figure 5.2 for the Extended Hamming [8,4,4]
Code.
Probability of Error on BSC Equivocation Normalised Equivocation
0.01 0.0275 0.0069
0.05 0.4064 0.1016
0.10 1.1132 0.2783
0.15 1.8442 0.4610
0.20 2.4939 0.6235
0.25 3.0222 0.7556
0.30 3.4215 0.8554
0.35 4.7013 0.9253
0.40 3.8784 0.9696
0.45 3.9721 0.9930
0.50 4 1
Table 5.6: Extended Hamming [8,4,4] Code - Equivocation and Normalised Equivoca-
tion values
Whilst Figure 5.2 shows normalised equivocation values for a single code, subsequent
results will enable the comparison of normalised equivocation levels for different codes,
85
5.3. PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION
Figure 5.2: Equivocation for Extended Hamming [8,4,4] Code for different BSC error
probabilities
modifications of those codes and for different channel arrangements. Thus it becomes
possible to identify codes and code modifications that yield improved equivocation lev-
els and thereby offer greater levels of secrecy to legitimate users against illegitimate
users on an eavesdropper channel of greater noise level.
5.3 Program Implementation
During the development of an efficient program to calculate the equivocation of a code,
early iterations employed linear programming to work through a program sequentially.
This created a need to repeatedly call sections of code many times. Shoup’s Number
Theory Library “NTL" (Shoup 2015) was used extensively during this phase, primarily
for vector and matrix manipulation over the GF2 field.
NTL is described as:
“a high-performance, portable C++ library providing data structures and al-
gorithms for manipulating signed arbitrary length integers and for vectors,
matrices, and polynomials over the integers and over finite fields.”
In this respect, NTL worked well during the earlier stages of development, however
as the development of the program continued and more parallel programming tech-
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niques were introduced, the challenges of porting the library from a linear to a parallel
methodology meant that it became of less use.
5.3.1 Useful Algorithms
Generation of binary numbers in numerical order
In order to step from one binary number to the next in numerical order, the algorithm
below was used intially:
1. Start from the right-hand, least significant bit (lsb) of the current binary number,
bit n
2. Add ‘1’ to the lsb
3. If the result of the sum is a ‘0’, add ‘1’ to the next most significant bit. Repeat until
a value of ‘1’ results from the sum.
e.g. To generate the next binary number in numerical order after(
11 02 13 04 05 16 17 18
)
• Add ‘1’ to the lsb ‘1’ (bit 8), resulting in a lsb of ‘0’
• Add ‘1’ to bit 7, becoming ‘0’
• Add ‘1’ to bit 6, becoming ‘0’
• Add ‘1’ to bit 5, becoming ‘1’ - STOP
• Bits 4,3,2,1 unchanged
• This gives the next binary number in numerical order of(
11 02 13 04 15 06 07 08
)
In later work, however, as the use of bitwise manipulation of numbers became the
preferred method, this process became redundant as only a trivial increment of the
variable was required. However, it did act as a useful stepping stone to the process of
generating the binary numbers in weight order.
87
5.3. PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION
Generation of binary numbers in weight order
In order to step from one binary number to the next in weight order, the algorithm below
was used:
1. Start from the right-hand, lsb of the current binary number
2. Working from lsb to most significant bit (msb) (i.e. from right to left), locate the
first ‘1’ bit that can be shifted left (i.e. the first ’1’ bit that has a ’0’ it the left of it)
3. Shift this bit left
4. Shift any bits to the right of this bit as far to the right as possible
5. If no bits exist that can be shifted left, then no further binary numbers of the
current weight exist. Shift all i set bits back to the right-most positions and set the
next MSB to 1.
e.g. To generate the next binary number in weight order after 18410,(
11 02 13 14 15 06 07 08
)
,
• Starting from the right, bit ’3’ is the first ‘1’ bit that has a ’0’ to the left of it and is
therefore able to be shifted to the left
• Bit 3 is shifted left to position 2
• The remaining ‘1’ bits to the right of this, in positions 4 and 5, must all be shifted
as far right as possible i.e. to positions 7 and 8
• This gives the next binary number in weight order of(
11 12 03 04 05 06 17 18
)
= 19510
e.g.2 From step 5,
(
11 12 13 04 05 06 97 98
)
= 22410 would automatically be-
come
(
01 02 03 04 15 16 17 18
)
= 1510
When considering 5-bit numbers (for brevity), the process above will yield a set of
binary numbers in weight order as shown in Appendix A.
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5.3.2 Parallelisation of Calculations
The high volume of calculations needed to evaluate the equivocation of a code of any
significant length means that on a standard laptop or desktop computer, the length of
time needed to run a calculation is the dominant limiting factor (although memory can
also be a limiting factor). When performing the calculation via a linear process, the
implementation could calculate the equivocation for codes of length n < 32, but little
more. To overcome this, stages of the calculation needed to be performed in parallel
i.e. a single process that can be called many times concurrently. To parallelise the cal-
culation, a computer capable of running Nvidia’s CUDA architecture and programming
model was used.
Graphics Processing Units evolved to take some of the load for managing the graphical
output requirements of a computer away from the CPU. Over time, GPUs have become
increasingly capable devices for performing relatively simple, repetitive operations in
parallel and at high speed, extending their remit beyond graphics and evolving into
General Purpose GPU (GPGPUs).
CUDA (Compute Unified Device Architecture) is a parallel computing platform and pro-
gramming model created by Nvidia (Nvidia 2015). It is implemented by computers
with CUDA-capable Nvidia GPUs, with the main CPU acting as the ‘host’ for the linear
component of a program which then delegates responsibility for running parallelised
sections of code to the GPU ‘device’ (Sanders & Kandbrot 2011). The task of efficient
delegation and management of resources is largely done by the CUDA architecture
and programming model.
In this case, a laptop with an i7 processor, 12GB of RAM and the CUDA enabled
GeForce GTX470M GPU with 288 cores and 2GB of RAM was used. Different GPUs
and versions have different capabilities. Whilst the GTX740M GPU is designed for a
laptop device, it was still able to offer a CUDA compute capability of 3.5, enabling it to
comfortably access a sufficiently capable version of the CUDA programming model.
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The laptop was configured to run Ubuntu 14.04 LTS. Within this platform, Eclipse was
used as an Integrated Development Environment for writing the code, along with the
Nvidia CUDA Compiler NVCC and Nsight for Eclipse, an add-on for Eclipse to enable
development of the CUDA specific code.
The main program is run on the CPU. A section of code within the main program,
similar to a function and called a kernel, can be written for the GPU device to execute.
Each instance of the kernel is called a thread. The CUDA architecture enables multiple
threads to be run concurrently. These threads can be grouped together into blocks and
the blocks can be grouped as warps. In order to pass references to variables between
the host and the device, pointers were used.
Numerous limitations on memory capacity and processing speed, caused by the ar-
chitecture and capability of the CPU and GPU, enforced compromises and constraints
on block sizes and the grouping together of blocks into batches. For example with a
setup with compute capability 3.5, a maximum of 210 = 1024 threads are permitted per
block. Similarly, a maximum of 231− 1 blocks are permitted. This implies a maximum
of 241−210 threads per kernel call. In practice, however, the 2GB RAM of the GPU and
the dynamic limitations of how much contiguous memory can be allocated to a single
variable pointer meant that significantly smaller batches of blocks could be used at any
time to prevent memory overflow.
One of the greatest sources of problems encountered during this work was secondary
issues arising from using the GPU to parallel process the calculations, despite it provid-
ing more time-efficient calculations. The parallel processing load detracted significantly
from the GPUs ability to simultaneously perform its more normal duties. This caused
intolerable delays in user input and screen refresh rates, often causing the computer
to crash. In addition, the significant time taken learning how to program in the CUDA
environment created a large time overhead.
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5.3.3 Implementation Iterations
The development of the software to calculate code equivocation was undertaken as a
series of iterations, with each iteration evolving from and building on the previous one.
Five iterations were produced that adopted a linear approach to programming before
swapping to a parallel approach and producing fourteen further iterations. During the
linear phase, NTL was used extensively, however this caused issued when trying to
integrate the NTL functions with the CUDA architecture. The key differences between
the parallel iterations are summarised in Table 5.7.
Iteration Key developments
Number
1 First conversion of a linear solution to a parallel solution. NTL functions used
previously not working. Variables used with a kernel function must be declared
locally or copied into CUDA memory space. Not considered feasible to do this
with all background NTL variables.
2 Improved CUDA memory allocation and use of variable pointers.
3 Conversion of NTL GF2 format vectors to integer format, so that pointers to
vector variables can be sent to the CUDA kernel. Enables error vectors to be
dealt with in parallel.
4 Improved memory allocation and de-allocation. Codewords and error vectors
treated as integers throughout, rather than being converted from GF2 vectors.
More efficient rolling calculation of H(X ,Y ).
5 Minor changes - housekeeping / tidying up
6 Minor changes only.
7 Creation of a second parallel processing task by a distinct kernel. The first
kernel calculates the weights of the received vectors. The new kernel uses the
vector weights to calculate the P(X ,Y ) joint probability for each error probability
pe, a task previously done by a linear loop.
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Iteration Key developments
Number
8 Improved efficiency of second kernel, calculating combined probabilities. In-
corporation of mutual entropy calculation into second kernel, changing the
sub-task from a linear one to a parallel one.
9 Attempt to calculate message encoding into a codeword as a parallel task
within the first kernel. Discontinued since this could be done more efficiently
by NTL in the linear part of the program.
10 Calculation is limited by hardware and architecture constraints. With a CUDA-
imposed maximum of 1024 threads per block and a memory limit on the
amount of block data that the GPU can store at any time, a compromise be-
tween linear and parallel processing must be introduced. The maximum num-
ber of blocks processed at any time is limited to a batch size of 1024. Linearly
processed loops control the parallel process.
11 Interim version, aimed at improving integration of codeword production mem-
ory control into batch process.
12 Minor changes - housekeeping / tidying up.
13 Further optimisation of batch size control. Separation of task into a standalone
function. This version is used for the majority of code equivocation and pro-
gram run-time calculations presented in the report.
14 Interval between error probabilities decreased from 0.05 to 0.01. Equivocation
values now being calculated for 51 values rather than 11, increasing calcula-
tion run times by a factor of 5. Yielding much smoother output graphs with
fewer discontinuities, this version is used for the generation of most of the
output graphs in the report.
Table 5.7: Key differences between software iterations
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5.3.4 CUDA Coding
In the main part of a program, a CUDA kernel (Sanders & Kandbrot 2011) called
getWts can be called by the CPU host by the code:
getWts«<*blocks,*threads»>(d_Ctx, d_EV, d_powK, d_powNK, d_n, d_wts);
The triple angled brackets indicate that the function is a kernel to be run on the GPU
device and define the number of blocks and threads to be created by each instance of
the kernel. Parameters in the brackets are pointer variables to be used by the kernel.
As malloc can be used to allocate CPU memory for use by pointers, so cudaMalloc
can be used in a similar fashion to allocate GPU memory for use by pointers within the
device. Prior to calling a kernel, any required host variables must be copied to device
memory, using the cudaMemCpy function. The code for the kernel to be run in parallel
by the device is indicated by the __global__ function.
__global__ void getWts(int* Ctx, int* EV, long*
powK, long* powNK, int* n, int* wts)
{
long id = blockIdx.x * blockDim.x
+ threadIdx.x;
long wt = 0;
for (long i = 0; i < *powNK; i++ )
{
wt = 0;
for (int j = 0; j < *n; j++)
{
if ( ( ( *(Ctx + id*(*n) + j) +
*(EV + i*(*n) + j ) ) % 2 ) == 1)
{
wt++;
}
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}
(*(wts + id * (*n+1) + wt ))++;
}
}
The values held by variables such as blockDim.x, blockIdx.x and threadIdx.x
identify the number of threads per block and the identity of the block or thread be-
ing executed. This enables each individual thread to access the specific data that it
requires.
The central part of the function is used to add each bit of the error vector (pointed to
by the variable ‘EV’) to each bit of the transmitted codeword (pointed to by the variable
‘Ctx’) and then to find the weight of the resultant vector. A record of the weight of
each received vector is then stored in memory space allocated to the GPU device
and pointed to by the variable ‘wts’. The nested ‘for’ loops enable this to be carried
out for each bit of every error vector. The parallelisation of the program enables the
process to be done in batches for every possible codeword, thereby considering every
possible combination of codeword and error vector. A second kernel then uses batch
processing to calculate the summation of the probabilities of the received codeword
weights, enabling the entropies and the equivocation to be calculated.
5.4 Results
A graph showing the normalised equivocation values of some perfect and extended
perfect codes is shown in Figure 5.3 and reproduced in log− log form in Figure 5.4.
Of the Hamming codes examined, the longer codes exhibited higher levels of nor-
malised equivocation than the shorter ones. Hamming [31,26,3] has higher normalised
equivocation values than Hamming [15,11,3], which in turn, has higher values than
Hamming [7,4,3]. For pe . 0.17, Hamming codes also have higher normalised equivo-
cation values than the Golay [23,12,7] code. However this is offset by the Golay code
benefitting from its ability to correct up to 3 errors, whilst the Hamming codes can only
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Figure 5.3: Normalized equivocation of some perfect codes and their extensions
correct a single error.
Figure 5.4: log− log graph for normalised equivocation of perfect codes
A comparison of the normalised equivocation of the perfect Golay [23,12,7] code and
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the two random [23,12] codes, code A and code B, whose standard form generator
matrices, GA and GB are given below was performed and the results are shown in
Figure 5.5.. The first k columns of each matrix form a k× k identity matrix, while the
remaining n− k columns are populated with randomly distributed bits.
GA =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0

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GB =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1

This shows that random codes can possess higher levels of equivocation (and there-
fore secrecy) than a perfect code, although their error correcting capabilities may be
significantly less.
The normalised equivocation values of some longer Best Known Linear Codes are
shown in Figure 5.6 and show comparatively little difference between the codes as
code length increases.
A log− log graph, concentrating on the range 0.01 ≤ pe ≤ 0.1 is shown in Figure 5.7 to
highlight the similarity between the results.
The BKLCs used in Figure 5.6 were originally chosen to demonstrate the different
lengths of time that the parallelised calculation would take as code lengths increased
(discussed in subsection 5.4.1). They were not known to possess similar properties
to each other, however as the code length increases, the gradients of their respective
equivocation curves become increasingly similar to one another. The expanded log
scale graph of Figure 5.7 highlights these similarities.
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Figure 5.5: Normalized equivocation of Golay [23,12,7] and two random [23,12] codes
For all codes examined, the normalised equivocation is an increasing function when
expressed as a function of the probability of error pe on a binary symmetric channel.
However the rate of increase is often at its lowest in the ranges 0 ≤ pe . 0.05 and
0.4. pe. 0.5, while the rate of increase is often at its highest in the range 0.05. pe. 0.2
. Given that it may be common for a legitimate receiver to receive the signal through
a channel with a low probability of transmission error and for an illegitimate receiver to
receive the signal with a markedly higher probability of transmission error, this could
be of use when developing codes that are designed to maximise the differences in
ambiguity levels between a legitimate and illegitimate receiver.
Such an approach enables a move away from theoretical situations, where both the
legitimate recipient and the eavesdropper have a perfect channel, towards situations
where both channels may involve a level of signal degradation. By accepting and
managing a level of degradation for the legitimate recipient, more coding schemes
could be made available that provide a significantly higher level of equivocation for an
eavesdropper than for the legitimate receiver. The nature of the channels becomes a
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Figure 5.6: Normalized equivocation of longer Best Known Linear Codes
Figure 5.7: log− log graph for normalised equivocation of BKLC
means of providing security.
For example, if when transmitting data using the Golay [23,12,7] code on the BSC, if the
legitimate receiver has a pe of 0.01 whilst the eavesdropper has a net error probability
of 0.1, the legitimate receiver will face a normalised equivocation level of 0.000148.
The eavesdropper on the other hand has an equivocation value of 0.205, some 1385
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times greater.
5.4.1 Calculation Times
The times taken to calculate equivocation values for some Best Known Linear Codes
are shown in Table 5.8.
Code Linear time (s) Parallel time (s) Linear : Parallel
ratio
BKLC [30,20,5] 3466 (≈ 58min) 105.99 33 : 1
BKLC [31,21,5] 6880 (1hr 54m) 238.6 29 : 1
BKLC [32,22,5] 13702 (3.8hr) 444 31 : 1
BKLC [33,21,6] 27048 (7.5hr) 780 35 : 1
BKLC [33,23,5] 27634 (7.7hr) 1021 27 : 1
BKLC [36,25,5] not reasonably calculable 6760 -
BKLC [36,26,4] not reasonably calculable 8878 (2.5 hr) -
BKLC [40,27,6] not reasonably calculable 91875 (25.5 hr) -
Table 5.8: Time to calculate equivocation for longer BKLCs
The times taken to calculate equivocation values for some perfect codes and their
extensions are shown in Table 5.9.
Code Linear time (s) Parallel time (s) Linear : Parallel
ratio
Hamming [7,4,3] 0.0174 0.068 1 : 4
Extended Hamming [8,4,4] 0.021 0.084 1 : 4
Hamming [15,11,3] 0.991 0.147 7 : 1
Golay [23,12,7] 67.996 4.48 15 : 1
Extended Golay [24,12,8] 238.6 17.8 13 : 1
Hamming [31,26,3] 33961 3809 9 : 1
Table 5.9: Time to calculate equivocation for some perfect codes and their extensions
Both Table 5.8 and Table 5.9 show a significant increase in the calculation times as the
code length increases. Once code lengths approaching n = 36 or higher are consid-
ered, the linear calculation on a standard laptop takes sufficiently long as to cease to
be reasonably calculable. In this work, an unreasonable calculation was considered
to be one that took in excess of 2 days to complete. This was due to the requirement
to run a privately owned laptop at maximum processor capability for extended periods
of time. Whilst the linear method is actually quicker for very short length codes, the
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parallel method soon becomes the preferred solution, producing a result more quickly
for all code lengths where n> 10. The results for longer length codes show that signif-
icant gains can be made, with calculations being performed by the parallel processing
method up to 35 times quicker than by the linear method in the instance of the BKLC
[33,21,6] code.
When considering the different ratios between the calculation times of the parallal pro-
cessed and linear methods, a possible trend is visible but it is hard to draw any rigorous
conclusions from these. Table 5.9 show a general improvement in the linear:parallel
ratio from 1:4 for Hamming[7,4,3] up to 15:1 for Golay[23,12,7], however the addition
of an extra bit to the Golay code to yield the extended Golay[24,12,8] code does not
continue that trend. The linear calculation time increases by a factor of 3.5 from 68s
to 239s, whereas the parallel time increases by a factor of 4 from 4.5s to 17.8s, giving
a slightly decreased ratio of 13:1 for the extended code. The additional bit has had a
slightly greater impact on the software implementation underlying the parallel method
than on the linear method. Similarly in Table 5.8, many of the ratios are in the order of
30:1 but, for the codes examined, there is no consistent or predictable pattern. Of all
the codes examined, those listed in Table 5.8 gave the greatest ratio of improvement
in calculation run-time from linear to parallel processing. However, the codes selected
for examination in these 2 tables vary in both their code and message length, making it
difficult to confirm the inter-related impact of either unless the factors are isolated from
each other.
The calculation time is dependant upon many factors, including both the message
length k, the codeword length n, the number of threads per block, blocks per batch
and the structure of the calculation program. To highlight the effect of increasing k
and n on calculation times, independent runs of calculations for increasing lengths of
k and n were performed. The times taken to calculate equivocation values for some
Best Known Linear Codes of message length k = 15 and increasing values of n are
shown in Table 5.10. The times listed are for calculations that were performed for the
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probabilities 0 ≤ pe ≤ 0.5 in 0.05 increments, with 0.01 as an additional value. Many
of the calculations were subsequently re-performed for probabilities 0 ≤ pe ≤ 0.5 in
increments of 0.01 in order to give more accurate and smoother output graphs.
Since these results were published, it has been observed that the calculation times ex-
hibit greater variability on subsequent re-calculations than originally noted, so all times
are now only given to 2s.f. rather than 3s.f. . Even so, there is still occasionally some
variation around these values, although the values given form a fair median value. This
variation is presumed to be due to the computer being in different states on each re-
calculation, due to factors such as different background programs being in operation at
the time.
Code Parallel time (s)
BKLC [20,15,3] 1.4
BKLC [21,15,4] 1.5
BKLC [22,15,4] 1.6
BKLC [23,15,4] 2.3
BKLC [24,15,4] 5.8
BKLC [25,15,5] 4.1
BKLC [26,15,6] 12
BKLC [27,15,6] 66
BKLC [28,15,6] 430
BKLC [29,15,7] 430
Table 5.10: Calculation times for BKLCs with message length k = 15
A graph of these times is shown in Figure 5.8. The graph shows a general trend that
as the code length n increases, the calculation time increases exponentially, as would
be expected. However several anomalies exist. The calculation time for n = 25 is
less than that for n = 24 while the calculation times for n = 28 and n = 29 are almost
identical. This is not caused by the main body of the calculation where the P(y j|xi) are
calculated. Instead the irregularities stem from the initial process of setting up the error
correction process and the identification of which codeword is the first one in weight
order to yield each syndrome. This can take significantly different times for each code,
depending on the structure of the code’s generator (and parity check) matrix. There is
also the potential for different parity check matrices of the same code to cause different
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calculation run times, although this was not investigated in any detail here. Again,
this would be due to differences in the order in which codewords are identified that
are the first to yield each syndrome. It would appear that for the BKLC [24,15,4] and
BKLC [28,15,6] codes the first codewords to yield each syndrome by weight order
occur significantly later on average than for BKLC [25,15,5] and BKLC [29,15,7] codes
respectively.
Figure 5.8: Time to calculate equivocation for codes of message length k = 15 for
different code lengths (n)
The times taken to calculate equivocation values for some Best Known Linear Codes
of code length n=30 and increasing values of k are shown in Table 5.11.
A graph of these times is shown in Figure 5.9.
It can be seen that for a fixed codeword length, there is an optimal message length k
that gives a minimum calculation time. This occurs around code length n = 19 and is
due to the calculation method used in the software. There are 210 threads in each block
and 210 blocks per instance of the kernel of the parallel component of the program. Be-
low a message length of k = 20, the parallel component of the program has not yet
achieved maximum efficiency and above k = 20, the linear part of the program is per-
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Code Parallel time (s)
BKLC [30,16,7] 552
BKLC [30,17,6] 562
BKLC [30,18,6] 212
BKLC [30,19,5] 93
BKLC [30,20,5] 107
BKLC [30,21,4] 171
BKLC [30,22,4] 279
BKLC [30,23,4] 500
BKLC [30,24,4] 955
BKLC [30,25,3] 3631
Table 5.11: Calculation times for BKLCs with code length n= 30
Figure 5.9: Time to calculate equivocation for codes of length n= 30 for different mes-
sage lengths(k)
forming an increasing proportion of the workload. For the program arrangement used,
operating with a message length of k = 19 to 20 enabled a “sweet spot" of efficiency to
be achieved. This also supports the observation made from Table 5.8 that many of the
best improvements in calculation time from linear to parallel processing were achieved
with message lengths around k = 20.
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5.4.2 Run-Time Factors
There are, however, many inter-related factors at play that influence the efficiency of
the calculation and the time taken for the calculation to run. These include but are not
limited to:
• Code length - This is one of the most fundamental factors affecting the length
of time that a calculation will take. At its most basic, a single-bit increase in the
length of a codeword will approximately double the number of calculations to be
performed and the time taken. However the presence of numerous other factors
means that this is unlikely to directly bring an exact doubling of the calculation
run-time.
• Message length - At very low code lengths (e.g. below k= 15), the CPU performs
much of the calculation. As the code length increases, an increasing proportion
of the workload is able to be taken by the GPU. Once the “hand-off" of tasking by
the CPU to the parallel-processing GPU has reached the greatest rate that the
GPU and CUDA architecture can manage, each subsequent single-bit increase in
message length will approximately double the calculation time if all other factors
remain the same.
• Code structure - One of the first tasks of the calculation is to identify those error
vectors that yield the first instance of each syndrome. The code structure indi-
cated by the generator matrix will directly affect which error vectors give each
syndrome, how long it will take to locate them and thereby, the calculation run-
time.
• Available RAM - limitations of the parallel processing performed by the GPU were
counter-acted by holding significant amounts of data in memory. For example, in
the intiial stage of the calculations, a record of each error vector that gave an
initial instance of a syndrome was recorded. This record itself rapidly becomes
bounded by memory limitations, both the overal amount of available memory and
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the way in which contiguous space is allocated. Increasing the available memory
would increase the amount of data held in RAM and reduce the processing load.
• Number of processors - It is reasonable to anticipate that an increase in the num-
ber of processors used will bring a proportionate increase in processing capability
and a decrease in calculation times. However, as each additional processor will
bring time overheads, both through its own internal operation and in it’s interac-
tions with other processors, the actual impact on calculation run times is likely to
be more complex.
• CPU capability - Since the CPU runs the main, linear component of the program,
a more capable CPU (with higher clock speed, bus speed, cache size, number of
cores, etc.) would enable the linear calculations to be carried out more quickly.
• Number of GPUs - the software was written to be run on a standard laptop with
a single CPU and single GPU. Further work on this topic could extend calcula-
tions further by employing a suite of processors with parallel computing capabil-
ity. Adding further GPUs will decrease calculation run-times with each new set of
CUDA enabled cores brought to bear on the calculation.
• GPU capability - the Nvidia GeForce GTX470M GPU used for the calculations
had 288 cores, such that 288 threads could be run simultaneously, at a processor
clock speed of 1.1GHz. A more capable GPU would have more cores, operating
at higher speeds. For example, the GeForce TITAN V has 5120 cores operating at
1.455GHz. Numerous other differences between different CUDA-enabled GPUs
will also affect calculation times significantly.
• CUDA compute capability - the GPU used had a compute capability of 3.5, en-
abling 1024 threads per block, but running subject to the capability of the GPU
cores. The GeForce TITAN X has a compute capability of 6.1, giving a range of
improvements and advantages such as an increased number of 32-bit registers
available per block and an increased amount of shared memory per multiproces-
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sor.
• Number of threads per block - Most compute capabilities permit blocks to be
created in up to 3-dimensions with up to 1024 threads in x and y dimensions
and 64 threads in the z dimension. In the software solution developed, only the
x dimension was used. Further development of the software could potentially
reduce run-times further through the use of y and z dimensions for running multi-
dimensional blocks of threads.
• Number of blocks per warp - At the next level, blocks can be treated in groups
of up to 64, called warps. Warps were not used in the software solution but do
potentially form another mechanism for reducing calculation run-times.
• Programming model: It has been shown that a hybrid programming model, where
the core program is linear and repetitive tasks are performed in parallel can offer
signficant improvements in efficiency over a purely linear program. A different
mechanism for achieving this could come through the multi-core CPUs that many
standard PCs now offer. However, it was decided to pursue the CUDA architec-
ture approach because:
– CUDA-enabled GPUs generally have many more cores than a multi-core
CPU, enabling a greater level of parallelisation for the completion of highly
repetitive but relatively simple calculations.
– Use of the CUDA architecture offered a novel approach to performing an
equivocation calculation.
• Program efficiency - Finally, one of the greatest factors affecting the calculation
run-time was the programming ability of the author, who started the research
period with a relatively low level of programming skill. Throughout the course of
the PhD, many significant programming lessons were learnt and improvements
made. It is inevitable that further significant improvements would be possible,
especially in light of the observations just made above.
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5.5 Improving Code Equivocation by Expansion
Once a procedure for efficiently calculating the equivocation of a code has been imple-
mented, it encourages the comparison of codes and the location and design of codes
with improved levels of equivocation. As an example, consider a modification of the
simple Hamming [7,4,3] code. A single bit of data could be replaced by a sequence of
data bits, say 4 bits long. The first three bits are randomly generated whilst the fourth
bit is chosen to give an overall message parity equivalent to the data that is to be trans-
mitted. So the data bit 0 could be represented as (0011), each component of which is
transmitted over the course of 4 successive messages:
(
RandomBits︷︸︸︷
001
ParityBit︷︸︸︷
1 )
Where previously the probability of an error occurring while a single bit was transmitted
might have been quite low, for example pe = 0.01, now that the representation of the
data bit 0 is transmitted across more messages, the probability of an error becomes
compounded and potentially much increased. If an f -fold expansion of a code is taken
to be one in which a data bit is represented by f − 1 random bits and 1 parity check
bit, then the received data bit would be expressed in terms of the parity of the received
data bits:
Parity=
f
∑
i=1
ri (5.10)
where ri is the i’th received bit of the code expansion. The received data is the sum of
the transmitted data and any associated errors that occur during transmission:
ri = ti+ vi (5.11)
where ti is the i’th bit of the expansion and vi is i’th bit of the associated error vector.
Therefore:
Parity=
f
∑
i=1
ti+
f
∑
i=1
vi (5.12)
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But by design, ∑ fi=1 ti = 0 and therefore Parity = ∑
f
i=1 vi, so if the received message
parity is non-zero, then a decoder error must have occurred.
When considering a 4-fold code expansion, the possible error combinations that could
occur range from
(
0 0 0 0
)
to
(
1 1 1 1
)
. Given that we only need to consider
the combinations that give an odd parity, then the probability of the 4-fold expansion
being decoded erroneously is:
(
4
1
)
(1− pe)3pe+
(
4
3
)
(1− pe)p3e
In general for an f -fold expansion, the probability of an incorrect decoding would be:
i≤ f/2
∑
i=0
(
f
2i+1
)
(1− pe) f−(2i+1)p2i+1e
A 4-fold expansion of the Hamming code gives effective channel probability errors as
shown in Table 5.12.
Single bit probability 4-fold expansion
of error probability of error
0 0
0.01 0.038816
0.05 0.17195
0.10 0.2952
0.15 0.37995
0.20 0.4352
0.25 0.46875
0.30 0.4872
0.35 0.49595
0.40 0.4992
0.45 0.49995
0.50 0.5
Table 5.12: Compounded channel probability errors for a 4-fold code expansion
The effective channel probabilities for 2-, 4-, and 10-fold code expansion are shown in
Figure 5.10.
These effective channel probability errors yield normalised equivocation values for a
4-fold expansion of the Hamming [7,4,3] code shown in Table 5.13 and plotted in Fig-
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Figure 5.10: Effective Channel Probability Errors 2x, 4x and 10x code expansion
ure 5.11. As previously, normalised equivocation values were calculated by dividing
the equivocation by the original message length. The graph also includes 2-, 3- and
10-fold expansions of the Hamming [7,4,3] code. The values for each expansion were
calculated in a similar manner to those of the 4-fold expansion.The figure shows that
the equivocation values of the code expansions are significantly higher than those of a
simple Hamming code.
Single bit probability of error Normalised Equivocation
0 0
0.01 0.067291
0.05 0.53895
0.1 0.85093
0.15 0.95522
0.2 0.98774
0.25 0.99721
0.3 0.99954
0.35 0.99995
0.4 0.99998
0.45 1
0.5 1
Table 5.13: Normalised equivocation for a 4-fold expansion of the Hamming [7,4,3]
code
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Figure 5.11: Comparison of BKLC [14,4,7] and Hamming code with 2x, 3x, 4x and
10x code expansion
Figure 5.12: Comparison of Golay [23,12,7] and 2 random [23,12] codes with 4-fold
expansion
For the 10-fold expansion, a 0.01 probability of transmission error yields a normalised
equivocation level of 0.23. However an error probability of just 0.05 now yields a nor-
malised equivocation value of 0.897, compared to 0.101 for the unexpanded Hamming
code. If the intended recipient has a channel probability error of 0.01, they still have a
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Figure 5.13: Comparison of Golay [23,12,7] and 2 random [23,12] codes with 10-fold
expansion
good chance of recovering the data, whereas an illegitimate eavesdropper with a chan-
nel error probability of 0.05 will now need to overcome a much higher level of ambiguity
in order to recover the data. The secrecy of the data transmission has been very signif-
icantly improved by the expansion of a simple Hamming code. However this improved
secrapacity ecy comes at a cost; only one bit of data is transmitted for every 4 or 10
bits of data carried by the Hamming code, reducing the net data rate significantly.
It is worth noting that while the Hamming [7,4,3] code with 2-fold expansion and BKLC
[14,4,7] code both effectively take 14 bits to transmit 4 bits worth of data, their equiv-
ocation graphs are very different. The 2-fold expansion of the Hamming [7,4,3] code
offers a significant improvement in equivocation over the basic Hamming [7,4,3] code,
whereas the BKLC [14,4,7] code shows a significant worsening in performance. For
a BSC error probability of pe = 0.05, the 2-fold expanded Hamming code gives a nor-
malised equivocation of 0.259, while the non-expanded Hamming code gave a value
of 0.101 and BKLC[14,4,7] only gives a value of 0.038. This suggests that simply using
longer and longer codes may not be as effective at improving equivocation as using
code expansions.
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Additionally, the 4-fold and 10-fold expansions for the Golay [23,12] code and the 2
random [23,12] codes previously discussed are shown in Figure 5.12 and Figure 5.13
respectively. Code expansion of a random code can give a higher normalised equiv-
ocation value that for a non-expanded but more structured code. For example, with a
BSC error probability pe= 0.05, a 4-fold expansion of the random [23,12] code A gives a
normalised equivocation of 0.597, compared to a non-expanded Golay[23,12,7] value
of 0.033. As with the Hamming codes, these figures show that there is a very marked
increase in normalised equivocation levels when code expansion is used compared to
the original codes.
5.6 Chapter Conclusions
This chapter has developed several points with regard to both the use of parallel pro-
cessing for calculating equivocation and the comparison of equivocation values for
different codes and their variants.
• In subsection 5.3.2, it was seen that parallel processing can be effectively im-
plemented on a general purpose computer using the Nvidia CUDA architecture.
Developing the code to implement the parallel processed component of the pro-
gram was both time consuming and challenging but enabled the generation of
results for longer codes.
• Parallel processing can provide significant improvements in calculation times for
intensive calculations. The best improvements obtained gave calculation results
up to 35 times more quickly with parallel processing than with linear processing.
• Parallel processing code must be carefully implemented in order to optimise its
efficiency for the actual task. In particular careful memory management is nec-
essary to enable the GPU to continue operate its core duties effectively whilst
simultaneously carrying out the parallel processed component of the calculation.
• Section 5.4 shows that normalised equivocation values can be used to compare
the relative secrecies of codes, enabling codes with higher inherent levels of se-
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crecy to be selected if required, although the other properties of the codes, such
as the error correcting capability must also be borne in mind. For example, from
Figure 5.3, when operating with a BSC error probability of 0.05, Golay[23,12,7]
has a normalised equivocation of 0.033, whereas Hamming[31,26,3] has a value
of 0.221, nearly 7 times higher. The Hamming code offers a higher level of se-
crecy for that error probability than the Golay[23,12,7] code but is only able to
correct 1 error rather than 3.
• For the codes examined from the Hamming code family, longer codes had higher
normalised equivocation values than the shorter codes. For example, with pe =
0.05, the normalised equivocation of Hamming[7,4,3] is 0.101 compared to 0.157
for Hamming[15,11,3] and 0.221 for Hamming[31,26,3]. However, the complex-
ity of the calculations to find equivocation values for longer codes meant that it
wasn’t possible to verify this for longer Hamming codes such as Hamming[63,57,3]
or Hamming[127,120,3]. Further work is required to establish if the pattern holds
for either longer Hamming codes or for other families of code.
• Largest differences in code equivocation values were often found in the more
central range of the error probabilities for the codes investigated (especially for
expanded codes). This can be seen by identifying the steepest part of the curve
in any of the normalised equivocation graphs from Figure 5.3 to Figure 5.13.
• For the codes examined, the differences in normalised equivocation values be-
tween codes decrease as code lengths increase. For example, in Figure 5.6 with
longer length BKLCs, the similarity in value of all 7 functions can be seen quite
clearly, whereas the differences between the shorter codes in Figure 5.3 are sign-
ficantly more marked. This may be partly due to structural similarities that must
exist in order to yield the best linear codes for each code length. As the code
lengths increase, it may be that the relative differences between the codes that
give the greatest minimum distance for each code length decrease, however this
was not formally confirmed.
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• In Section 5.5, it was shown that by expanding a simple code through the use
of random data and parity check bits, much greater levels of secrecy can be
achieved in some cases. For example, with a BSC error probability pe = 0.05, a
10-fold expansion of the Hamming[7,4,3] code gives a normalised equivocation
level of 0.897, compared to 0.101 for the non-expanded code. However, there is
a trade-off between achieving the desired level of secrecy by expanding a sim-
ple code and the significant increase in the number of bits of data that need to be
transmitted in order to achieve it. A 10-fold code expansion of the Hamming[7,4,3]
code may enable very high levels of equivocation but would require the transmis-
sion of 70 bits of data to send a 4-bit message.
• Rather than designing codes with improved error-correcting capabilities, one of
the aims of the work was to identify codes that either a) give a higher equivoca-
tion value and level of secrecy than other similar or related codes or b) enable
a large differential in equivocation level to be established between the legitimate
recipient and the eavesdropper. It was possible to use random codes to achieve
higher equivocation values than for more structured but non-expanded codes.
For example, with a BSC error probability pe = 0.05, a 4-fold expansion of a
random [23,12] code gives a normalised equivocation of 0.597, compared to a
non-expanded Golay[23,12,7] value of 0.033. However, although the inherent
randomness of the codes increased equivocation levels, this is of little benefit
given that the codes offer no error correcting capability.
• The expansion of a code can offer higher normalised equivocation values than
a code with a similar net code rate. For example, consider the Hamming[7,4,3]
code with 2-fold expansion and the BKLC[14,4,7] code. Both require 14 bits
to transmit 4 bits worth of message data, however for pe = 0.05, the 2-fold ex-
panded Hamming code gives a normalised equivocation of 0.259, while the non-
expanded Hamming code gave a value of 0.101 and the BKLC[14,4,7] only gives
a value of 0.038. Code expansion has a compounding influence on equivocation.
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Chapter 6
Equivocation of Erasures
6.1 Introduction
The key outcomes of Chapter 6 were published by Schofield et al. (2016).
Having established a parallel processing method to calculate the equivocation of a
code transmitted via a BSC, this approach can be extended to examine the impact of
erasures and deletions. In this chapter, two different situations involving erasures are
considered:
• Equivocation of codes, including intentional erasures on a BSC
• Equivocation of codes on the Binary Erasure Channel (BEC)
6.2 Equivocation of a BSC with Intentional Erasures (IE+BSC)
It has already been seen that if transmitting across a BSC while an eavesdropper
listens via a Wire-Tap Channel, the difference in signal quality can be exploited to
improve the inherent transmission secrecy. However if this exploitation involves the
‘managed’ use of erasures, then the secrecy of the code transmitted across the channel
can be improved whilst simultaneously reducing the volume of data that is transmitted.
This is in contrast to the increased volume of data incurred by the code expansion
methods used in Chapter 5.
In his use of punctured LDPC codes in order to modify the security gap, Klinc et al.
(2011) acknowledged that it can be difficult to measure or analyse equivocation. Work
has also been done to establish upper and lower bounds for equivocation, including
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the use of known and unknown puncturing patterns Almeida (2013). Other techniques
have been applied to specific circumstances to calculate equivocation, such as the
analysis of the generator matrix of the eavesdropper’s code (Wickramasooriya et al.
2013) and the use of probability mass functions for syndrome coding (Al-Hassan et al.
2014). However, calculations such as Al-Hassan’s remain computationally demanding,
requiring the generation of many error patterns and syndromes.
This section looks at the deliberate introduction of erasures whilst transmitting data
across a BSC (IE+BSC) within a Wire-Tap environment. The software solution used
in Chapter 5 has been enhanced to permit the calculation of normalised equivocation
values for the IE+BSC.
Since an error-correcting code can correct at most d−12 errors or d− 1 erasures (Hoff-
man 1991), in this work, the number of erasures deliberately introduced will always be
constrained to be less than or equal to the correction capability of the code.
If deliberate erasures are introduced, then the value of a bit in a specified location is
unknown as shown in Figure 6.1 and must be treated as random.
1
0
X Y?
Figure 6.1: Deliberate Erasures
As in Chapter 5, the processes of correcting the received codeword and decoding it
are considered separately, as shown in Figure 6.2. The message m is encoded as
the codeword x before bits are intentionally erased to give the transmission vector
t. Transmission across the BSC and potential introduction of a BSC error v yields a
received vector r. This vector r is then corrected by the addition of a vector c to give
the corrected, received codeword y. Finally y is decoded to give the message estimate
mest .
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BSCEncoder Intentional
Erasure
Correction Decoderm x= mG t r = t+ v y= r+ c mest
Figure 6.2: IE+BSC encoding / decoding process
6.2.1 Calculations
A message of length k is encoded as a codeword of length n. If a bits, in known
locations (for example the right-hand a bits of the codeword), are deliberately erased
ahead of transmission, then n− a bits of known value and a erased bits of unknown
value (but known location) would be received. The data is transmitted across a BSC
and therefore the known bits will still have been susceptible to a cross-over error of
probability pe.
For an [n,k,d] code containing a erasures in known locations, it is necessary to con-
sider all possible values that the erased bits could have held and also all possible BSC
errors in non-erased locations. Whilst this adds complexity to the scenario compared to
that for calculating the equivocation for codes on the BSC without erasures, it is signif-
icantly less complex than when considering deletions where the erasure locations are
unknown. This aspect will form the fundamental difference between the approaches
for erasures and deletions.
There would be 2n−a possible error vectors that could affect the n−a received bits. For
each of those possible error vectors, it would be necessary to consider 2a possibilities
of what the erased bits could have been. If the probability of a symmetric crossover
error on the BSC is pe, the probability of there being ε errors in a received codeword
that is known to contain a erasures in known positions is thus:
P(ε,a) =
(
n−a
ε
)
(1− pe)(n−a)−ε pεe (6.1)
Therefore if a BKLC [8,2,5] code was transmitted with two bits erased in positions 7 and
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8,
(
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 ?7 ?8
)
, the probability of receiving a codeword of length 8
bits containing a single error with a BSC error probability pe = 0.01 is:
P(1,2) =
(
6
1
)
×0.995×0.01= 0.0571
When calculating the equivocation of the code across the channel, the probability and
thence the conditional entropy of each possible output, given each possible input, must
be found. Any erased bits could have been either a 0 or a 1 with equal probability, so
the received codeword could have been any one of 12a possible options before the a bits
were erased.
Thus the probability of a received message having contained ε errors in specific loca-
tions and the a erasures having come from a particular combination of 0’s and 1’s will
be as shown in Equation 6.2:
P(ε,a) = (1− pe)(n−a)−ε pεe ×
1
2a
(6.2)
So the probability of receiving an 8-bit codeword on a BSC with error probability pe =
0.01, with errors in positions 1 and 4 with 2 erased bits in positions 7 and 8 ( i.e. the
vector
(
01 12 03 04 15 06 ?7 ?8
)
will be:
0.994×0.012× 1
22
= 2.401×10−5
Equivocation calculations allowing for erasures were initially performed by the comple-
tion of a spreadsheet of calculations for a short code (in this case, the BKLC [8,2,5]
code) before being incorporated into the existing C++ program used previously for cal-
culating the code equivocation.
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The BKLC [8,2,5] code can have Generator Matrix:
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1

and Parity Check Matrix: 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

The 4 possible messages
(
0 0
)
,
(
0 1
)
,
(
1 0
)
and
(
1 1
)
yield valid codewords
of: (
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
)(
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
)(
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
)(
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
)
.
The first section of the spreadsheet, showing the calculation of probabilities for each
possible error vector and erasure combination for the zero codeword
(
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
)
,
with known erasures in positions 7 and 8 and pe = 0.01, is shown in column two of Ta-
ble 6.1 with possible erasure combinations shown in grey. The error vectors are listed
in weight order, containing ε errors where 0≤ ε ≤ n−a.
Once the probabilities have been calculated for each possible combination of BSC error
and erased bits, these probabilities can be used to find the equivocation.
This is achieved by:
1. Multiplying the received codeword by the parity check matrix to obtain the syn-
drome.
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2. Using the syndrome to correct the received codeword to the most likely valid
codeword (columns 3 to 5 of Table 6.1).
3. Summing probabilities to find the total probability of each codeword y j being re-
ceived, given a particular message xi as input. This gives P(y j|xi).
4. P(xi,y j) = P(xi)P(y j|xi)
5. H(xi,y j) = P(xi,y j) log2
1
P(xi,y j)
6. H(xi,Y ) = ∑y∈Y H(xi,y j) = ∑y∈Y P(xi,y j) log2 1P(xi,y j))
7. H(X ,Y ) = ∑x∈X H(xi,Y ) = ∑x∈X ∑y∈Y P(xi,y j) log2 1P(xi,y j))
The probabilities for the output codeword y0 =
(
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
)
given the
input codeword x0 =
(
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
)
are shown in bold in Table 6.1. The
probability sums for each codeword, x0, ...,x3 can be seen in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2 shows that the contribution to the joint equivocation from one codeword is
0.50197. The contribution to the joint entropy from each input codeword will be the
same and therefore the joint entropy H(X ,Y ) = 0.50197×4= 2.007886.
Figure 6.3 shows the conditional probabilities for BKLC [8,2,5] with 2 erasures and
pe = 0.01. The output probabilities can be found from these, as shown in Table 6.3.
This demonstrates that if the input codewords are equally likely then so too are the
output codewords i.e. P(y j) = 0.25.
If P(yi) = 0.25, then
H(Y ) = ∑
y∈Y
P(y j) log(
1
P(y j)
) = 4×0.25log2(
1
0.25
) = 4×0.25×2= 2
Therefore when pe = 0.01,
H(X |Y ) = H(X ,Y )−H(Y ) = 2.007886−2= 7.886×10−3
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Codeword:
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Received Codeword P(ε,a) Syndrome Correction Corrected codeword
+erased bits
0 0 0 0 0 0 ? ?
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.23537 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.23537 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.23537 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.23537 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
P(0,2) = 0.94148
0 0 0 0 0 1 ? ?
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.002377 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.002377 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0.002377 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.002377 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
...
...
...
...
1 0 0 0 0 0 ? ?
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.002377 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.002377 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.002377 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.002377 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
P(1,2) = 0.05706
...
...
...
...
0 0 0 0 1 1 ? ?
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2.4×10−5 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 2.4×10−5 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 2.4×10−5 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2.4×10−5 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
...
...
...
...
1 1 0 0 0 0 ? ?
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.4×10−5 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2.4×10−5 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 2.4×10−5 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 2.4×10−5 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
P(2,2) = 1.441×10−3
...
...
...
...
1 1 1 1 1 1 ? ?
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 2.5×10−13 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 2.5×10−13 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2.5×10−13 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.5×10−13 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
P(6,2) = 1×10−12
Table 6.1: Error and erasure correction process
Since the BKLC [8,2,5] code encodes 2 bit messages as a codeword of length 8, the
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Output Codeword P(y j|x0) P(x0,y j) H(x0,y j)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.99940409 0.24985102 0.49991691
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0.00029694 7.4235E-05 0.00101832
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.00029213 7.3032E-5 0.00100354
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6.8414E-06 1.1703E-06 3.2766E-05
TOTAL 1 0.50197154
Table 6.2: Calculation of joint entropy from probabilities for codeword x0 = 00000000
Output codeword P(y j)
00000000 (0.99940+0.000297+0.00029+6.8414E−06)×0.25 = 0.25
00011111 (0.000297+0.99940+6.8414E−06+0.00029)×0.25 = 0.25
11100111 (0.00029+6.8414E−06+0.99940+0.000297)×0.25 = 0.25
11111000 (6.8414E−06+0.00029+0.000297+0.99940)×0.25 = 0.25
Table 6.3: Combined output probabilities and entropies BKLC [8,2,5] with pe = 0.01
normalised equivocation will be
7.886×10−3÷2= 3.943×10−3
In all results for codes of differing lengths, the equivocation values stated have been
normalised to between 0 and 1, depending on the message length of the code, to give
the equivocation per data bit.
6.2.2 Results
As an imperfect code, the BKLC [8,2,5] is only capable of correcting at most 4 erasures
(d− 1), where d is the minimum distance of the code. Alternatively it can correct at
most 2 errors or other combinations of errors and erasures, subject to the constraint
that 2ε+a< d (Sweeney 2002, p.164). Hence the BKLC [8,2,5] code can correct the
combinations of errors and erasures in Table 6.4
Errors Erasures
0 0, 1, 2, 3, 4
1 0, 1, 2
2 0
Table 6.4: Correctable Combinations of Errors and Erasures for the BKLC [8,2,5]
Code
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x3 = 11111000, P(x3) = 0.25
P (y0|x3) = 6.8414E−06
P(y1|x3) = 0.000292129
P(y2|x3) = 0.000296941
P(y3|x3) = 0.999404089
x2 = 11100111, P(x2) = 0.25
P (y0|x2) = 0.000292129
P(y1|x2) = 6.8414E−06
P(y2|x2) = 0.999404089
P(y3|x2) = 0.000296941
x1 = 00011111, P(x1) = 0.25
P (y0|x1) = 0.000296941
P(y1|x1) = 0.999404089
P(y2|x1) = 6.8414E−06
P(y3|x1) = 0.000292129
x0 = 00000000, P(x0) = 0.25
P (y0|x0) = 0.999404089
P(y1|x0) = 0.000296941
P(y2|x0) = 0.000292129
P(y3|x0) = 6.8414E−06
Figure 6.3: Input and output probabilities for BKLC [8,2,5] on IE+BSC with 2 erasures
and pe = 0.8
For the Golay [23,12,7], this increases as shown in Table 6.5.
For the BKLC [8,2,5] shown in Figure 6.4, all curves are monotonic (i.e. always increas-
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Errors Erasures
0 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
1 0, 1, 2, 3, 4
2 0, 2, 4
3 0
Table 6.5: Correctable Combinations of Errors and Erasures for the Golay [23,12,7]
Code
ing), therefore increasing the number of deliberately erased bits that are transmitted
increases the equivocation of the code. One important observation is that the curves
for both 3 and 4 erasures of the BKLC [8,2,5] code are co-linear i.e. transmitting the
code with either 3 or 4 erasures produces the same values of normalised equivocation.
This is because the increase from 3 to 4 erasures does not change the ability of the
code to use the 26 available syndrome patterns for the detection or correction of either
errors or erasures.
Figure 6.4: Equivocation of BKLC [8,2,5] code with up to 4 erasures
Similarly, for the Golay [23,12,7] code in Figure 6.5 with the ability to correct up to 6
erasures, 6 monotonic lines are obtained, with the equivocation increasing with each
additional erasure.
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Figure 6.5: Equivocation of Golay [23,12,7] code with erasures
When code expansion is brought in to the arrangement as well, as discussed in Sec-
tion 5.5, the 4 distinct groups of curves on each of Figure 6.6 and Figure 6.7 reflect
the different code expansions (none, 2-fold, 4-fold and 10-fold). It is worth noting that
each graph shows multiple crossover points when comparing equivocation curves for
scenarios with different numbers of erasures and different levels of code expansion.
For example in Figure 6.6, when comparing BKLC [8,2,5] with 4 erasures and no code
expansion and the same code with no erasures and 2-fold code expansion, there is a
crossover point between 0.1 and 0.11. When pe ≤ 0.1, the scenarios with 4 erasures
and no code expansion gives higher equivocation values. Conversely if pe ≥ 0.11, no
erasures and 2-fold code expansion give higher equivocation values. Therefore it can
be seen that one arrangement gives higher equivocation at lower error probabilities,
while the other may be more useful at higher error probabilities. Similarly, compar-
isons can be drawn between the differing gradients of the curves in different parts of
the graph. Between approximately 0.04 and 0.25, 4 erasures and no code expansion
gives a steeper graph than no erasures and 2-fold code expansion. Thus it may be pos-
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sible to achieve a greater differential between the equivocation level for the intended
recipient and the illegitimate eavesdropper. If the likely error probability of the chan-
nel can be established, estimated or measured then a choice could be made about
which arrangement should be selected in order to maximise the required characteris-
tics. Similar comparisons can be made and implications drawn for any of the crossover
points in either Figure 6.6 or Figure 6.7.
Figure 6.6: Equivocation of BKLC [8,2,5] code with erasures and code expansion
Figure 6.8 highlights some differences between the use of code expansion and the
use of erasures, in this case for the Golay [23,12,7] code. For all error probabilities
above pe = 0.05, 2-fold code expansion offers greater increases in equivocation than
the deliberate introduction of erasures. However below pe = 0.05, the use of multiple
erasures gives a greater increase in equivocation. Therefore at close to pe = 0.05 for
the Golay code, there is a changeover point above which a 2-fold code expansion gives
higher equivocation levels and below which the use of 6 erasures gives higher equivo-
cation. A similar changeover occurs for the BKLC [31,21,5] in Figure 6.9 although the
changeover occurs at pe between 0.01 and 0.02 and is less obvious. Either modifica-
tion to the code (code expansion or intentional erasures) carries a penalty - the use of
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Figure 6.7: Equivocation of Golay [23,12,7] code with erasures and code expansion
code expansion increases the number of transmitted bits dramatically whereas the de-
liberate introduction of erasures decreases the error detecting and correcting capability
of the code.
The deliberate introduction of erasures to a transmission system can, if chosen care-
fully, lead to a greater increase in equivocation for an illegitimate eavesdropper than for
the legitimate receiver. For example with the Golay [23,12,7] code, a BSC error prob-
ability pe of 0.01 for the legitimate receiver and 0.10 for the eavesdropper will produce
the normalised equivocation levels shown in Table 6.6 for scenarios with no erasures
and with 2 erasures.
Legitimate receiver Eavesdropper
BSC error probability 0.01 0.10
Equivocation (with no erasures) 0.00015 0.20496
Equivocation (with 2 erasures) 0.00147 0.29394
Increase in equivocation 0.00132 0.08898
Table 6.6: Equivocation of Golay [23,12,7] code on BSC with and without 2 erasures
In this case, the deliberate introduction of 2 erasures has increased the normalised
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Figure 6.8: Equivocation of Golay [23,12,7] code with 6 erasures versus 2-fold code
expansion
equivocation for the eavesdropper by a greater amount (0.089) than for the legitimate
receiver (0.0013), a factor of 67.
However, this does not always hold and is dependent on the scenarios being compared
and the range of error probability being considered. Consider the Golay [23,12,7] code
with an error probability pe = 0.05 for the legitimate receiver and overall error probability
0.20 for the eavesdropper for scenarios with no erasures and 6 erasures, as shown in
Table 6.7.
Legitimate receiver Eavesdropper
BSC error probability 0.05 0.20
Equivocation (with no erasures) 0.03317 0.64453
Equivocation (with 6 erasures) 0.17759 0.71385
Increase 0.14442 0.06932
Table 6.7: Equivocation of Golay [23,12,7] code on BSC with and without 6 erasures
In this case, the equivocation has increased for the legitimate receiver by a greater
amount (0.144) than it has for the eavesdropper (0.069).
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Figure 6.9: Equivocation of BKLC [31,21,5] with 4 erasures versus 2-fold code expan-
sion
6.2.3 Conclusion
• The intentional introduction of erasures to the BSC increases the equivocation of
the code, but not generally by as much as the use of code expansion. For exam-
ple, below approximately 0.05, introducing 6 erasures gives higher equivocation
levels than 2-fold code expansion but above 0.05, 2-fold code expansion always
gives a higher equivocation value. However 10-fold code expansion would give
higher equivocation levels and 6 erasures for every error probability examined (6
erasures would only give higher values for very small error probabilities ie well
below 0.01)
• An increase in the number of erasures on the IE+BSC may not always lead to an
increase in the equivocation. For example, either 3 or 4 intentional erasures of
the BKLC[8,2,5] code on a BSC will yield the same equivocation levels in each
case, because the additional erasure doesn’t change the ability of the code to use
the available syndrome patterns for the detection and correction of either errors
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or erasures.
• As with the BSC, code expansion can be used on the IE+BSC to increase equiv-
ocation.
• Combinations of erasures and code expansion can be used to maximise the dif-
ference in equivocation for the legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper for a par-
ticular error probability. For example, from Figure 6.7, the Golay[23,12,7] code
on the BSC with 3 erasures and 4-fold expansion could give a legitimate recip-
ient with an error probability of 0.01 a normalised equivocation value of 0.054,
whereas an eavesdropper with a WTC error probability of 0.05 would be liable to
a normalised equivocation of 0.602, over 11 times greater.
6.3 Equivocation on the Binary Erasure Channel
The previous section had to address two factors that had a simultaneous impact on the
equivocation of the channel, namely the intentional use of erasures and the likelihood
of an error from the BSC itself.
This section looks at the transmission of data across a Binary Erasure Channel as
shown in Figure 6.10. The message m is encoded as the codeword x ahead of trans-
mission across the BEC. On receipt, x may have had a bits erased to yield the received
vector r. This is then corrected to give y before being decoded to the message esti-
mate mest . The erasures are no longer ‘intentional’ or ‘controlled’ and can occur in any
position. The erasures can occur in any single position with a probability of ps.
BECEncoder Correction Decoderm x= mG r y= r+ c mest
Figure 6.10: BEC encoding / decoding process
The probability of a erasures occurring in any word of length n is:
P(a) =
(
n
a
)
(1− ps)n−apas (6.3)
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6.3.1 Calculation
As previously, a spreadsheet was first drawn up as a ‘proof of concept’ prior to the
calculation algorithm being coded in C++.
The equivocation is calculated by initially considering every possible erasure pattern
for each transmitted codeword, as in Table 6.8.
Option probability
Messages 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
Codewords 00000000 00011111 11100111 11111000
0 Erasures 00000000 00011111 11100111 11111000 P(a= 0) = 0.43046721
1 Erasure 0000000? 0001111? 1110011? 1111100? 0.04782969
...
...
...
...
...
?0000000 ?0011111 ?1100111 ?1111000 0.04782969
P(a= 1) = 0.38263752
2 Erasures 000000?? 000111?? 111001?? 111110?? 0.00531441
00000?0? 00011?1? 11100?1? 11111?0?
...
...
...
...
...
...
??000000 ??011111 ??100111 ??111000 0.00531441
P(a= 2) = 0.14880348
...
7 Erasures 0??????? 0??????? 1??????? 1??????? 9E−08
...
...
...
...
...
???????0 ???????1 ???????1 ???????1 9E−08
P(a= 7) = 7.2E−08
8 Erasures ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? P(a= 8) = 1E−08
Table 6.8: BEC Erasure probabilities for BKLC [8,2,5] with ps = 0.1
For each erasure option, the origin of the option must be considered. For example,
with bits 6 and 8 of the received codeword
(
01 02 03 14 15 ?6 17 ?8
)
erased,
22 = 4 options must be taken into account. To decide which option is the most likely,
calculate the syndrome. To be a valid codeword decode, the syndrome must be zero.
Table 6.9 shows that for the received codeword
(
0 0 0 1 1 ? 1 ?
)
,(
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
)
is the only option that yields a syndrome of zero and is the
most likely to be correct. Therefore this option would be chosen as the decode for the
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Received codeword Syndrome
00011?1?
00011010 111001
00011011 000010
00011110 111011
00011111 000000
Table 6.9: BEC Erasure options for bits 6 and 8 for BKLC [8,2,5]
received, erased codeword.
This process works well when the errors introduced are well within the erasure cor-
recting capabilities of the codeword. However as more erasures occur, more than one
zero-syndrome may occur, with no way of distinguishing which yields the correct de-
code.
So for the received codeword
(
0 0 ? ? ? ? ? ?
)
with 6 erasures, two of the
26 = 64 possible options are valid codewords, (00000000 and 00011111) and give a
zero-syndrome as shown in Table 6.10.
Received codeword Syndrome
00??????
00000000 000000
00000001 111011
00000010 000001
00000100 000010
...
...
00000011 111010
...
...
11000000 110000
...
...
11110000 111100
00011111 000000
00101111 001100
...
...
11111011 000100
11111101 111001
11111110 000011
11111111 111000
Table 6.10: Syndromes for BKLC [8,2,5]
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When looking at the Hamming [7,4,3] code, with its limited error and erasure correcting
capability, as a perfect code it can correct up to 2 erasures on the BEC. However for
4 erasures there are 2 possible correct decode options, 4 options for 5 erasures, 8
options for 6 erasures and all 16 possible options for all 7 bits being erased.
This leads to the question of how to decide which valid decode is the correct option.
Since all the options that give a valid decode are equally likely, there are 2 apparent
decoding strategies.
• Choose a valid decode option randomly.
• Choose the first valid decode option i.e. the first option that gives a zero-syndrome.
Calculation of the equivocation using the first strategy will give a slightly different value
each time since different decode options are randomly selected. The values will differ
because it is only the received vectors with high numbers of erasures that are affected,
beyond the correction capability of the code and therefore with low probabilities of
occurrence.
The second strategy is one specific case of the first strategy and its use would provide
consistent, predictable results. Since the first valid decode option is just as likely as
any other option to be the correct codeword and this strategy yields some interesting
results, this is the strategy pursued.
For the BKLC [8,2,5] code with a BEC erasure rate of ps = 0.01, the message
(
0 1
)
will be transmitted as the codeword
(
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
)
. The full list of all pos-
sible received vectors and their decodes, probabilities and contributions to the joint
entropy are listed at Appendix B. Table 6.11 shows that for the transmitted codeword(
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
)
there are 8 possible erasure combinations that would result
in an incorrect decode using the strategy described. In this case, all would yield the
zero codeword as in Table 6.11
When summing the contributions to the joint entropy for each of the transmitted code-
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Erasure pattern Probability Decode
000????? 9.7E-11 00000000
00?????? 9.8E-13 00000000
0?0????? 9.8E-13 00000000
?00????? 9.8E-13 00000000
0??????? 9.9E-15 00000000
?0?????? 9.9E-15 00000000
??0????? 9.9E-15 00000000
???????? 1E-16 00000000
Table 6.11: Incorrect Decodes for BKLC [8,2,5] with ps = 0.01
words, Table 6.12 is obtained. It can be seen that for the BKLC [8,2,5] with a BEC
erasure probability of ps = 0.01, the joint equivocation H(X,Y) is close to 2.
Trasnmitted Codeword Decode P(y j|xi) P(xi,y j) H(xi,y j)
x0 = 00000000 00000000 0.25 0.0625 0.5
00011111 0 0 0
11100111 0 0 0
11111000 0 0 0
x1 = 00011111 00000000 2.5E-11 6.25E-12 8.805E-10
00011111 0.25 0.0625 0.5
11100111 0 0 0
11111000 0 0 0
x2 = 11100111 00000000 2.5E-13 6.25E-14 1.047E-11
00011111 2.5E-11 6.25E-12 8.805E-10
11100111 0.25 0.0625 0.5
11111000 0 0 0
x3 = 11111000 00000000 2.5E-11 6.25E-13 8.805E-10
00011111 2.5E-13 6.25E-14 1.047E-11
11100111 2.5E-11 6.25E-013 8.805E-10
11111000 0.25 0.0625 0.5
Joint Entropy H(X ,Y ) 2.0000000035
Table 6.12: Joint Entropy contributions for BKLC [8,2,5] with p(s) = 0.01
6.3.2 Calculating H(Y )
In Chapter 4, it was noted that H(X |Y ) = H(X ,Y )−H(Y ) and that H(Y |X) = H(X ,Y )−
H(X). Up until this point, previous channel arrangements have meant that H(X) and
H(Y ) have been equal and therefore so have H(X |Y ) and H(Y |X). However, due to the
decoding method used with transmission across the BEC, this is no longer the case. In
order to calculate H(X |Y ) as a measure of the secrecy of the code across the channel,
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it is important to calculate the value of H(Y ) as it changes with ps.
As the number of erasures increases beyond the ability of the code to correct them,
the probability of incorrectly decoding the received codeword increases. Since the
decoding strategy in the event of multiple valid decode options is to select the first
option, there will be an increasing probability of selecting the first codeword that gives
a zero-syndrome, usually the zero codeword. In extremis, if all bits are erased, then
the zero codeword will always be selected.
Table 6.12 gives the conditional and joint probabilities obtained for an erasure proba-
bility of ps = 0.01, while Figure 6.11 shows just the conditional probabilities for ps = 0.8
with y0 probabilities emphasised. The output probabilities can be obtained from these,
shown for ps = 0.01 in Table 6.13 and for ps = 0.8 in Table 6.14. Both tables (but in
particular Table 6.14) show that the probabilities of obtaining each output codeword
are no longer uniform as was the case for both the BSC and the IE+BSC. This comes
as a direct result of the decoding method being used and the decreasing likelihood of
choosing codewords other than the zero codeword as ps approaches 1.
Output codeword P(y) H(y)
00000000 0.25+2.5E-11 + 2.5E-13 + 2.5E-11 = 0.2500000001 0.5
00011111 0 + 0.25 + 2.5E-11 + 2.5E-13 = 0.25 0.5
11100111 0 + 0 + 0.25 + 2.5E-11 = 0.25 0.5
11111000 0 + 0 + 0 + 0.2499999999 = 0.2499999999 0.5
H(Y) 2
Table 6.13: Output probabilties and entropies BKLC [8,2,5] with ps = 0.01
Output codeword P(y) H(y)
00000000 0.25 + 0.0819 + 0.0655 + 0.0819 = 0.4794 0.5085
00011111 0 + 0.1681 + 0.0400 + 0.0236 = 0.2316 0.4888
11100111 0 + 0 + 0.1445 + 0.0400 = 0.1845 0.4498
11111000 0 + 0 + 0 + 0.1045 = 0.1045 0.3405
H(Y) 1.7876
Table 6.14: Output probabilties and entropies BKLC [8,2,5] with ps = 0.8
For a much higher ps, the likelihood of having multiple erasures also increases accord-
ing to Equation 6.3. If many erasures become likely, then the probability of the code
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x3 = 11111000, P(x3) = 0.25
P (y0|x3) = 0.32768
P(y1|x3) = 0.09437184
P(y2|x3) = 0.15990784
P(y3|x3) = 0.41804032
x2 = 11100111, P(x2) = 0.25
P (y0|x2) = 0.262144
P(y1|x2) = 0.15990784
P(y2|x2) = 0.57794816
P(y3|x2) = 0
x1 = 00011111, P(x1) = 0.25
P (y0|x1) = 0.32768
P(y1|x1) = 0.67232
P(y2|x1) = 0
P(y3|x1) = 0
x0 = 00000000, P(x0) = 0.25
P (y0|x0) = 1
P(y1|x0) = 0
P(y2|x0) = 0
P(y3|x0) = 0
Figure 6.11: Input and output probabilities for BKLC [8,2,5] on BE C with 2 erasures
and pe = 0.8
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being unable to correct the erasures will also increase. As this happens, it becomes
more likely that the decoding process will resort to selecting the zero codeword as the
decode. As previously noted, in extremis when all bits are erased, it becomes a cer-
tainty that the zero codeword will be selected as the decode. Hence as ps → 1, the
output entropy H(Y )→ 0. When considering the relationship between H(X) and H(Y )
as shown in Figure 4.2, as ps increases H(Y ) decreases, as shown in Figure 6.12.
H(X |Y ) H(Y |X)I(X ,Y )
H(X) H(Y )
H(X ,Y )
Figure 6.12: Changing Relationship between Input and Output Entropies on BEC as
ps increases and H(Y ) decreases
Once both H(X ,Y ) and H(Y ) have been calculated, the equivocation can be found from
H(X |Y ) = H(X ,Y )−H(Y ).
6.3.3 Results
When dealing with the BSC, it was only necessary to consider symmetric crossover
errors of probability 0 ≤ pe ≤ 0.5. Once pe reaches 0.5, the channel has become fully
randomised, with the output having ceased to be dependent on the input. There is no
point proceeding with error probabilities greater than 0.5 because an error has become
more likely than not. However for the BEC, the risk of an erasure occurring must
be considered up until it becomes a certainty i.e. the full range 0 ≤ ps ≤ 1 must be
considered. Figure 6.13 show the normalised equivocation for 4 codes of different
lengths and Figure 6.14 shows the corresponding normalised values of H(Y ) for each
code as ps changes, demonstrating how the output entropies decrease rapidly as ps
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approaches 1. Figure 6.15 shows the normalised equivocation for a range of Best
Known Linear Codes of length n = 15. Both Figure 6.13 and Figure 6.15 illustrate the
dramatic differences in normalised equivocation between different length codes.
The ability of a code to correct erasures is limited by the dmin of the code. The figures
suggest that of the BKLCs examined, those codes with low dmin values and low era-
sure correcting capabilities will yield higher equivocation levels. These differences in
equivocation level are at their most prominent for mid-range probabilities. For example
if ps = 0.5, the normalised equivocation of the BKLC [15,4,8] code is 0.0597882 while
for the BKLC [15,12,2] code it is 0.689081.
Figure 6.13: Equivocation of codes on the BEC
6.3.4 Conclusions
The work on equivocation on the BEC demonstrates that the methods previously used
for the BSC can be extended to include other channels. Whilst some worthwhile results
were obtained for a few codes, programming limitations prevented getting results for
any codes of length greater than n = 15. Despite that, the results showed that there
can be some very large differences in normalised equivocation values, even for closely
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Figure 6.14: Output Entropy H(Y ) of codes on the BEC
related codes.
The most worthwhile point developed was the observation of a system, whose correc-
tion and decoding mechanism reduces the set of possible outcomes and hence the
output entropy as the erasure probabilty ps increases.
6.4 Chapter Conclusions
In addition to the expansion of codes previously discussed, erasures can be used as
an alternative mechanism for increasing the equivocation of a code over a BSC and
thereby its average ambiguity and secrecy.
• Increases in equivocation from the introduction of intentional erasures on the
BSC can be significant, but not as great as those increases shown by the use
of code expansions. For example, from Figure 6.7 in subsection 6.2.2, for the
Golay[23,12,7] code with pe = 0.05, 6 erasures give a normalised equivocation of
0.178 while 4-fold expansion gives a much higher value of 0.540.
• Some increases in the number of bits erased on the IE+BSC do not necessarily
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Figure 6.15: Equivocation of BKLCs of length 15 and different k on BEC
lead to an increase in equivocation. This was seen with BKLC[8,2,5], where the
increase from 3 to 4 erasures did not change the equivocation. This was because
the increase in erasures didn’t change the ability of the code to use the available
syndrome patterns for the detection or correction of either errors or erasures.
• The controlled introduction of erasures to a BSC can lead to a greater increase
in equivocation for an eavesdropper than it does for the legitimate receiver. The
introduction of 2 erasures to the Golay[23,12,7] code on the IE+BSC gave an
increase in normalised equivocation of 0.00132 for the legitimate receiver with
pe= 0.05 but a much larger increase of 0.08898 for an eavesdropper with pe= 0.1.
• A comparison between code expansions and erasures can show situations where,
for a particular error probability, there is a changeover point in which method pro-
duces the higher equivocation values. It was seen that for Golay [23,12,7] with
pe < 0.05, 6 erasures gave a higher equivocation value, whereas for pe > 0.05,
2-fold code expansion gave higher values.
• On the BEC in Section 6.3, even codes with similar properties or similar lengths
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can have wildly different equivocation characteristics. Figure 6.13 shows that with
ps = 0.2, BKLC[15,10,4] had a normalised equivocation of just 0.0733, whereas
BKLC[15,12,2] had a value of 0.3581.
• The correction and decoding mechansim used for the BEC in subsection 6.3.2
caused a reduction in the possible outcomes and a decreasing output entropy as
the probability of an erasure increased. As ps→ 1, H(Y )→ 0. In extremis, when
all bits are erased, it becomes a certainty that the zero codeword will be selected
as the decode.
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Chapter 7
Equivocation of Deletions
7.1 Introduction
Golomb et al. (1963) observed that:
the single insertion and deletion channel, even in the absence of other
noise, would make a fascinating study.
Subsequent work by Dobrushin (1967) and Stambler (1970) discussed coding theo-
rems for channels subject to random deletions and insertions, while Graham (2015)
introduces an alternative model for the Binary Deletion Channel (BDC) and Davey &
Mackay (2001) discussed reliable communication of channels with insertions, dele-
tions and substitutions. No closed-form expression for the capacity of the BDC exists
at present, however extensive work has been undertaken on providing tighter bounds
for the BDC by Dalai (2011), Mitzenmacher (2006), Kalai et al. (2010), Kanoria & Mon-
tanari (2010, 2013), Kirsch & Drinea (2007), Fertonani & Duman (2010).
This chapter looks at a method of evaluating the equivocation of a code when symbols
are intentionally deleted ahead of transmission across a Binary Symmetric Channel (ID
+ BSC), shown in Figure 7.1. The system includes a simple state switch that controls
whether a deletion is introduced into the system or not. When the switch is in position
‘0’, the system acts as a simple BSC with wiretap, the results of which have already
been discussed in Section 5.4. When the switch is in position ‘1’, the system acts as
an ID+BSC with Wire-Tap.
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m
Encoder
x= mG Deletion
State switch
‘0’ =⇒ No deletion
‘1’ =⇒ Deletion
x∗
BSC
y∗
Wiretap
Channel
Correction Decoder
ya mesta
yb,mestb
Figure 7.1: Code transmission across a BSC with intentional deletions (ID+BSC), sub-
ject to wiretap
7.2 Equivocation of a Binary Symmetric Channel with Intentional Deletions
(ID+BSC)
If δ deletions of transmitted symbols xi ∈ X are introduced for the ID+BSC then as with
the BDC, the positions of the received bits y∗i may differ from the transmitted positions.
{x0x1....xn−1} 7→ {y∗0y∗1....y∗n−δ−1}
The n− δ non-deleted bits will also be susceptible to a cross-over probability of pe on
the BSC.
However, when considering multiple deletions, the number of permutations that must
be considered rapidly extends beyond the practical capabilities of a ‘standard’ PC, even
if the parallel processing techniques previously described were implemented on the
GPU. For δ deletions in a codeword of length n, there are
(n
δ
)
possible arrangements
of locations in which the bits could have been deleted. If any number of deletions
were permitted, up to a value δ , ∑δi=0
(n
i
)
cumulative arrangements must be consid-
ered. Even for a relatively short code such as the Golay [23,12,7] code, considering 2
deletions rather than 1 deletion gives 11 times more arrangements of deletion positions
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to consider since (23
2
)(23
1
) = 23!/21!2!
23!/22!1!
=
(23×22)/(2×1)
23/1
= 22/2= 11
Considering up to and including 3 deletions would give 89 times more arrangements of
deletion positions to consider:
(23
1
)
+
(23
2
)
+
(23
3
)(23
1
) = 23+253+1771
23
=
2047
23
= 89
The impact of the BSC must still be considered for every possible arrangement. There-
fore this chapter will only consider a single intentional deletion ahead of transmis-
sion via the BSC.
In Figure 7.1, a message m is encoded as the codeword x of length n and subjected to a
single-bit deletion, yielding x∗. before being transmitted across the BSC. The received
punctured codeword y∗ must then be corrected back to a valid codeword y of length n
before finally being decoded to an estimate of the original message, mest .
Punctured (n−1)-bit codewords x∗ will be referred to as codeword stubs. Every code-
word will generate its own set of n codeword stubs, some of which may be similar to
each other or to stubs from other codewords. For every position in which the deletion
could have occurred, all 2n−1 possible BSC errors must be considered.
The 24 = 16 possible sets of codeword stubs for the Hamming [7,4,3] code are shown
at Appendix C.
7.2.1 Calculation of Equivocation
As previously, a proof-of-concept spreadsheet was drawn up in Microsoft Excel prior to
coding up the algorithm. Even for a code as simple as the Hamming [7,4,3] code, such
a spreadsheet consists of many hundreds of rows and columns. It was assumed that
messages selected are independent and identically distributed, such that for a linear
[n,k,d] code, P(xi) = 12k .
There are two main phases to the process of calculating the equivocation of an ID+BSC
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channel:
• Determine how to decode each received punctured codeword
• Evaluate the entropic contribution for every possible input/output combination,
allowing for both intentional deletions and BSC errors.
Maximum Likelihood Decoding (MLD) compares received sequences with valid code-
words, taking into account the confidence in the received symbols and selecting the
codeword closest to the received sequence (Sweeney 2002, van Lint 1999, Togneri &
deSilva 2002). To decide how to decode the codeword stubs, a MLD approach is used:
• For all 2n−1 received codeword stubs, list the 2n possible n-bit rebuild options ru,v
that the stub could have come from (u indicates the stub number 0≤ u≤ 2n−1−1,
v indicates the rebuild number 0≤ v≤ 2n−1).
• Find the Hamming distance d(ru,v,xi) of each rebuild option from all 2k valid code-
words xi. However only rebuild options with the reconstructed bit equal to the
equivalent bit of the valid codeword need be considered, halving the number of
distances that must be found. This requires the evaluation of 2n−1 × n× 2k =
n×2n+k−1 distances, a number that increases exponentially with both n and k.
• Given d(ru,v,xi), calculate the probability, P(xi|ru,v) of the rebuild option having
come from each valid codeword.
• The output codeword yˆ j with the highest probability Pmax(xi|y j) of being the source
of the stub is selected.
• P(yˆi) can be found from the mean probability of the rebuild having come from each
codeword. Each transmitted codeword has n possibilities for each bit deleted,
with probability 1n . The decoder has no information about which bit is deleted so
has to sum over all n deletion possibilities to find the most likely codeword, given
y j.
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• If two codewords are equally likely then one is chosen randomly.
For example, with the Hamming [7,4,3] code and a BSC pe = 0.01, the codeword stub(
0 0 0 1 1 1
)
has 14 possible rebuild options with distances to valid codewords
as shown in Table D.1 of Appendix D. Once the distances are known, the probabili-
ties in Table D.2 can be calculated. This shows that codewords c1 and c8 have equal
maximum likelihood of being the correct decode, so one of these is chosen, potentially
rebuilding
(
0 0 0 1 1 1
)
as
(
0 0 0 1 1 1 0
)
.
The probability of each received vector, P(y j) can be found from the mean of these
probabilities for each received vector. For 0.01 with the Hamming [7,4,3] code, the
codeword stub
(
0 0 0 1 1 1
)
gives P(y7) = 0.01768. A full list of decodes and
output probabilities P(y j) for the Hamming [7,4,3] code with one intentional deletion
and when pe = 0.01 is in Appendix E.
To evaluate the contribution to the entropy of every possible combination of input and
output codeword:
• Consider every possible input message and corresponding codeword
• For every one of 2k codewords, consider all n codeword stubs
• For every one of n codeword stubs, consider all 2n−1 possible BSC errors
• For every codeword stub with 2n−1 possible errors, consider its distance to a valid
codeword and calculate P(y j|xi). This gives 2k× n× 2n−1 = 2n+k−1× n distances
to consider i.e. it again rises exponentially with both n and k. Even for the short
Hamming [7,4,3] code, this requires the evaluation of 210 distances.
By Bayes’ Theorem,
P(xi|y j) = P(y j|xi) ·P(xi)P(y j) (7.1)
and since:
147
7.2. EQUIVOCATION OF A BINARY SYMMETRIC CHANNEL WITH INTENTIONAL
DELETIONS (ID+BSC)
• P(y j|xi) is known
• P(y j) is known
• P(xi) = 12k for an [n,k,d] linear code with equally likely input codewords
• H(xi|y j) = P(xi|y j) · log2( 1P(xi|y j))
we can calculate H(xi|y j). By summing across all input codewords, we obtain Equa-
tion 7.2
H(X |y j) = ∑
x∈X
P(xi|y j) log2
(
1
P(xi|y j)
)
(7.2)
The contributions to the conditional entropy of codeword y7 are shown in Table 7.1.
Subsequent summing over all received codewords gives Equation 7.3
H(X |Y ) = ∑
y∈Y
P(y j)H(X |y j)
= ∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
P(y j)P(xi|y j) log2
(
1
P(xi|y j)
)
= ∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
P(xi,y j) log2
(
1
P(xi|y j)
) (7.3)
For Hamming [7,4,3] with pe = 0.01, H(X |Y ) = 0.1681. The calculation can be repeated
for a range of probabilities and codes to give the results in subsection 7.2.5.
7.2.2 Code Choice
Initital calculations were performed with simple codes such as Hamming codes or Best
Known Linear Codes, taken from existing code tables (Grassl 2015). However, whilst
they may be efficient in terms of offering a good minimum Hamming distance relative
to the code length, such codes may not be effective codes with regards to how they
cope with deletions.
Take, for example, the two 7-bit codewords x1 =
(
01 12 03 04 15 06 17
)
and
x2 =
(
11 02 03 14 05 16 17
)
. They differ in positions 1,2,4,5 and 6 i.e. they
have a Hamming distance of 5. However if bit 1 of x1 is deleted and either bit 6 or 7
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xi P(y7) P(y7|xi) P(xi|y7) H(xi|y7)
x0 = 0000 0.0176839 9.70299e-07 3.42932e-06 1.1009e-06
x1 = 0001 0.0176839 0.138614 0.489903 0.00891835
x2 = 0010 0.0176839 0.00141373 0.00499653 0.000675483
x3 = 0011 0.0176839 0.00141373 0.00499653 0.000675483
x4 = 0100 0.0176839 0.00141373 0.00499653 0.000675483
x5 = 0101 0.0176839 0.00141373 0.00499653 0.000675483
x6 = 0110 0.0176839 2.78642e-05 9.84805e-05 2.31792e-05
x7 = 0111 0.0176839 4.243e-09 1.4996e-08 6.89245e-09
x8 = 1000 0.0176839 0.138614 0.489903 0.00891835
x9 = 1001 0.0176839 2.78642e-05 9.84805e-05 2.31792e-05
x10 = 1010 0.0176839 2.82843e-07 9.99651e-07 3.52353e-07
x11 = 1011 0.0176839 2.82843e-07 9.99651e-07 3.52353e-07
x12 = 1100 0.0176839 2.82843e-07 9.99651e-07 3.52353e-07
x13 = 1101 0.0176839 2.82843e-07 9.99651e-07 3.52353e-07
x14 = 1110 0.0176839 4.243e-09 1.4996e-08 6.89245e-09
x15 = 1111 0.0176839 9.70299e-07 3.42932e-06 1.1009e-06
Sum H(X |y7) 0.02058863
Table 7.1: Entropy contributions for y7
of x2 is deleted ahead of transmission, the vector
(
1 0 0 1 0 1
)
is transmitted in
both cases. Thus, even if there is no risk of error from the BSC (pe = 0), upon receipt it
isn’t possible to determine which codeword the received stub originated from. This will
contribute towards the code having a non-zero equivocation even when pe = 0.
In order to mitigate against this, codes can be designed for use with the deletion chan-
nel. Such codes will need to consider the number of ambiguous codeword stubs (i.e.
they could have originated from more than one valid codeword) that exist once one or
more deletions have been intentionally made.
However to consider every possible codeword stub interaction with all others in order
to optimise the code for deletions is not trivial. An [n,k,d] code will have 2k codewords,
each with n possible stubs. There will be (2k× n)× (2k−1× n) = 22k−1× n2 interactions
between possible pairs of stubs. For a [7,2,d] code, this would give 23 × 72 = 392
interactions, but for the Hamming [15,11,3] code it rises to 221×152 = 4.82×108.
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7.2.3 Varshamov-Tenengolts Codes
One useful set of codes when dealing with deletions highlighted by Sloane (2002) are
the Varshamov & Tenengolts (1965) codes. These codes were proven to be useful for
correcting single deletions by Levenshtein (1965a) and Levenshtein (1965b).
For 0 ≤ a ≤ n, the Varshamov-Tenengolts code VTa(n) consists of all binary vectors
(x1, ...,xn) satisfying
n
∑
i=1
ixi ≡ a(mod(n+1)) (7.4)
Alternatively,
x1+2x2+ ixi, ...nxn = m(n+1), m ∈ Z+
Codes with a= 0 contain the most codewords, giving the first few such codes as:
Code Codewords
VT0(1) {0}
VT0(2) {00,11}
VT0(3) {000,101}
VT0(4) {0000,1001,0110,1111}
VT0(5) {00000,10001,01010,11011,11100,00111}
VT0(6) {000000,001011,001100,010010,011110,100001,101101,110011,110100,111111}
...
...
Table 7.2: Varshamov-Tenengolts codes
A binary word of length n is a valid codeword of a Varshamov-Tenengolts VT0(n) code
if the sum of the positions of the bits with value 1 is equal to 0 mod n+ 1. So for the
VT0(8) code,
(
11 12 03 04 05 06 17 18
)
is a codeword because bits 1,2,7 and
8 are set and (1+2+7+8) mod 9= 0.
The key characteristic of VT0(n) codes that is of use in this situation is their resistance
to deletions. Considering the VT0(5) code, deletion of a single bit of each codeword
gives codeword stubs of length 4 as shown in Table 7.3.
Each codeword stub is unique to a single codeword without ambiguity, making it possi-
ble to determine its origin. All that remains is to allow for the impact of possible errors
from transmission across the BSC.
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Codeword Single deletion codeword stubs
00000 0000
10001 1000, 1001, 0001
01010 0101, 0100, 0110, 0010, 1010
11011 1101, 1111, 1011
11100 1110, 1100
00111 0011, 0111
Table 7.3: Single deletion codeword stubs for VT0(5)
It is worth noting Sloane’s observation (Sloane 2002) that few VT0(n) codes are linear.
Indeed VT0(n) codes are linear for n ≤ 4 but are never linear again, since for n ≥ 5,
VT0(n) contains the vectors 1 0 . . . 0 0 1 and 1 1 . . . 1 0 0 but not their sum.
To identify VT0(n) codewords, the computer code in Figure 7.2 was used.
powN = 1 « n;
for( int x = 0; x < powN; x++ ){ // Considers every n-bit vector
sum=0;
for( int i = 0; i < n; i++ ){ // Considers each bit of the vector
val = ( x & ( 1 « i) ) » i;
if( val == 1 ){
sum += ( n - i );} } // Sum of positions with bit = 1
if( sum % ( n + 1 ) == 0 ) { // Checks if codeword is valid
c[ nVT ] = x; // Adds to list of valid codewords
nVT++;} } // Tally of valid codewords
Figure 7.2: Code for generating Varshamov-Tenengolts codes
The number of codewords in a particular VT code (the cardinality of the code) can be
calculated from Sloane’s Theorem:
|VTa(n)|= 12(n+1) ∑odd d|(n+1)
φ(d)
µ( d(d,a))
φ( d(d,a))
2(n+1)/d (7.5)
where d are the odd divisors of n, φ is the Euler totient function, µ(n) is the Möbius
function and (d,a) = gcd(d,a). For a= 0, this gives the sequence in Table 7.4
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Varshamov-Tenengolts Code Cardinality
VT0(1) 1
VT0(2) 2
VT0(3) 2
VT0(4) 4
VT0(5) 6
VT0(6) 10
VT0(7) 16
VT0(8) 30
VT0(9) 52
VT0(10) 94
VT0(11) 172
VT0(12) 316
VT0(13) 586
VT0(14) 1096
VT0(15) 2048
...
...
Table 7.4: Cardinality of VT0(n) codes
A code with cardinality |VT0(n)| will contain x bits of information, where 2x = |VT0(n)| or
x = log(|VT0(n)|)log2 . So for VT0(5) with 6 codewords, the equivocation must be divided by
log6
log2 to normalise it.
If a= 0, then gcd(d,a) = d and
|VT0(n)|= 12(n+1) ∑odd d|(n+1)
φ(d)
µ(dd )
φ(dd )
2(n+1)/d
=
1
2(n+1) ∑odd d|(n+1)
φ(d)
µ(1)
φ(1)
2(n+1)/d
=
1
2(n+1) ∑odd d|(n+1)
φ(d)2(n+1)/d
However, if the special case where n= 2m−1, m ∈ Z+ is considered,
|VT0(2m−1)|= 12(2m−1+1) ∑odd d|(2m−1+1)
φ(d)2(2
m−1+1)/d
=
1
2m+1 ∑odd d|(2m)
φ(d)22
m/d
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but the only odd divisor of 2m is 1, so
|VT0(2m−1)|= 12m+1φ(1)2
(2m)
=
1
2m+1
22
m
= 22
m−m−1
Therefore, for 1≤m≤ 6, the VT0(n) codes will have the cardinalities shown in Table 7.5
m n |VT0(n)|
1 0 20
2 3 21
3 7 24
4 15 211
5 31 226
6 63 257
Table 7.5: Cardinality of VT0(n) codes with n= 2m−1
It can be seen that for VT0(n) codes with n= 2m−1, m≥ 2, the code will have the same
number of codewords as the Hamming (m,2) code (where m= n−k), described by the
properties Ham[2m−1,2m−m−1,3] or Ham[n,k,3], i.e.:
|VT0(n)|= |Ham[n,k,3]| (7.6)
It is believed that this is the first time that this relationship has been described.
7.2.4 Expanded Varshamov-Tenengolts Codes
Consider the combination of a Varshamov-Tenengolts code with a repetition code
where the f -fold expansion of any codeword repeats each original bit f times. Describ-
ing each bit of an expanded codeword with respect to its source bit and its repetition
number, we have Figure 7.3.
If f = 3, the VT0(6) codeword
(
101101
)
, with ∑6i=1 ixi = 1+3+4+6 = 14 = 0 (mod 7),
becomes the VT 30 (6) codeword
(
111000111111000111
)
. The bit originally in position 4,
x4 would be repeated in positions 10, 11 and 12 in the expanded codeword and would
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x1,x2, ...xi, ...xn
︷ ︸︸ ︷
x11,x12, ...,x1 f ,
︷ ︸︸ ︷
x21,x22, ...,x2 f , ...
︷ ︸︸ ︷
xi1,xi2, ...,xi f
frepeats
, ...
︷ ︸︸ ︷
xn1,xn2,xn f
Figure 7.3: Expansion of a Varshamov-Tenengolts codeword
give a contribution of 10x4+ 11x4+ 12x4 to the sum of products. For any original bit
xi, the triplicated bits will now reside in positions 3i− 2,3i− 1 and 3i. In general, for f
repeats, the repeated bits will be in positions f (i− 1)i+ 1, f (i− 1)i+ 2, ... f (i− 1)i+ f .
Overall, the sum of the products would become:
∑ni=1∑
f
j=1 ixi j = (x1+2x1+ ...+ f x1) +
(( f +1)x2+( f +2)x2+ ...+2 f x2)+
...
( f (i−1)+1)xi)+( f (i−1)+2)xi+ ...+( f (i−1)+ f )xi+
...
( f (n−1)+1)xn+( f (n−1)+2)xn+ ...+n f xn
So the f terms that originated from the i′th bit yield a contribution of:
(( f (i−1)+1)+( f (i−1)+2)+ ...( f (i−1)+ f ))xi
= ( f f (i−1)+Σ fi=1i)xi
= f f (i−1)+ f2 ( f +1))xi
= f ( f i− 12( f −1))xi
Which will always give an integer value of xi since f ( f −1) is always even. For example,
with triplication, the contribution from the expansion of the original fourth term of a
VT 30 (6) codeword would be 3(3×4− 12(3−1))x4= 3(12−1)x4= 33x4 as previously noted.
Over all terms for an expanded VT code with i original bits, xi , and f -fold expansion,
this gives a sum of
n
∑
i=1
f
∑
j=1
ixi j =
n
∑
i=1
f ( f i− 1
2
( f −1))xi (7.7)
So for the VT 30 (6) codeword,
(
101101
)
, we get
However 114 6= 0 (mod7), so expanded VT codewords do not retain this property of the
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∑ni=1∑
f
j=1 ixi j = 3(3×1− 12(3−1)) · · ·1)+3(3×2− 12(3−1)) · · ·0)+
3(3×3− 12(3−1)) · · ·1)+3(3×4− 12(3−1)) · · ·1)+
3(3×5− 12(3−1)) · · ·0)+3(3×6− 12(3−1)) · · ·1)
= 6+0+24+33+0+51
= 114
primary VT codes. Despite this, an f -fold expansion of a VT0(n) code is resilient to
multiple deletions, inheriting a combination of the VT code’s ability to tolerate deletions
and a repetition code’s ability to increase its resistance to defects.
Landjev & Haralambiev (2007) proved that if C is a t-deletion correcting code of length
n, then the expanded code:
C f = {(x1...x1︸ ︷︷ ︸
f
,x2...x2︸ ︷︷ ︸
f
, ...xn...xn︸ ︷︷ ︸
f
)|(x1,x2, ...xn) ∈C} (7.8)
is a code of length f n correcting f t+ f −1 deletions.
So single-deletion correcting VT codes that have undergone f -fold expansion are ca-
pable of correcting 2 f − 1 deletions e.g. a VT 20 (n) code can correct 3 deletions. For
example, the VT0(4) code has the codewords ( 0 0 0 0 ), ( 1 0 0 1 ), ( 0 1 1 0 ), and ( 1
1 1 1 ). With 2-fold expansion, the VT 20 (4) codewords become those in Table 7.6.
Binary Denary
( 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ) 0
( 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 ) 195
( 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 ) 60
( 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ) 255
Table 7.6: 2-fold expansion of Varshamov-Tenengolts VT0(4)
When single, double and triple deletions are applied to each of these codewords, the
7, 6 and 5-bit codeword stubs (in denary) in Table 7.7, Table 7.8 and Table 7.9 are
obtained respectively:
In each of the tables, each stub is unique to a single codeword. There are no am-
biguities about the origin of the codeword stub. As discussed in subsection 7.2.2, if
there is no ambiguity in the source of the codeword stub, then it possible to correctly
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Codeword Single deletion codeword stubs
0 0
195 97,99,67
60 30, 28, 60
255 127
Table 7.7: Single deletion codeword stubs for VT 20 (4)
Codeword Twin deletion codeword stubs
0 0
195 48, 49, 33, 51, 35, 3
60 15, 14, 30, 12, 28, 60
255 63
Table 7.8: Twin deletion codeword stubs for VT 20 (4)
Codeword Triple deletion codeword stubs
0 0
195 24, 16, 25, 17, 1, 27, 19, 3
60 7, 15, 6, 14, 30, 4, 12, 28
255 31
Table 7.9: Triple deletion codeword stubs for VT 20 (4)
‘correct’ the received stub to the transmitted codeword, enabling an equivocation of
zero, provided pe = 0. Thus the expansion of Varshamov-Tenengolts codes enables
the construction of codes that are resistant to multiple deletions. It’s worth noting that
whilst individual codeword lengths may be quite long, the number of codewords can be
optimized for the intended use.
To construct a ‘simple’ multi-deletion tolerant code, the algorithm below could be used:
• Identify the number of information bits b to be transmitted
• Identify the level of deletion correction required e.g. to correct 5 deletions requires
2 f −1= 5, or f = 3.
• Select a suitable Varshamov-Tenengolts code where |VT0(n)|> 2b
• Generate the f -fold expanded VT code, VT f0 (n) from the original VT code
For example, a code that could transmit 11 information bits and be resistant to 2 dele-
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tions would require a VT code of length 15 to be expanded 2-fold, giving 2048 code-
words each of length 30. Unfortunately, it was considered impractical to write software
to calculate the equivocation of these expanded VT codes as even this simple VT 20 (15)
code would be moving beyond the processing capabilities available to the author.
7.2.5 Results
As with other scenarios investigated, the program was written to calculate the equivo-
cation of the code on the ID+BSC for a range of probabilities 0≤ pe ≤ 0.5 with step size
0.01. The equivocation was found for a range of codes, up to the time-bounded practi-
cal limits of the algorithm. For the BKLC [19,10,5], a run-time of approximately 2 days
was required. Results for some codes of length less than 16 are shown in Figure 7.4
and for codes of length 16≤ n≤ 19 in Figure 7.5.
Many of the curves follow a similar pattern. One of the largest differences lies between
those codes whose equivocation is zero when pe = 0 and those with non-zero values.
If a code has a non-zero equivocation value when pe = 0, then it is unable to cope
with a single deletion even before the possibility of additional errors from the BSC is
considered. Codes that cannot cope with a single deletion are of less interest and use
than those that can tolerate a deletion. In all cases examined, the only crossover points
occurred when comparing against a code with a non-zero equivocation. No crossover
points between different codes of interest were identified.
Of the codes evaluated initially, only BKLC [12,4,6], BKLC [15,5,7], BKLC [16,5,8] and
the manually constructed code [17,9] code had normalised equivocation values of less
than the nominal value 0.01 when pe = 0, as shown in Table 7.10. The alternative [17,9]
code had been designed as an attempt to reduce the impact of ambiguous codeword
stubs, whilst enabling comparison with BKLC [17,9,5].
7.2.6 Comparison of Equivocation for Erasures and Deletions
Since a deletion might be considered as an erasure that can occur in any position, it
might appear tempting to compare their respective graphs of equivocation with era-
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Figure 7.4: Equivocation of different codes of length 15 or less on the ID+BSC
Figure 7.5: Equivocation of different codes of length 16≤ n≤ 19 on the ID+BSC
sures and deletions. For example, the equivocation of erasures on the BSC for BKLC
[8,2,5] in Figure 6.4 could perhaps be compared to the equivocation of a deletion on
the BSC for the same code, shown in Figure 7.4. Such a comparison is shown in Fig-
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Code Normalized equivocation HN(X |Y )
Hamming [7,4,3] 0.1139
BKLC [8,2,5] 0.2845
BKLC [10,4,4] 0.0195
BKLC [12,4,6] 0.0078
BKLC [13,7,4] 0.0146
BKLC [15,7,7] 0.0039
Hamming [15,11,3] 0.0458
BKLC [16,5,8] 0.0000
BKLC [17,9,5] 0.0228
BKLC [18,9,6] 0.0239
BKLC [19,7,8] 0.0124
Table 7.10: Normalized equivocation values for ID+BSC when pe = 0
ure 7.6. Consideration could be given as to whether the equivocation for a deletion
might form some type of upper bound for increasing numbers of erasures. However
it is not appropriate to make such a comparison. The underlying mechanisms behind
how intentional erasures and intentional deletions on the BSC are handled and how the
equivocation is calculated are significantly different because of the unknown location
of the deletions. With deletions, decisions must be made about how to decode each
punctured codeword, even though there may be ambiguities in that decision process
when working with codes not specifically designed for handling deletions. Due to the
different error correction and deletion correction properties of the code, the equivoca-
tion curve for a BKLC with single erasure starts at zero but the curve for a deletion may
not. With deletions, entropic contributions for each input/output combination are cal-
culated based on a maximum likelihood decoding that compares received sequences
with valid codewords and must take into account the level of confidence in the received
symbols. Furthermore, even if some form of relationship between i erasures and i
deletions could be established, the practical challenges of calculating the equivocation
for multiple deletions made it impractical to investigate during this research.
7.2.7 Equivocation of Varshamov-Tenengolts Codes
When equivocation values are calculated for Varshamov-Tenengolts codes on the ID+BSC,
shown in Figure 7.7, a significantly different picture emerges than that for BKLCs. By
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Figure 7.6: Comparison of a single deletion and multiple erasures for BKLC[8,2,5]
design, all VT codes offer an equivocation of zero when pe = 0, however the graphs for
the more ‘purpose-built’ VT codes also exhibit far less variation in their shape, with a
gradient that decreases as pe increases. For several BKLCs such as BKLC [16,5,8],
the gradient initially increases before reaching a point of inflexion and then decreasing.
All graphs are monotonic i.e. if pe1 < pe2 then Hpe1 (X |Y )< Hpe2 (X |Y ).
For the VT0(12) code, if the intended recipient had a BSC error probability pe of 0.01,
they would be liable for a normalised equivocation value of 0.084 whereas if the eaves-
dropper had a pe = 0.1, they would be liable to a value nearly six times greater of 0.485.
A simple comparison in Figure 7.8 of the VT0(17) code with the BKLC [17,9,5] and a
code of length n= 17, manually constructed to reduce the risk of ambiguities between
stubs when a bit is deleted, shows that the Varshamov-Tenengolts code provides an
equivocation of zero when pe = 0 but it also provides significantly higher equivocation
values for all other BSC error probabilities.
When code expansion is introduced on top of intentional deletions on the BSC for
Varshamov-Tenengolts codes, the results in Figure 7.9 are obtained.
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Figure 7.7: Equivocation of Varshamov-Tenengolts codes on ID+BSC
Figure 7.8: Comparison for Varshamov-Tenengolts, manually constructed and BKLCs
of length 17 on ID+BSC
The temptation to compare the BSC+ID equivocation of BKLCs of length n and VT0(n)
codes is not necessarily a constructive one, as the BKLC code may not provide re-
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Figure 7.9: Equivocation of Varshamov-Tenengolts codes on ID+BSC with 2, 4 and
10-fold code expansion
silience against a single deletion. However it is worth comparing a VT0 code that can
carry k bits of information with a BKLC with message length k that offers resistance
to a deletion when pe = 0. For example, consider VT0(7) which has 16 codewords,
can transmit 4 information bits and is resilient to 1 deletion. This can be compared to
BKLCs with k = 4 (and which therefore also can transmit 4 information bits) of increas-
ing codeword length n.
A graph of the equivocation of BKLCs on the ID+BSC as n increases is shown in
Figure 7.10. Closer examination of the equivocation values when pe = 0 for each code
gives us Table 7.11.
Unlike the Varshamov Tenengolts codes (and specifically the VT0(7) code), whose
codewords always yield unambiguous codeword stubs and an equivocation of zero
when pe = 0, BKLCs with k = 4 (and therefore 16 codewords) do not achieve an equiv-
ocation of zero until a code length of at least n = 14 is reached. A comparison of the
VT0(7) codes with BKLCs that have k= 4 and an equivocation of zero when pe = 0 is in
Figure 7.11.
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Figure 7.10: Equivocation of BKLCs with k = 4 on ID+BSC
Code Normalized equivocation HN(X |Y )
Hamming [7,4,3] 0.113883
BKLC [8,4,4] 0.060068
BKLC [9,4,4] 0.024306
BKLC [10,4,4] 0.019516
BKLC [11,4,5] 0.017421
BKLC [12,4,6] 0.007813
BKLC [13,4,6] 0.024038
BKLC [14,4,7] 0.000000
BKLC [15,4,8] 0.000000
BKLC [16,4,8] 0.000000
Table 7.11: Normalized equivocation values for ID+BSC for BKLCs, k= 4 when pe = 0
The VT0(7) code achieves its designed aim of providing effective tolerance of deletions
far more efficiently, with codewords half the length needed for a BKLC. In addition,
VT0(7) also yields higher equivocation values than any of the BKLCs that manage to
offer an equivocation of zero when pe = 0.
7.2.8 Chapter Conclusions
• In subsection 7.2.2, it was seen that Best Known Linear Codes that are selected
to maximise the minimum distance for any given value of n and k are not nec-
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Figure 7.11: Comparison of VT0(7) with BKLCs with k = 4 on ID+BSC
essarily good codes for using when deletions are involved. Neither the "perfect"
Hamming[7,4,3] nor Hamming[15,11,3] cannot reliably correct even a single dele-
tion on ID+BSC to give an equivocation of 0 when pe = 0.
• Codes that cannot correct a single intentional deletion always retain some am-
biguity in their decoding method and do not give an equivocation of zero when
pe=0. They are therefore are of little practical use on the ID+BSC.
• subsection 7.2.3 showed that Varshamov-Tenengolts VT0(n) codes provide a set
of codes that eliminate ambiguities between codewords stubs when a single dele-
tion in involved. VT0(n) codes offered higher levels of equivocation than the reli-
ably correcting BKLCs examined on the ID+BSC. For example, for pe = 0.1, the 3
BKLC codes in Figure 7.11 (in which all codes convey 4 bits of information) had
normalized equivocation values of 0.093, 0.109 and 0.132, compared to VT0(7)
which had a much higher value of 0.479.
• Varshamov-Tenengolts codes can generally offer the ability to correct a deletion
for a higher code rate (R = k/n) and lower redundancy than a BKLC that carries
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the same amount of information. Again for the codes in Figure 7.11, the BKLCs
had code rates of 0.286 (4/14), 0.2667 (4/15) and 0.25 (4/16) whereas VT0(7)
had the much more efficient code rate of 0.571 (4/7).
• In subsection 7.2.4, it was shown that codes to correct any number of deletions
can be designed, based on Varshamov-Tenengolts code, despite the modified
codes no longer satisfying ∑ni=1 ixi ≡ a(mod(n+ 1)). For example, the 2-fold ex-
panded Varshamov-Tenengolts code, VT 20 (4), is resistant to 3 deletions.
• If m≥ 2, n= 2m−1, k = n−m, then |VT0(n)|= |Ham[n,k,3]|
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
This doctoral work has enabled an investigation of the equivocation properties of many
different types of code and transmission channel. It was partially achieved through the
use of a novel mechanism for calculating the equivocation - parallel processing via the
CUDA architecture. Key points developed within the work include:
• In subsection 5.3.2, it was seen that parallel processing can be effectively im-
plemented on a general purpose computer using the Nvidia CUDA architecture.
Developing the code to implement the parallel processed component of the pro-
gram was both time consuming and challenging but enabled the generation of
results for longer codes. ı
• Parallel processing can provide significant improvements in calculation times for
intensive calculations. The best improvements obtained gave calculation results
up to 35 times more quickly with parallel processing than with linear processing.
• Parallel processing code must be carefully implemented in order to optimise its
efficiency for the actual task. In particular careful memory management is nec-
essary to enable the GPU to continue operate its core duties effectively whilst
simultaneously carrying out the parallel processed component of the calculation.
• Section 5.4 shows that normalised equivocation values can be used to compare
the relative secrecies of codes, enabling codes with higher inherent levels of se-
crecy to be selected if required, although the other properties of the codes, such
as the error correcting capability must also be borne in mind. For example, from
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Figure 5.3, when operating with a BSC error probability of 0.05, Golay[23,12,7]
has a normalised equivocation of 0.033, whereas Hamming[31,26,3] has a value
of 0.221, nearly 7 times higher. Based on the codes’ normalised equivocation val-
ues for that error probability, the Hamming code offers a higher level of secrecy
than the Golay[23,12,7] code despite having a lesser error correcting capability.
• For the codes examined from the Hamming code family, longer codes tended to
have higher normalised equivocation values than the shorter codes. For exam-
ple, with pe = 0.05, the normalised equivocation of Hamming[7,4,3] is 0.101 com-
pared to 0.157 for Hamming[15,11,3] and 0.221 for Hamming[31,26,3]. However,
the complexity of the calculations to find equivocation values for longer codes
meant that it wasn’t possible to verify this for longer Hamming codes such as
Hamming[63,57,3] or Hamming[127,120,3]. Further work is required to establish
if the pattern holds for either longer Hamming codes or for other families of code.
• Largest differences in code equivocation values were often found in the more
central range of the error probabilities, for the codes investigated (especially for
expanded codes). This can be seen by identifying the steepest part of the curve
in any of the normalised equivocation graphs from Figure 5.3 to Figure 5.13.
• For the codes examined, differences in normalised equivocation values between
codes decrease as code lengths increase. For example, in Figure 5.6 with longer
length BKLCs, the similarity in value of all 7 functions can be seen quite clearly,
whereas the differences between the shorter codes in Figure 5.3 are signficantly
more marked.
• In Section 5.5, it was shown that by expanding a simple code through the use
of random data and parity check bits, much greater levels of secrecy can be
achieved in some cases. For example, with a BSC error probability pe = 0.05, a
10-fold expansion of the Hamming[7,4,3] code gives a normalised equivocation
level of 0.897, compared to 0.101 for the non-expanded code. However, there is
a trade-off between achieving the desired level of secrecy by expanding a sim-
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ple code and the significant increase in the number of bits of data that need to be
transmitted in order to achieve it. A 10-fold code expansion of the Hamming[7,4,3]
code may enable very high levels of equivocation but would require the transmis-
sion of 70 bits of data to send a 4-bit message.
• One of the aims of the work was not to design codes with improved error-correcting
capabilities but to identify codes that either a) give a higher equivocation value
and level of secrecy than other similar or related codes or b) enable a large dif-
ferential in equivocation level to be established between the legitimate recipient
and the eavesdropper. By expanding random codes, higher equivocation values
can be achieved than for more structured but non-expanded codes. For example,
with a BSC error probability pe = 0.05, a 4-fold expansion of a random [23,12]
code gives a normalised equivocation of 0.597, compared to a non-expanded
Golay[23,12,7] value of 0.033. However, although the inherent randomness of the
codes increased equivocation levels, this is of little benefit given that the codes
offer no error correcting capability.
• The expansion of a code can offer higher normalised equivocation values than
a code with a similar net code rate. For example, consider the Hamming[7,4,3]
code with 2-fold expansion and the BKLC[14,4,7] code. Both effectively require
14 bits to transmit 4 bits worth of message data, however for a BSC error proba-
bility of pe = 0.05, the 2-fold expanded Hamming code gives a normalised equiv-
ocation of 0.259, while the non-expanded Hamming code gave a value of 0.101
and the BKLC[14,4,7] only gives a value of 0.038.
• Increases in equivocation from the introduction of intentional erasures on the
BSC are significant, but not as great as those increases shown by the use of
code expansions. For example, from Figure 6.7 in subsection 6.2.2, for the
Golay[23,12,7] code with pe = 0.05, 6 erasures give a normalised equivocation
of 0.178 while 4-fold expansion gives a much higher value of 0.540.
• Some increases in the number of bits erased on the IE+BSC do not necessarily
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lead to an increase in equivocation. This was seen with BKLC[8,2,5], where the
increase from 3 to 4 erasures did not change the equivocation. This was because
the increase in erasures didn’t change the ability of the code to use the available
syndrome patterns for the detection or correction of either errors or erasures.
• The controlled introduction of erasures to a BSC can potentially lead to a greater
increase in equivocation for an eavesdropper than it does for the legitimate re-
ceiver. The introduction of 2 erasures to the Golay[23,12,7] code on the IE+BSC
gave an increase in normalised equivocation of 0.00132 for the legitimate re-
ceiver with pe = 0.05 but a much larger increase of 0.08898 for an eavesdropper
with pe = 0.1.
• A comparison between code expansions and erasures can show situations where,
for a particular error probability, there is a changeover point in which method pro-
duces the higher equivocation values. It was seen that for Golay [23,12,7] with
pe < 0.05, 6 erasures gave a higher equivocation value, whereas for pe > 0.05,
2-fold code expansion gave higher values.
• On the BEC in Section 6.3, even codes with similar properties or similar lengths
can have wildly different equivocation characteristics. Figure 6.13 shows that with
ps = 0.2, BKLC[15,10,4] had a normalised equivocation of just 0.0733, whereas
BKLC[15,12,2] had a value of 0.3581.
• The correction and decoding mechansim used for the BEC in subsection 6.3.2
caused a reduction in the possible outcomes and a decreasing output entropy as
the probability of an erasure increased. As ps→ 1, H(Y )→ 0. In extremis, when
all bits are erased, it becomes a certainty that the zero codeword will be selected
as the decode.
• In subsection 7.2.2, it was seen that Best Known Linear Codes that are selected
to maximise the minimum distance for any given value of n and k are not nec-
essarily good codes for using when deletions are involved. Neither the "perfect"
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Hamming[7,4,3] nor Hamming[15,11,3] cannot reliably correct even a single dele-
tion on ID+BSC to give an equivocation of 0 when pe = 0.
• Codes that cannot correct a single intentional deletion always retain some am-
biguity in their decoding method and do not give an equivocation of zero when
pe=0. They are therefore are of little practical use on the ID+BSC.
• subsection 7.2.3 showed that Varshamov-Tenengolts VT0(n) codes provide a set
of codes that eliminate ambiguities between codewords stubs when a single dele-
tion in involved. VT0(n) codes offered higher levels of equivocation than the reli-
ably correcting BKLCs examined on the ID+BSC. For example, for pe = 0.1, the 3
BKLC codes in Figure 7.11 (in which all codes convey 4 bits of information) had
normalized equivocation values of 0.093, 0.109 and 0.132, compared to VT0(7)
which had a much higher value of 0.479.
• Varshamov-Tenengolts codes can generally offer the ability to correct a deletion
for a higher code rate (R = k/n) and lower redundancy than a BKLC that carries
the same amount of information. Again for the codes in Figure 7.11, the BKLCs
had code rates of 0.286 (4/14), 0.2667 (4/15) and 0.25 (4/16) whereas VT0(7)
had the much more efficient code rate of 0.571 (4/7).
• In subsection 7.2.4, it was shown that codes to correct any number of deletions
can be designed, based on Varshamov-Tenengolts code, despite the modified
codes no longer satisfying
∑ni=1 ixi≡ a(mod(n+1)). For example, the 2-fold expanded Varshamov-Tenengolts
code, VT 20 (4), is resistant to 3 deletions.
• If m≥ 2, n= 2m−1, k = n−m, then |VT0(n)|= |Ham[n,k,3]|.
8.1 Discussion
This programme of Ph.D. study was started immediately following successful comple-
tion of an Open University degree in computing and with a historical background of a
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pass degree in mathematics some 20 years previously. The key skills required during
the period of research included:
• the development of an understanding of the broader aspects of coding theory
• a specific understanding of equivocation
• sufficient ability to program software solutions for calculating equivocation
• the perseverance to work through the many issues encountered along the way.
The material covered during the OU computing degree formed a broad introduction
to some aspects of coding theory such as the error-correcting capabilities of Hamming
codes, however this was in very little detail, except to have been sufficient to encourage
the author to make further steps into the field. Before the PhD. was started, the author
had no knowledge of equivocation.
Similarly, some work on C++ and object-oriented programming in Java had been com-
pleted during the OU degree programme. However as the doctorate work progressed,
it became increasingly apparent how much there was to learn in order to construct pro-
grams that provided solutions to the necessary calculations in anything approaching a
time-effective manner.
Consequently, a huge amount of time and effort has been expended on bringing these
skills to a higher standard. It is particularly interesting to look back through the vari-
ous iterations of the programs produced to see how the programming methods have
changed and improved en route.
As examples,
• NTL library. At the outset, significant time was spent learning how to work with
Shoup’s C++ Number Theory Library (NTL). The aim of this was to enable op-
eration with very large numbers through mechanisms such as the ZZ class for
arbitrary length integers, GF2 for integers mod 2 and the GF2X class for poly-
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nomicals over GF2. The manipulation of these classes and passing of values
between them took a long time to become used to.
Unfortunately, as the research progressed and became more focussed towards
the calculation of equivocation on different channel arrangements, it became ap-
parent that the ability to handle large, long numbers was far less important than
the ability to handle smaller numbers very quickly. Eventually use of the NTL
library was dropped in favour of simpler mechanisms that were felt to handle
smaller codes more efficiently for the task. As an example in the first, linear ver-
sion of the program to calculate equivocation on the BSC, the function below was
used to generate the next binary number:
vec_GF2 getNextBin(vec_GF2 vecA)
{
carry = 1;
posn = k -1;
vecA[posn] += 1;
while ( (carry == 1) && (posn > 0) )
{
if (vecA[posn] == 0)
{
carry = 1;
}
else
carry = 0;
vecA[posn-1] += carry;
posn–;
}
return vecA;
}
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However, once the change away from using NTL had been made in favour of
using bitwise manipulation of numbers stored as integers, this reduced back to
the triviality of a numerical increment:
num++;
• Bit-shifting. For a large proportion of the study period, n-bit binary numbers were
first handled using the vector and then using pointers with either the int or
long number types to hold each single bit. Eventually this approach was dropped
and the whole n-bit number was stored as a single int or long. This was then
manipulated using left- and right- bit-shifting to multiply and divide by powers of
2 and the logical operations & (AND), | (OR) and ˆ(XOR) to enable functions
such as matrix multiplication. Not only did this significantly reduce the amount
of memory needed to store the variables, but it also significantly increased the
speed of calculation and hence the length of codes for which the equivocation
could be found. An example of this approach to coding has already been seen in
Figure 7.2 on page 151.
• Balance between speed (calculation time) and memory. The calculations
done during the research were very intensive, increasing exponentially with the
length of both the message and the codeword. This constantly pushed at the
boundaries of what a ‘standard’ computer was able to achieve, both in terms of
the processing speed and capability and the memory requirements. For a calcu-
lation to run quickly, there was often a need to store volumes of data beyond the
capacity of the computer, so compromises had to be found for each calculation.
• CUDA architecture. The use of Nvidia’s CUDA architecture was viewed as a
viable mechanism for reducing calculation times. By employing the graphics card
for parallel processing the most repetitive components of calculations, significant
time savings were able to be obtained, fulfilling the primary purpose of CUDA.
This was seen in Table 5.8 where parallel processed times were up to 35 times
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quicker than those for linear processing.
However implementing the software within the CUDA architecture came at a very
great time cost to the research programme. Where a working linear version of a
program could be written increasingly quickly, converting this across to work as a
parallel processed equivalent with CUDA took considerable time and effort. The
first working, parallel-processed version of the program to calculate equivocation
on the BSC took several months to complete. CUDA kernels have their own
instruction set and do not easily permit the use of external libraries. The use
of NTL within the CUDA environment was never able to be resolved and was
another major reason for discontinuing the use of NTL. These time penalties in
learning such programming techniques and pitfalls had a massive, dominating
impact on the overall amount of visible outputs from this research project.
• GPU limitations. The CUDA architecture is specifically designed to enable the
use of a Nvidia GPU within a standard computer to perform parallel calculations.
However in practice, this was found to present significant problems.
– Usability. When running an intensive CUDA program, most of the unit’s
processing capability is given over to the calculation. This leads the dis-
play(s) to react and refresh much more slowly and all responses to inputs
such as mouse movement and keyboard input are severely delayed. This
usually rendered the computer unusable for any other tasks whilst the CUDA
program was running. If the program was on an extended run (e.g. the cal-
culation of equivocation on the ID+BSC for BKLC [19,7,8] for 50 probabilities
in 0.01 intervals took in excess of 36 hours), then no other work could be
done on the computer during that time.
– Stability. The extensive but necessary use of memory to store mid-calculation
values and the intensive use of the GPU led to severe stability issues for the
computer. The computer would often ‘hang’ and become completely unus-
able. Any changes to the physical set-up of the computer e.g. (un)plugging
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a second monitor would usually trigger an instability. Re-starting would not
necessarily clear the issues and caused immense frustration and loss of
study time. When the computer was working correctly, it was generally left
powered on and running for days or weeks at a time to minimize any risks
from changes. Whilst it was believed that most of the issues emanated
from the atypical use of the GPU and heavy use of memory, no satisfactory
memory management solutions were found. Once the majority of the par-
allel processing phase of the work had been completed, the (Ubuntu 14.04
LTS) computer gradually re-acquired good stability.
8.2 Further areas of Study
In summary, the field has proven an interesting one to study as a Ph.D student and one
that would bear significant further study. There was relatively little research to draw on
regarding the actual evaluation of equivocation for different channels, especially when
extending to the Binary Erasure and Binary Deletion Channels. This doctoral work has
opened up numerous possible avenues for further research.
1. Investigation of other decoding strategies that yield a decreasing output entropy
H(Y ) as encountered in Section 6.3.
2. Extension of the work in Chapter 7 to include multiple deletions.
3. Further examination of the equivocation properties of Varshamov-Tenengolts codes.
Whilst VT codes work very well for single-deletion situations, processing limita-
tions prevented the actual calculation of equivocation values for multi-deletion
resistant codes. It would be interesting to pursue this further.
4. Calculation of equivocation on other channels, including the Binary Deletion Chan-
nel (BDC) and Binary Symmetric Erasure Channel (BSEC). These two channels
would form a very natural extension to the work already covered and have al-
ready been discussed to some extent. It is anticipated that calculations for the
BSEC would require little additional modification of existing software and would
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yield results for similar length codes to those already obtained. However, al-
though addressing the BDC would require few modifications to existing software
solutions, the additional complexity that deletions bring in comparison to erasures
would only make it possible to obtain results for quite short codes. In addition to
the channels already discussed, other channels might be considered such as the
Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) channel or Fading channels. The AWGN
channel is a model that mimics the impact of noise due to natural processes by
adding further noise to the intrinsic noise of an existing information system. Gaus-
sian noise is normally distributied with respect to time and White noise possesses
a uniform power level across the frequency band of the system. The AWGN chan-
nel models satellite and other space-based communication links well but less so
for terrestrial environments, due to other factors such as interference and multi-
path propagation. Fading channels model the degradation of signal quality over
large distances, even without significant AWGN. Fading is more likely to be due to
terrestrial influences such as multipath propagation, terrain/geography, weather
phenomena etc. It is considered that the existing methods developed during this
thesis would not transfer well to either the AWGN channel or Fading channels
without a substantially revised approach to the calculation of conditional proba-
bilities and equivocation values.
5. Development of further techniques to reduce calculation run-times and thereby
enable calculation of equivocation for longer codes The software solutions used
in this work have been shown to be effective at directly calculating equivocation
values that enable comparisons to be made between different codes, but only
for codes of length n ≤ 40. Whilst further channels arrangements could be con-
sidered, the primary way of extending the calculation to longer codes would be
via more efficient programming and by bringing greater processing capability to
bear on the problem. Those increases might come from the methods suggested
in subsection 5.4.2, however it is likely that they would only bring a few extra bits
of code length, since each extra bit of code length will approximately double the
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necessary processing.
6. Calculation of equivocation for other types of code. The codes examinded in
this thesis were mostly either perfect codes or best known linear codes, although
the work was extended to Varshamov-Tenengolts codes in order to better cope
with intentional deletions on the BSC. Extensions that might be considered would
be to look at Hadamard codes, Reed-Muller codes or Low Density Parity Check
(LDPC) codes. As relatively straightforward binary linear codes with definable
generator matrices and that are used for error detection and correction, both
Hadamard and Reed-Muller codes would make good candidates for further in-
vestigation using the methods employed in this work. However, LDPC codes
usually have very much larger parity check matrices (PCMs), in the order of hun-
dreds, if not thousands, of both columns and rows. It is considered unlikely that
the methods used here would be able to be extended to cope with PCMs on that
scale. Similarly, Turbo Codes, which are high-performing codes that approach the
channel capacity, rely on an iterative feedback process to correct errors during
decoding. The additional complexity brought by the compounding of calculations
caused by the feedback process would again probably render the methods used
as inadequate for calculating the equivocation of turbo codes.
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Appendix A
5-Bit Error Vectors in Weight Order
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 1
0 1 0 1 1
0 1 1 0 1
0 1 1 1 0
1 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 1
1 0 1 1 0
1 1 0 0 1
1 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 0
0 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 1
1 1 1 0 1
1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 1
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BKLC[8,2,5]Decode Probabilities and Joint
Entropy Contributions
Transmitted codeword x1 =
(
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
)
, ps = 0.01
Received codeword Decode P(y|x1) P(x1,y) H(x1,y)
No erasures
00011111 00011111 0.9227 0.2307 0.4881
1 erasure
0001111? 00011111 0.0093 0.0023 0.0203
000111?1 00011111 0.0093 0.0023 0.0203
00011?11 00011111 0.0093 0.0023 0.0203
0001?111 00011111 0.0093 0.0023 0.0203
000?1111 00011111 0.0093 0.0023 0.0203
00?11111 00011111 0.0093 0.0023 0.0203
0?011111 00011111 0.0093 0.0023 0.0203
?0011111 00011111 0.0093 0.0023 0.0203
2 erasures
000111?? 00011111 9.4148E-05 2.3537E-05 3.6187E-04
00011?1? 00011111 9.4148E-05 2.3537E-05 3.6187E-04
00011??1 00011111 9.4148E-05 2.3537E-05 3.6187E-04
0001?11? 00011111 9.4148E-05 2.3537E-05 3.6187E-04
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Received codeword Decode P(y|x1) P(x1,y) H(x1,y)
0001?1?1 00011111 9.4148E-05 2.3537E-05 3.6187E-04
0001??11 00011111 9.4148E-05 2.3537E-05 3.6187E-04
000?111? 00011111 9.4148E-05 2.3537E-05 3.6187E-04
000?11?1 00011111 9.4148E-05 2.3537E-05 3.6187E-04
000?1?11 00011111 9.4148E-05 2.3537E-05 3.6187E-04
000??111 00011111 9.4148E-05 2.3537E-05 3.6187E-04
00?1111? 00011111 9.4148E-05 2.3537E-05 3.6187E-04
00?111?1 00011111 9.4148E-05 2.3537E-05 3.6187E-04
00?11?11 00011111 9.4148E-05 2.3537E-05 3.6187E-04
00?1?111 00011111 9.4148E-05 2.3537E-05 3.6187E-04
00??1111 00011111 9.4148E-05 2.3537E-05 3.6187E-04
0?01111? 00011111 9.4148E-05 2.3537E-05 3.6187E-04
0?0111?1 00011111 9.4148E-05 2.3537E-05 3.6187E-04
0?011?11 00011111 9.4148E-05 2.3537E-05 3.6187E-04
0?01?111 00011111 9.4148E-05 2.3537E-05 3.6187E-04
0?0?1111 00011111 9.4148E-05 2.3537E-05 3.6187E-04
0??11111 00011111 9.4148E-05 2.3537E-05 3.6187E-04
?001111? 00011111 9.4148E-05 2.3537E-05 3.6187E-04
?00111?1 00011111 9.4148E-05 2.3537E-05 3.6187E-04
?0011?11 00011111 9.4148E-05 2.3537E-05 3.6187E-04
?001?111 00011111 9.4148E-05 2.3537E-05 3.6187E-04
?00?1111 00011111 9.4148E-05 2.3537E-05 3.6187E-04
?0?11111 00011111 9.4148E-05 2.3537E-05 3.6187E-04
??011111 00011111 9.4148E-05 2.3537E-05 3.6187E-04
3 erasures
00011??? 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
0001?1?? 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
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Received codeword Decode P(y|x1) P(x1,y) H(x1,y)
0001??1? 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
0001???1 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
000?11?? 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
000?1?1? 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
000?1??1 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
000??11? 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
000??1?1 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
000???11 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
00?111?? 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
00?11?1? 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
00?11??1 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
00?1?11? 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
00?1?1?1 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
00?1??11 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
00??111? 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
00??11?1 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
00??1?11 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
00???111 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
0?0111?? 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
0?011?1? 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
0?011??1 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
0?01?11? 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
0?01?1?1 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
0?01??11 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
0?0?111? 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
0?0?11?1 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
0?0?1?11 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
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Received codeword Decode P(y|x1) P(x1,y) H(x1,y)
0?0??111 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
0??1111? 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
0??111?1 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
0??11?11 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
0??1?111 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
0???1111 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
?00111?? 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
?0011?1? 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
?0011??1 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
?001?11? 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
?001?1?1 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
?001??11 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
?00?111? 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
?00?11?1 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
?00?1?11 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
?00??111 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
?0?1111? 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
?0?111?1 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
?0?11?11 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
?0?1?111 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
?0??1111 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
??01111? 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
??0111?1 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
??011?11 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
??01?111 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
??0?1111 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
???11111 00011111 9.5099E-07 2.3774E-07 5.2314E-006
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Received codeword Decode P(y|x1) P(x1,y) H(x1,y)
4 erasures
0001???? 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
000?1??? 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
000??1?? 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
000???1? 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
000????1 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
00?11??? 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
00?1?1?? 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
00?1??1? 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
00?1???1 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
00??11?? 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
00??1?1? 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
00??1??1 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
00???11? 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
00???1?1 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
00????11 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
0?011??? 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
0?01?1?? 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
0?01??1? 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
0?01???1 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
0?0?11?? 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
0?0?1?1? 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
0?0?1??1 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
0?0??11? 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
0?0??1?1 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
0?0???11 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
000111?? 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
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Received codeword Decode P(y|x1) P(x1,y) H(x1,y)
0??11?1? 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
0??11??1 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
0??1?11? 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
0??1?1?1 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
0??1??11 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
0???111? 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
0???11?1 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
0???1?11 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
0????111 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
?0011??? 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
?001?1?? 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
?001??1? 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
?001???1 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
?00?11?? 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
?00?1?1? 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
?00?1??1 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
?00??11? 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
?00??1?1 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
?00???11 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
?0?111?? 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
?0?11?1? 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
?0?11??1 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
?0?1?11? 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
?0?1?1?1 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
?0?1??11 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
?0??111? 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
?0??11?1 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
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Received codeword Decode P(y|x1) P(x1,y) H(x1,y)
?0??1?11 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
?0???111 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
??0111?? 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
??011?1? 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
??011??1 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
??01?11? 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
??01?1?1 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
??01??11 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
??0?111? 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
??0?11?1 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
??0?1?11 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
??0??111 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
???1111? 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
???111?1 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
???11?11 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
???1?111 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
????1111 00011111 9.6060E-009 2.4015E-009 6.8763E-008
5 erasures
000????? 00000000 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
00?1???? 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
00??1??? 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
00???1?? 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
00????1? 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
00?????1 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
0?01???? 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
0?0?1??? 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
0?0??1?? 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
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Received codeword Decode P(y|x1) P(x1,y) H(x1,y)
0?0???1? 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
0?0????1 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
0??11??? 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
0??1?1?? 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
0??1??1? 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
0??1???1 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
0???11?? 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
0???1?1? 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
0???1??1 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
0????11? 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
0????1?1 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
0?????11 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
?001???? 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
?00?1??? 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
?00??1?? 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
?00???1? 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
?00????1 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
?0?11??? 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
?0?1?1?? 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
?0?1??1? 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
?0?1???1 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
?0??11?? 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
?0???11? 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
?0???1?1 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
?0????11 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
??011??? 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
??01?1?? 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
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Received codeword Decode P(y|x1) P(x1,y) H(x1,y)
??01??1? 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
??01???1 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
??0?11?? 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
??0?1?1? 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
??0?1??1 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
??0??11? 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
??0??1?1 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
??0???11 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
???111?? 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
???11?1? 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
???11??1 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
???1?11? 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
???1?1?1 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
???1??11 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
????111? 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
????11?1 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
????1?11 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
?????111 00011111 9.7030E-011 2.4257E-011 8.5539E-010
6 erasures
00?????? 00000000 9.801E-013 2.4503E-013 1.0265E-011
0?0????? 00000000 9.801E-013 2.4503E-013 1.0265E-011
0??1???? 00011111 9.801E-013 2.4503E-013 1.0265E-011
0???1??? 00011111 9.801E-013 2.4503E-013 1.0265E-011
0????1?? 00011111 9.801E-013 2.4503E-013 1.0265E-011
0?????1? 00011111 9.801E-013 2.4503E-013 1.0265E-011
0??????1 00011111 9.801E-013 2.4503E-013 1.0265E-011
?00????? 00000000 9.801E-013 2.4503E-013 1.0265E-011
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Received codeword Decode P(y|x1) P(x1,y) H(x1,y)
?0?1???? 00011111 9.801E-013 2.4503E-013 1.0265E-011
?0??1??? 00011111 9.801E-013 2.4503E-013 1.0265E-011
?0???1?? 00011111 9.801E-013 2.4503E-013 1.0265E-011
?0????1? 00011111 9.801E-013 2.4503E-013 1.0265E-011
?0?????1 00011111 9.801E-013 2.4503E-013 1.0265E-011
??01???? 00011111 9.801E-013 2.4503E-013 1.0265E-011
??0?1??? 00011111 9.801E-013 2.4503E-013 1.0265E-011
??0??1?? 00011111 9.801E-013 2.4503E-013 1.0265E-011
??0???1? 00011111 9.801E-013 2.4503E-013 1.0265E-011
??0????1 00011111 9.801E-013 2.4503E-013 1.0265E-011
???11??? 00011111 9.801E-013 2.4503E-013 1.0265E-011
???1?1?? 00011111 9.801E-013 2.4503E-013 1.0265E-011
???1??1? 00011111 9.801E-013 2.4503E-013 1.0265E-011
???1???1 00011111 9.801E-013 2.4503E-013 1.0265E-011
????11?? 00011111 9.801E-013 2.4503E-013 1.0265E-011
????1?1? 00011111 9.801E-013 2.4503E-013 1.0265E-011
????1??1 00011111 9.801E-013 2.4503E-013 1.0265E-011
?????11? 00011111 9.801E-013 2.4503E-013 1.0265E-011
?????1?1 00011111 9.801E-013 2.4503E-013 1.0265E-011
??????11 00011111 9.801E-013 2.4503E-013 1.0265E-011
7 erasures
0??????? 00000000 9.9E-015 2.475E-015 1.2009E-013
?0?????? 00000000 9.9E-015 2.475E-015 1.2009E-013
??0????? 00000000 9.9E-015 2.475E-015 1.2009E-013
???1???? 00011111 9.9E-015 2.475E-015 1.2009E-013
????1??? 00011111 9.9E-015 2.475E-015 1.2009E-013
?????1?? 00011111 9.9E-015 2.475E-015 1.2009E-013
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Received codeword Decode P(y|x1) P(x1,y) H(x1,y)
??????1? 00011111 9.9E-015 2.475E-015 1.2009E-013
???????1 00011111 9.9E-015 2.475E-015 1.2009E-013
8 erasures
???????? 00000 1E-016 2.5E-017 1.3787E-015
Table B.1: BEC Received vector decodes, probabilities and joint entropy contributions
for BKLC[8,2,5] with P(A) = 0.01
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Appendix C
6-bit Codeword Stubs for Ham[7,4,3]
Codeword C0 = 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
Codeword C1 = 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 1 1 1 0
0 0 1 1 1 0
0 0 1 1 1 0
Codeword C2 = 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 1 1
Codeword C3 = 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
0 0 1 1 1 0
0 0 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 0 1
0 0 1 1 0 1
0 0 1 1 0 1
0 1 1 1 0 1
0 1 1 1 0 1
190
Codeword C4 = 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 1
1 0 0 1 0 1
Codeword C5 = 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 1 1 1
0 1 0 0 1 1
0 1 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 1 1
Codeword C6 = 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
0 1 1 0 1 1
0 1 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 1 0
Codeword C7 = 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 0 0
0 1 1 1 0 0
0 1 1 1 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0
Codeword C8 = 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 1
Codeword C9 = 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
1 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 1
1 0 0 1 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 1
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Codeword C10 = 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0
Codeword C11 = 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
1 0 1 1 0 1
1 0 1 1 0 0
1 0 1 1 1 0
1 0 1 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 0 1 0
Codeword C12 = 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 0 1
1 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 1
1 1 0 0 0 1
1 1 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 1 0
Codeword C13 = 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
1 1 0 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 0
1 0 1 1 0 0
1 0 1 1 0 0
Codeword C14 = 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
1 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 1
1 1 1 0 0 1
1 1 1 0 0 1
1 1 0 0 0 1
1 1 0 0 0 1
1 1 0 0 0 1
Codeword C15 = 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
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Appendix E
Codeword stub decodes and probabilities
for Hamming[7,4,3]
Codeword stub Decode Output probabilities
p(y j)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.05886
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00121
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00121
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0.00945
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00121
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.00945
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0.02592
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0.01768
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00121
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0.02592
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0.00121
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0.00259
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0.00121
0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0.02592
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0.03415
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0.00945
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Codeword stub Decode Output probabilities
p(y j)
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00121
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.00945
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.00945
0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0.03415
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0.00945
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.03415
0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01768
0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0.00945
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0.02592
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0.00121
0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0.02592
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0.01768
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0.02592
0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0.01768
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0.00945
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.00121
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00121
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.00945
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0.01768
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.02592
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0.01768
1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.02592
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0.00121
1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.02592
1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0.00945
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Codeword stub Decode Output probabilities
p(y j)
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.01768
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0.03415
1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0.00945
1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0.03415
1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0.00945
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0.00945
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.00121
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0.00945
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0.03415
1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0.02592
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0.00121
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0.02592
1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0.00121
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0.02592
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.00121
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0.01768
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0.02592
1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0.00945
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.00121
1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0.00945
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.00121
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.00121
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.05886
Table E.1: Received stub decodes and probabilities for Hamming[7,4,3] with pe = 0.01
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Abstract—Equivocation gives a measure of the average level
of ambiguity of a received signal and the level of security
that a code can offer. The development of a software solution
using GPU parallel processing to calculate the equivocation more
efficiently enables values for longer code lengths to be calculated.
Equivocation values for various codes and their expansions are
compared and inferences drawn about their relative security.
I. INTRODUCTION
One metric of a code’s secrecy is its equivocation. By com-
paring the equivocation of different codes and modifications of
those codes, codes with higher levels of equivocation can be
identified. Since such a process can be very computationally
intensive, a method for calculating the equivocation using par-
allel processing was developed. Whilst others [1],[2] have used
equivocation calculations to compare and construct codes and
improve code secrecy, especially involving syndrome coding,
none have previously done so using parallel processing.
II. CODES AND EQUIVOCATION
A binary, linear code is constructed from symbols belong-
ing to the binary field F2 (also known as the Galois Field of
2, GF2) [3] in which any linear combination of codewords is
also a codeword.
Equivocation (or the conditional entropy) describes the av-
erage ambiguity of a received signal [4]. It represents the
information loss of the channel going from input to output.
The probabilities of input messages (X) and output messages
(Y) can be used to calculate a set of entropies. In turn, these
entropies can be used to calculate the equivocation of the code.
For each given input message, the conditional probabilities
Pr(y | x) of each decoded message can be calculated. From
the conditional probabilities, the joint probabilities Pr(X,Y )
can be calculated. The entropy of an information source is
given by equation 1:
Hr(X) = −
∑
i
Pr(xi) log(Pr(xi)) (1)
Similarly the joint entropy of an information source and output
is given by equation 2:
Hr(X,Y ) = −
∑
i,j
Pr(xi, yj) log(Pr(xi, yj)) (2)
The joint entropy is the sum of the source entropy and the
conditional entropy. Hence the equivocation (or conditional
entropy) can be found from equation 3 :
Hr(Y |X) = Hr(X,Y )−Hr(X) (3)
The equivocation for an (n, k, d) code where n=codeword
length, k=message length and d=minimum distance of the
code, can be calculated using the method:
For one message and its codeword,
1) Add successively weighted error vectors.
2) Note for which errors each syndrome is obtained
first. These are the errors that can be correctly
corrected.
3) Operating on batches of codewords at a time, add
the 2n−k error vectors to each of the 2k codewords
in turn
4) Record the weights and probabilities of the resulting
received codewords.
5) Use these 2n probabilities to find the equivocation.
III. IMPLEMENTATION AND PARALLELISATION OF
CALCULATIONS
Early iterations of an efficient program to calculate the
equivocation of a code employed linear programming. This
created a need to call sections of code many times. Shoup’s
Number Theory Library “NTL” [5] was used extensively
during this phase, primarily for vector and matrix manipulation
over the GF2 field.
The high volume of calculations needed to evaluate the equiv-
ocation of a code of any significant length means that on
a standard laptop or desktop computer, the length of time
needed to run a calculation is the dominant limiting factor.
When performing the calculation via a linear process, the
implementation could calculate the equivocation for codes of
length n < 32 but little more. To overcome this, stages of the
calculation needed to be performed in parallel.
To parallelise the calculation, a computer capable of running
Nvidia’s Cuda architecture and programming model was used.
CUDA (Compute Unified Device Architecture) [6] is a par-
allel computing platform and programming model created by
Nvidia. It is implemented by computers with Cuda-capable
Nvidia GPUs, with the main CPU acting as the ’host’ for the
linear component of a program which then delegates respon-
sibility for running parallelised sections of code to the GPU
’device’. Different combinations of GPUs and Cuda versions
have different capabilities. To write and compile the Cuda
specific code, Nsight for Eclipse was used as an enhanced
Integrated Development Environment, along with the Nvidia
Cuda Compiler NVCC.
Once compiled, the linear part of the program is run on the host
CPU. The part of the program to be executed in parallel by the
GPU device is similar in structure to a function and is called a
kernel. Each instance of the kernel is called a thread. The Cuda
architecture enables multiple threads to be run concurrently,
grouped into blocks.
Limitations on memory capacity and processing speed en-
forced compromises and constraints on block sizes and the
grouping together of blocks into batches. A set-up with
compute capability 3.5 will restrict the maximum number of
threads per block to 210. Similarly, a maximum of (231 − 1)
blocks are permitted. This implies a maximum of (241 − 210)
threads per kernel call. In practice however, the dynamic
limitations of how much contiguous memory can be allocated
to a single variable pointer meant that significantly smaller
batches of blocks had to be used in order to prevent memory
overflow.
IV. CUDA CODING
A Cuda kernel [7] called getWts can be called by the
CPU host by the following code:
getWts<<<*blocks,*threads>>>(d_Ctx,
d_EV, d_powK, d_powNK, d_n, d_wts);
The triple angled brackets indicate that the function is a
kernel to be run on the GPU device and define the number
of blocks and threads to be created by each instance of the
kernel. Parameters in the brackets are pointer variables to
be used by the kernel. The code for the kernel to be run
in parallel by the device is indicated by the __global__
function.
__global__ void getWts(int* Ctx, int* EV, long*
powK, long* powNK, int* n, int* wts)
{
long id = blockIdx.x * blockDim.x
+ threadIdx.x;
long wt = 0;
for (long i = 0; i < *powNK; i++ )
{
....
}
}
The values held by variables such as blockDim.x,
blockIdx.x and threadIdx.x identify the number of
threads per block and the identity of the block or thread being
executed. This enables each individual thread to access the
specific data that it requires.
V. RESULTS
The use of parallel processing enabled calculations to be
performed for codewords of length up to 40, an improvement
of 8 bits over the linear method. The calculation time is
dependent upon many factors, including the message length
k, the codeword length n, the number of threads per block and
blocks per batch and the structure of the calculation program.
Independent runs of calculations for increasing lengths of
k and n were performed. A graph of the times taken to
calculate equivocation values for some Best Known Linear
Codes (BKLCs) of message length k=15 and increasing values
of n is shown in figure 1. The BKLCs used were generated
using Magma software from the University of Sydney [8].
The calculations that were performed for the probabilities 0
to 0.5 in 0.05 increments, with 0.01 as an additional value.
Many of the calculations were subsequently re-performed for
probabilities 0 to 0.5 in 0.01 increments in order to give more
accurate and smoother output graphs.
A graph of the times taken to calculate equivocation values for
Fig. 1. Time to calculate equivocation for codes of message length k=15 for
different code lengths(n)
some BKLCs of code length n=30 and increasing values of k
are shown in figure 2. It can be seen that for a fixed codeword
length, there is an optimal message length k that gives a
minimum calculation time. This occurs around k=20 and is due
to the calculation method used in the software. There are 210
threads in each block and 210 blocks per instance of the kernel
of the parallel component of the program. Below a message
length of k=20, the parallel component of the program has not
yet achieved maximum efficiency and above k=20, the linear
part of the program is performing an increasing proportion of
the workload. The times taken to calculate equivocation values
Fig. 2. Time to calculate equivocation for codes of length n=30 for different
message lengths(k)
for some perfect codes,their extensions and some longer codes
are shown in table I. Whilst the linear method is actually
quicker for very short length codes, the parallel method soon
becomes the preferred method, producing a result more quickly
for all code lengths where n > 10. The results for longer
length codes show that significant gains can be made, with
calculations being performed by the parallel processing method
up to 35 times quicker than by the linear method in the instance
of the BKLC(33,21,6) code.
A graph showing the normalised equivocation values of dif-
ferent perfect and extended perfect codes is shown in figure 3.
Code Linear time (s) Parallel Linear to
time (s) parallel
ratio
Hamming(7, 4, 3) 0.0174 0.068 1 : 4
Ext. Hamming (8, 4, 4) 0.021 0.084 1 : 4
Hamming(15, 11, 3) 0.991 0.147 7 : 1
Golay(23, 12, 7) 67.996 4.48 15 : 1
Ext. Golay(24, 12, 8) 238.6 17.8 13 : 1
Hamming(31, 26, 3) 33961 3809 9 : 1
BKLC(30, 20, 5) 3466 105.99 33 : 1
BKLC(31, 21, 5) 6880 238.6 29 : 1
BKLC(32, 22, 5) 13702 444 31 : 1
BKLC(33, 21, 6) 27048 780 35 : 1
BKLC(33, 23, 5) 27634 1021 27 : 1
BKLC(36, 25, 5) not reasonably calculable 6760 -
BKLC(36, 26, 4) not reasonably calculable 8878 -
BKLC(40, 27, 6) not reasonably calculable 91875 -
TABLE I. EQUIVOCATION CALCULATION TIMES FOR SOME PERFECT
CODES, THEIR EXTENSIONS AND LONGER BKLCS
Longer perfect codes generally exhibit higher levels of equiv-
Fig. 3. Normalized equivocation of some perfect codes and their extensions
ocation than shorter ones. Hamming (31,26,3) has higher nor-
malised equivocation values than Hamming (15,11,3), which in
turn, has higher values than Hamming(7,4,3). Hamming codes
also have higher equivocation values than the Golay(23,12,7)
code at lower probabilities (p(e) < 0.15). However this is
offset by the Golay code benefitting from its ability to correct
up to 3 errors whilst the Hamming codes can only correct a
single error [9].
The normalised equivocation values of some longer Best
Known Linear Codes (BKLC) in figure 4 show comparatively
little difference between the codes as code length increases.
The BKLCs used in figures 4 were chosen to demonstrate
the different lengths of time that the parallelised calculation
would take as code lengths increased. They were not known
to possess similar properties to each other, however as the code
length increases, the gradients of their respective equivocation
curves become increasingly similar to each other.
For all codes examined, the normalised equivocation is an
increasing function when expressed as a function of the
probability of error on a binary symmetric channel. How-
ever the rate of increase is often at its lowest in the range
0 ≤ p(e) ≤ 0.05, while the rate of increase is often at
its highest in the range 0.05 ≤ p(e) ≤ 0.2 . Given that it
may be common for a legitimate receiver to receive the signal
through a channel with a low probability of transmission error
and for an illegitimate receiver to receive the signal with a
markedly higher probability of transmission error, this could
Fig. 4. Normalized equivocation of longer Best Known Linear Codes
be of use when developing codes that are designed to maximise
the differences in ambiguity levels between a legitimate and
illegitimate receiver.
Such an approach enables a move away from theoretical situa-
tions where both the legitimate recipient and the eavesdropper
have a perfect channel towards situations where both channels
may involve a level of signal degradation. By accepting and
managing a level of degradation for the legitimate recipient,
more coding schemes could be made available that provide a
significantly higher level of equivocation for an eavesdropper
than for the legitimate receiver. The nature of the channels
becomes a means of providing security.
VI. EXPANDING CODES
Once a procedure for efficiently calculating the equivoca-
tion of a code has been implemented, it also encourages the
ability to compare codes and to locate and design codes with
improved levels of equivocation. As an example, consider a
modification of the simple Hamming(7,4,3) code. A single bit
of data could be replaced by a sequence of data bits, say, 4
bits long. The first three bits are randomly generated whilst
the fourth bit is chosen to give a message parity equivalent to
the data that is to be transmitted. So the data bit 0 could be
represented as (0011), each component of which is transmitted
as the first bit of 4 successively transmitted messages:
(
RandomBits︷︸︸︷
001
ParityBit︷︸︸︷
1 )
Where previously the probability of an error occurring as a
single bit was transmitted might have been quite low, for
example 0.01, now that the representation of the data bit 0 is
transmitted across more messages, the probability of an error
becomes compounded and potentially much increased. If an
x-fold expansion of a code is taken to be one in which a data
bit is represented by x-1 random bits and 1 parity check bit,
then the received data bit would be expressed in terms of the
parity of the received data bits:
Parity =
x∑
i=0
ri (4)
where ri is the i’th received bit of the code expansion. The
received data is the sum of the transmitted data and any
associated errors that occur during transmission:
ri = ti + ei (5)
where ti is the i’th bit of the expansion and ei is the associated
error. Therefore:
Parity =
x∑
i=0
ti +
x∑
i=0
ei (6)
But by design,
∑x
i=0 ti = 0 and therefore Parity =∑x
i=0 ei,so if the received message parity equals 1, then a
decoder error must have occurred.
When considering a 4-fold code expansion, the possible error
combinations that could occur range from 0000 to 1111. Given
that we only need to consider the combinations that give an
odd parity, then the probability of the 4-fold expansion being
decoded erroneously is:(
4
1
)
(1− p(e))3p(e) +
(
4
3
)
(1− p(e))p(e)3
In general for an x-fold expansion, the probability of an
incorrect decoding would be:
i≤x/2∑
i=0
(
x
2i+ 1
)
(1− p(e))x−(2i+1)p(e)2i+1
A 4-fold expansion of the Hamming code gives effective
channel probability errors as shown in table II. These effec-
Single bit probability of error 4-fold expansion probability of error
0 0
0.01 0.038816
0.05 0.17195
0.1 0.2952
0.15 0.37995
0.2 0.4352
0.25 0.46875
0.3 0.4872
0.35 0.49595
0.4 0.4992
0.45 49995
0.5 0.5
TABLE II. COMPOUNDED CHANNEL PROBABILITY ERRORS FOR A
4-FOLD CODE EXPANSION
tive channel probability errors yield normalized equivocation
values for a 4-fold expansion of the Hamming(7, 4, 3) code
plotted in figure 5, along with 2, 3 and 10-fold expansions of
the code. The figure shows that the equivocation values of code
expansions can be significantly higher than that of a simple
Hamming code. For the 10-fold expansion, a 0.01 probability
of transmission error yields a normalised equivocation level of
0.23, however an error probability of just 0.05 now yields a
normalised equivocation value of 0.897, compared to 0.1005
for the unexpanded Hamming code. If the intended recipient
has a channel probability error of 0.01, they still have a
good chance of recovering the data, whereas an illegitimate
eavesdropper with a channel error probability of 0.05 will now
need to overcome a much higher level of ambiguity in order
to recover the data. The secrecy of the data transmission has
been very significantly improved by the expansion of a simple
Hamming code. However this improved secrecy comes at a
cost; only one bit of data is transmitted for every 4 or 10 bits
of data carried by the Hamming code, reducing the data rate
significantly.
Fig. 5. Comparison of Hamming code with 2x, 3x, 4x and 10x code expansion
and BKLC(14,4)
While the Hamming(7,4,3) code with 2-fold expansion and
BKLC(14,4,7) code both effectively take 14 bits to transmit 4
bits worth of data (and therefore have the same effective code
rate), their equivocation graphs are very different. The 2-fold
expansion of the Hamming (7,4,3) code offers a significant
improvement in equivocation over the basic Hamming (7,4,3)
code, whereas the BKLC(14,4,7) code shows a significant
worsening in performance. This suggests that using code
expansions is more effective at improving equivocation than
simply using longer and longer codes.
A comparison of the equivocation of the perfect Go-
lay(23,12,7) code and two random (23,12) codes is shown in
figure 6, along with their 4-fold expansions. This shows that:
• Random codes can possess higher levels of equiv-
ocation (and therefore secrecy) than a perfect code,
although their error correcting capabilities may not be
as good.
• Normalised equivocation rates of 4-fold expansions of
the Golay and random (23,12) codes are significantly
higher than those of the original codes.
Fig. 6. Comparison of Golay(23, 12, 7) and 2 random (23, 12) codes with
4-fold expansion
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper has developed several points with regard to both
the use of parallel processing for calculating equivocation and
the comparison of equivocation values for different codes and
their variants.
• Parallel processing significantly improve equivocation
calculation times.
• Longer codes of the same family will tend to have
higher relative equivocation values.
• Largest differences in code equivocation values are
often found in the 0.01 < p(e) < 0.2 range, especially
for expanded codes.
• Differences in normalised equivocation values be-
tween codes appear to decrease as code lengths in-
crease.
• By expanding a code through using random data and
parity check bits, greater secrecy can be achieved.
• By expanding random codes, higher equivocation val-
ues can be achieved than for non-expanded codes.
• Code expansions can offer higher normalised equivo-
cation values than a code with a similar code rate.
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Abstract—Secure data transfer is often achieved by encryption.
However, if transmitting across a Binary Symmetric Channel
while an eavesdropper listens via a Wiretap Channel, the differ-
ence in signal quality can be exploited to improve the inherent
transmission secrecy. If this exploitation involves the managed
use of erasures, then the secrecy of a code transmitted across
the channel can be improved whilst simultaneously reducing the
volume of data that is transmitted.
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expansion, equivocation, erasure, graphical processing unit
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I. INTRODUCTION
Shannon’s seminal papers [1], [2] introduced equivocation
(conditional entropy) as a measure of the secrecy of the
information contained within a received signal. Other metrics
for assessing secrecy have been proposed such as the value
function [3] and the security gap [4], however Klinc’s paper
also noted that equivocation continues to be recognised as an
established metric. As such, equivocation will be used in this
work.
It is acknowledged [5] that it can be difficult to measure
or analyse equivocation. Work has been done to establish
upper and lower bounds for equivocation such as Almeida’s
use of known and unknown puncturing patterns [6], while
other techniques have been applied to specific circumstances
to calculate equivocation. These include Wickramsooriya’s
analysis of the generator matrix of the eavesdropper’s code
[7], [8] and Al-Hassan’s use of probability mass functions for
syndrome coding [9].
Zhang’s work [10], [11] constructs best binary equivocation
codes for syndrome coding in the Binary Symmetric Channel
(BSC) [12], however the direct evaluation of the equivocation
of a code suitable for a channel having erasures has received
little attention. The consideration of all possible input mes-
sages to a transmission system and all possible decoded output
messages is highly numerically intensive. An [n, k, d] code
(n = code length, k = message length, d = min. distance)
must consider 2n error vectors for each of the 2k messages.
This was addressed by the author in [13] when GPU parallel
processing techniques were used to calculate the equivocation
values for codes and their expansions more efficiently. The use
of GPU-based parallel processing permitted calculation times
up to 35 times quicker than with traditional linear techniques.
Source
Intentional
Erasures
Encoder BSC
Wiretap
Channel
Decoder
Fig. 1. Code Transmission across a BSC with erasures, subject to wiretap
1
0
x y?
Fig. 2. Deliberate Erasures
This paper extends that work to consider the normalised
equivocation of codes that include intentionally erased bits.
An erasure of a data bit is where the value of the data bit
is not known but the location of the bit is known. The Binary
Erasure Channel (BEC) is an idealised channel that uses
erasures [14]. Equivocation of BECs in a wiretap environment
[15] has been examined [16], [17], [18], however here we
look at the intentional erasure of one or more bits of data
ahead of transmission across a BSC (IE+BSC) within a wiretap
environment, shown in Fig. 1. If erasures of a transmitted
symbol x ∈ X are introduced for the IE+BSC then the value
of a received symbol y ∈ Y in a specified location is unknown
as in Fig. 2 and has a uniform distribution. The non-erased bits
will be susceptible to a cross-over probability of p on the BSC.
II. CALCULATION OF EQUIVOCATION
If a message of length k is encoded as codeword of length
n and s bits in known locations are then intentionally erased
ahead of transmission, the probability of a received message
having contained e errors in specific locations and the s
erasures having come from a particular combination of 0’s
and 1’s is:
p(e, s) = (1− p)(n−s)−epe × 1
2s
(1)
The joint entropy of a set of source symbols X and received
symbols Y is:
H(X,Y ) =
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
p(x, y) log
1
p(x, y)
(2)
Shannon defined secrecy as:
H(X|Y ) = H(X,Y )−H(Y ) (3)
This is evaluated as:
H(X|Y ) =
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
p(x, y) log
1
p(x, y)
−
∑
y∈Y
p(y) log
1
p(y)
(4)
The evaluation of Eqn. 4 is numerically intensive but eval-
uation for short codes is possible with modern hardware. The
normalised equivocation is the equivocation per transmitted
bit, H(X|Y )k .
III. SOFTWARE IMPLEMENTATION
The software implementation of the equivocation calcula-
tion was achieved through the use of the GPU parallel pro-
cessing capabilities afforded by the Nvidia CUDA architecture
[19], where the linear component of the program is run on the
CPU and the repetitive codeword and error vector additions
are performed in parallel on a CUDA-enabled Nvidia graphics
processor [20]. This multi-threaded approach offers significant
efficiency (and therefore time) savings over standard linear
methods. The calculations were run for a variety of binary
linear codes, including perfect Hamming and Golay codes and
best known linear codes (BKLCs) identified in [21]. Since
combinations of e errors and s erasures can be correctly
decoded provided that 2e+ s < d [22], a maximum of d− 1
erasures can be corrected. Generator and parity check matrices
for codes were generated using online Magma software [23].
IV. RESULTS
It can be seen from the BKLC[8, 2, 5] in Fig. 3 and the
Golay[23, 12, 7] code in Fig. 4 that increasing the number
of deliberately erased bits that are transmitted increases the
equivocation of the code. The curves for both 3 and 4 erasures
of the BKLC[8, 2, 5] code are co-linear i.e. transmitting the
code with either 3 or 4 erasures produces the same values of
normalised equivocation. This is because the increase from 3
to 4 erasures does not change the ability of the code to use the
26 available syndrome patterns for the detection or correction
of either errors or erasures.
The deliberate introduction of erasures to a transmission
system can, if chosen carefully, lead to a greater increase in
equivocation for an illegitimate eavesdropper than for the le-
gitimate receiver. For example with the Golay[23, 12, 7] code,
a BSC error probability of 0.01 for the legitimate receiver
and 0.10 for the eavesdropper will produce the normalised
Fig. 3. Equivocation of BKLC[8, 2, 5] code with up to 4 erasures
Fig. 4. Equivocation of Golay[23, 12, 7] code with up to 6 erasures
Legitimate receiver Eavesdropper
BSC error probability 0.01 0.10
Equivocation (with no erasures) 0.00015 0.20496
Equivocation (with 2 erasures) 0.00147 0.29394
Increase in equivocation 0.00132 0.08898
TABLE I
EQUIVOCATION OF GOLAY[23, 12, 7] CODE ON BSC WITH AND WITHOUT
2 ERASURES
equivocation levels in Table I for scenarios with no erasures
and with 2 erasures.
In this case, the deliberate introduction of 2 erasures has
increased the normalised equivocation for the eavesdropper
by a greater amount (0.089) than for the legitimate receiver
(0.0013).
However, this does not always hold. Consider the
Golay[23, 12, 7] code with an error probability of 0.05 for the
legitimate receiver and 0.20 for the eavesdropper for scenarios
with no erasures and 6 erasures, shown in Table II.
In this case, the equivocation has increased for the legiti-
mate receiver by a great amount (0.144) than it has for the
eavesdropper (0.069).
Fig. 5 highlights some differences between the use of
code expansion and the use of erasures, in this case for the
Golay[23, 12, 7] code. n-fold code expansion was achieved by
Legitimate receiver Eavesdropper
BSC error probability 0.05 0.20
Equivocation (with no erasures) 0.03317 0.64453
Equivocation (with 2 erasures) 0.17759 0.71385
Increase 0.14442 0.06932
TABLE II
EQUIVOCATION OF GOLAY[23, 12, 7] CODE ON BSC WITH AND WITHOUT
6 ERASURES
Fig. 5. Equivocation of Golay[23, 12, 7] code with 6 erasures versus 2-fold
code expansion
replacing a single data bit with a sequence of n − 1 random
bits and an n’th bit that gives a message parity equivalent to
the data to be transmitted. For all error probabilities above
0.05, code expansion offers greater increases in equivocation
than the deliberate introduction of erasures. However below
0.05, the use of multiple erasures gives a greater increase
in equivocation. Therefore at close to 0.05 for the Golay
code, there is a changeover point above which a 2-fold
code expansion gives higher equivocation levels and below
which the use of 6 erasures gives higher equivocation. Either
adaptation to the code carries a penalty - the use of code
expansion increases the number of transmitted bit dramatically
whereas the deliberate introduction of erasures decreases the
error detecting and correcting capability of the code.
V. CONCLUSION
In addition to the expansion of codes previously discussed,
erasures can be used as an alternative mechanism for in-
creasing the equivocation of a code over a Binary Symmetric
Channel and thereby its average ambiguity and secrecy.
• Increases in equivocation in the erasure examples given
are significant but not as great as those increases shown
by the use of code expansions
• Some increases in the number of bits erased do not
necessarily lead to an increase in equivocation
• The introduction of erasures to a channel can potentially
lead to a greater increase in equivocation for an eaves-
dropper than it does for the legitimate receiver.
• A comparison between code expansions and erasures can
show situations where, for a particular error probability,
there is a changeover point in which method produces the
higher equivocation values e.g. at around p(e) = 0.05 for
the Golay[23, 12, 7] code.
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